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A bstract
This thesis addresses the issue of policy effects on domestic and international 
migration, considering in particular the case of Mexican migration. The first 
essay investigates the effect of U.S. border enforcement on the net flow of 
Mexican undocumented migration. Such effect is theoretically ambiguous, 
given th a t increases in border controls deter prospective migrants from cross­
ing the border illegally, but lengthen the U.S. permanence of current ones. 
It estimates border enforcement’s net impact on migration inflow using a 
sample of potential and current illegal migrants. U.S. border enforcement 
significantly reduces the net flow of undocumented migration. However, the 
reduction in net flow is more than half the size of the decrease in inflow.
The second essay models the short and medium-run impact of aid on 
migration, considering alternatively the effect of unconditional and condi­
tional cash transfers to  financially constrained households. D ata from the 
evaluation of a Mexican development program, Progresa, are used to esti­
m ate the effect of the grant on migration. The empirical analysis shows tha t 
the program is associated with an increase in international migration, which 
is also a positive function of the potential transfer size. Conditional grants 
in the form of secondary school subsidies reduce the short-term  migration 
probability. Progresa does not seem to increase medium-term migration.
The final chapter reviews the approaches employed to estimate Treat­
ment on the Treated Effects (TTEs) using experimental da ta  in the presence 
of non-compliers. It discusses the types of parameters th a t can be identified 
using the Progresa data. It uncovers new parameters tha t have not been 
estimated so far, based on the fact tha t a group of eligible households did 
not receive the program transfer in the initial stages of its implementation. 
It proposes alternative estimating procedures to identify counterfactuals in 
the presence of non-compliers for users of the Progresa data. It complements 
the theoretical part with an empirical application by estimating the effect 
of Progresa on school enrolment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The first two chapters of this thesis study the impact that different policies 
have on both international and domestic migration. In particular, the ques­
tions I try  to answer are whether enforcing the border of the destination 
country reduces the net flow of illegal immigration from the country of ori­
gin; whether there are alternative means to achieve this objective, and, in 
particular, how aid programs affects current and future domestic and inter­
national migration. The final part of my thesis deals with the estimation of 
treatm ent on the treated effects (TTEs) in the experimental data set used 
in the second chapter. I present a new set of identifying assumptions, differ­
ent from the ones normally made by the users of these data, and I uncover 
several new param eters tha t have clear policy relevance.
The focus of the empirical analysis is on Mexican migration because of 
its interesting features. Mexico is a country where both domestic and in­
ternational labour migration occurs. Given the geographic proximity and 
the large wage differential, almost all international migrants are directed 
to the United States. The bulk of Mexican migration to the U.S. is illegal 
and composed of highly mobile temporary movers, who may migrate several 
times over the life cycle. The size of the phenomenon is considerable: ac­
cording to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, some 5 million 
undocumented Mexicans lived in the United States in 2000, 69 percent of
12
the overall illegal population. Nevertheless, the theoretical conclusions can 
be easily extended to different sets of countries.
1.1 U .S . border enforcem ent and the net flow of  
M exican illegal m igration
Especially since the mid 1980s, the U.S. government has been exerting con­
siderable effort to discourage illegal immigration. The 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act has introduced employer’s sanctions for hiring un­
documented workers and devoted more resources to the apprehension of 
aliens. The tougher enforcement has resulted in substantial increases in 
border patrol. Aliens apprehended trying to cross the southern U.S. border 
are in most cases not prosecuted, given the high associated administrative 
costs. They are instead driven back to the Mexican side of the border, from 
which they normally soon attem pt re-entry.
To date, there is a small but growing literature tha t tries to evaluate the 
effect on border enforcement on the inflow of illegal migration. However, 
these studies suffer from two limitations: first, they try  to infer the deterrent 
effect of border controls on prospective migrants by looking at changes in 
border apprehensions. The relationship between the latter and the size 
of migration is not straightforward, because of the possibility of repeated 
border-crossing attem pts within a single trip. Moreover, in order to assess 
the policy impact on the size of the undocumented U.S. residents, one has 
to understand how the behaviour of current illegal migrants is affected by 
changes in border enforcement. Tougher policing of the border translates 
in higher migration costs. Higher costs may reduce the number of people 
entering the United States illegally, but at the same time it is likely to 
lengthen migration spells, because it takes longer to reap a positive return 
from the trip. Also, if undocumented migrants who are currently in the U.S. 
anticipate future tougher enforcement, they may increase the duration of the 
current migration knowing tha t future trips will be more costly. Since higher
13
border policing reduces both the inflow and the outflow of illegal migration, 
its effect on migration net inflow, hence stock, is ambiguous and it depends 
on the size of potential and current undocumented migrant populations and 
on how sensitive to changes of border patrol each group’s behaviour is.
The empirical analysis estimates the effect tha t changes in the intensity 
of border enforcement between 1972 and 1993 have on both the U.S. inflow 
and outflow of illegal Mexican migrants modelling individual transitions be­
tween two states: potential and current illegal migrant. The estimations are 
undertaken using a unique data  set tha t merges aggregate border enforce­
ment linewatch data with information on a sample of illegal potential and 
de facto migrants from the Mexican Migration Project. The shortcomings 
associated with the particular design of the survey are extensively discussed. 
The econometric model accounts for the endogeneity of border controls using 
Drugs Enforcement Administration budget as instrumental variable. Af­
ter computing the size of the illegal undocumented inflow, the estimated 
marginal effects are used to measure the effect of a marginal change in en­
forcement on the number of individuals who are respectively deterred from 
migrating illegally and from returning to Mexico from an undocumented 
U.S. migration. I show that the deterrent effect is small but significant, in 
line with the existing literature. When the outflow effect is included as well, 
the size of the net impact is still positive, but halved. Hence, estimates of 
the effectiveness of border patrol based on its reduction in inflow are grossly 
overestimating its true effect. I provide back-of-the envelope measures of 
the marginal cost of reducing the stock of migration by one person, which 
amounts to a few hundred dollars. Furthermore, an additional cost of this 
policy is its contribution to the creation of a more permanent undocumented 
resident population.
14
1.2 A id  and m igration: an analysis o f the im pact 
of Progresa on th e  tim ing and size of M exican  
m igration
In the current analysis I study the impact of aid policies on current and 
future domestic and international migration. In particular, I consider the 
effects of an unconditional transfer and of a conditional schooling subsidy. 
Transfers to prospective migrants reduce the economic disparities between 
home and the destination location, lowering the incentives to leave. How­
ever, if individuals or households are credit constrained, the grants may be 
used to finance new migrations. The latter fact may have sizeable effects, 
given th a t the imperfection of capital markets is one acute problem faced 
by indigent families in developing and middle-income countries. The con­
ditional transfer that requires recipients to stay in the home country may 
reduce migration in the short-term. Nevertheless, individuals may revert 
to migrating once the subsidy ends. Future migration levels may even be 
higher than in the zero-aid scenario, if recipients save in order to fund future 
trips.
A development policy that has all the aforementioned features is Pro­
gresa, a program that targets poor Mexican rural households. Among the 
various components of the program, there are a (smaller) unconditional nu­
trition support grant, and then some (cumulatively larger) transfers condi­
tional upon attendance of the last four grades of primary school and first 
three grades of secondary school, all paid bi-monthly. The subsidy to pri­
mary school attendance is roughly equivalent to an unconditional transfer, 
since primary school enrolment is very high. The secondary school grant 
” conditionality” constraint is instead binding for the majority of potential 
recipients, as secondary school enrolment is much lower.
The effect of aid policies on migration is estimated by using the data 
collected for the evaluation of Progresa, whose characteristics are discussed 
below. The main findings in this chapter support the hypothesis that credit
15
constraints limit migration: indeed, unconditional transfers are associated 
with increased international migration, partly due to new trips being fi­
nanced or to households substituting (cheaper but with low-yielding) do­
mestic migration for (costlier but with a higher benefit) international one. 
At the same time, grants to secondary school attendance are associated with 
a reduction in migration.
1.3 E stim ation  of treatm ent on the treated  effects 
using the experim ental sam ple of Progresa
This chapter deals with the estimation of treatm ent on the treated effects 
(TTEs) using the Progresa data. Progresa is an aid program implemented 
in Mexico, aimed at fostering education, health and nutrition among poor 
households. The data collected for its evaluation consists of 506 villages, 186 
of which are randomized out. Poor residents of these villages are not admin­
istered the programme until 2000. All households are classified into poor 
and non-poor according to the information collected in the pre-programme 
September 1997 census of Progresa localities. All residents of both control 
and treatm ent villages are then interviewed at biannual intervals. Detailed 
data  are collected on health, consumption, income and employment, edu­
cation and migration at least in one of the two annual surveys. W ith a 
sample size ranging between 22,000 and 25,000 households in both control 
and treatm ent villages, complete coverage of all locality residents, a panel 
of up to five waves, of which one or two prior to the implementation of the 
programme, and the exogenous variation induced by the randomization, the 
Progresa data  have attracted the attention of scholars and researchers.
One flaw of this data set is tha t counterfactuals for a large sub-group of 
eligible households in treatm ent communities could not be identified. This 
has normally resulted into the exclusion of part of the available data, which 
are simply om itted from the analysis. The contribution of the current ex­
ercise consists of recognizing tha t this group is composed by four different
16
subsets; suggesting ways to identify counterfactuals for three of these sub­
sets; presenting alternative hypotheses to identify TTEs in the presence of 
non-compliers; providing an empirical application by estimating TTEs on 
school enrolment for all subsets of households.
The subgroup of households for which a counterfactual could not be 
identified can be divided into the following categories:
- ’’True” beneficiaries, i.e. households who are eligible to participate to 
the program, and receive the treatm ent, provided tha t they comply with its 
requirements.
- Standard non-compliers, th a t is households who, although eligible, de­
cide not to participate to the program. The standard approach to estimate 
TTEs in the presence of non-compliers consists of either making some hy­
potheses on the likely program effect on this group, or finding exclusions 
restrictions to identify a valid set of counterfactuals in the control group.
- ’’Forgotten” households who, despite their eligibility to the program, 
are excluded from it because of administrative errors. These households 
know they belong to the treatm ent group but do not receive any subsidies, 
irrespective of their compliance with the program rules.
- Households who begin being recorded in the surveys after the program 
begins, hence who are not included in the program although they have the 
required characteristics to be included in the treatm ent group (i.e. they are 
classified as poor).
I discuss the relevance of the estimable parameters, and suggest possible 
applications.
1.4 C onclusion
This thesis seeks to contribute to the migration literature by assessing the 
impacts of two existing and popular policies on both international and do­
mestic Mexican migration. It is a first step towards a comparative eval­
uation of the effectiveness of the policies, as well as an attem pt to focus 
on the indirect effects tha t aid programs to developing countries may have.
17
The methodological contribution is very specific, because it regards one 
particular sample. Nevertheless, it is hopefully going to provide with new 
parameters tha t will enable researchers to answer a richer set of questions.
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Chapter 2
U .S. Border Enforcement 
and the N et Inflow of 
M exican Illegal M igration
2.1 Introduction
This paper studies the relationship between illegal immigration to the United 
States and the enforcement of its borders. Border enforcement has been 
a cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy, especially since the second half 
of the 1980s. Understanding the impact of border controls on the flow of 
illegal Mexican migration is of primary importance for several reasons. First, 
Mexican nationals accounts for 69 percent of the total unauthorized resident 
population of the United States. Second, most illegal Mexican entries occur 
through the southern U.S. border. Third, undocumented Mexican migrants 
tend to be very mobile and to undertake multiple U.S. trips over the life 
cycle. Donato et al. (1992), for instance, show that migrating at least once 
increases the likelihood of undertaking future migrations.
The undocumented resident population of Mexican nationality has grown 
from 1.1 millions in 1980 to 2 millions in 1990 and 4.8 in 2000 (U.S. Census, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service), with an average annual growth of
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90,000 units in the 1980s and 280,000 ones in the 1990s. At the same time, 
the intensity of border enforcement has nearly trebled between the early 
1970s and the mid 1990s. The allocated resources to border patrol have 
been growing steadily especially since the 1986 Immigration Reform and 
Control Act. In 2002, the immigration enforcement appropriation totalled 
two billion dollars.
The large growth in undocumented migration despite the higher expen­
diture in border controls questions the effectiveness of such policy. I argue 
th a t tight border controls may have perverse effects on the net flow of il­
legal migration because they influence the behaviour of both prospective 
and current migrants: while enforcement increases may deter prospective 
migrants from crossing the border illegally, the optimal U.S. permanence of 
current ones may be lengthier because of the higher costs of future migra­
tions. This effect may be of a relevant magnitude, given the large size and 
the high mobility of such group (see Massey and Singer (1995) for estimates 
of annual inflow and outflow of U.S.-based Mexican migrants.). If tougher 
border enforcement lengthens migration duration by raising its cost, patrol 
of the border might, to some extent, indirectly encourage the formation of 
a more permanent undocumented resident community.
This fact provides an additional explanation for the disproportionate 
resources allocated to border versus interior enforcement. If the effectiveness 
of border patrol is measured by its reduction in undocumented entries only, 
neglecting its impact on the outflow of migrants, the resulting estimate will 
overstate border enforcement’s true effect on migration net inflow. This 
causes a larger than optimal resource allocation to border controls.
Although there is awareness of these issues both at the theoretical and 
anecdotal level, the existing literature has focussed almost entirely on border 
enforcement’s impact of migration inflow only, neglecting to assess its effect 
on the outflow of illegal migrants. I suspect this is partially due to the 
scarcity of data  on undocumented migrations.
This paper seeks to understand the impact that border policing has
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on the net inflow of illegal Mexican migrants, contributing to the existing 
literature in several ways. First, it proves how the impact of border patrol on 
migration net flow is theoretically ambiguous, and how optimal enforcement 
is a function of the stock of the U.S. undocumented resident population.
Second, it presents a model where multiple migrations over the life cycle 
are the optimal choice of utility maximizing rational agents with complete 
information. To my knowledge, multiple migrations have been explained as 
the consequence of shocks or of imperfect information. I show that if absence 
from home entails a positive cost tha t increases over time, repeated, short­
term  migrations may maximize inter-temporal utility even in the presence 
of a sunk cost of migration. This setting permits us to endogenise migration 
duration.
Third, it provides direct estimates of the effect of border enforcement on 
the net inflow of undocumented Mexican migrants. This is the first paper 
in which such estimates are provided. This is achieved by merging border 
enforcement information with individual-level data on undocumented migra­
tion from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP71). Hence, it is possible to 
test border controls’ effects on both the likelihood and the duration of ille­
gal migrations. The obtained estimates are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions. Border enforcement has a significant deterrent effect, as it dis­
courages prospective migrants from attempting an illegal trip to the United 
States. At the same time, it lengthens the U.S. permanence of current mi­
grants. My favourite set of estimates reveals that a marginal increase in 
border controls is associated with a significant reduction in the net inflow of 
undocumented Mexican migrants between 1972 and 1993. The net effect is 
roughly half the size of the inflow reduction. Hence, assessing the effective­
ness of border enforcement by analysing its deterrent effect only provides a 
gross overestimates of its true impact
Fourth, it considers how the survey design and the data structure may 
affect the estimation of the parameter of interest. This analysis, which 
may be relevant in different applications, has to my knowledge never been
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undertaken before, despite the wide use of the MMP71 sample.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing lit­
erature. Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 derives testable hy­
potheses on the impact of border enforcement on both inflow and outflow 
of undocumented migrants using a dynamic model of illegal migration with 
heterogenous costs. Section 5 illustrates the empirical specification and the 
related estimation and identification issues. Section 6 presents the results 
from the econometric analysis. It further discusses how the sample design 
may bias the estimates of the border controls coefficient. Section 7 uses 
the estimated parameter of interest and calculates the size of the undocu­
mented illegal migration to compute border patrol’s net effect on the size of 
undocumented migration, highlighting some policy implications. Section 8 
concludes.
2.2 Literature review
There is a growing literature trying to understand the relationship between 
illegal migration and border enforcement. However, the effects of border 
controls on migration net flow are scarcely known. In my opinion, there are 
a conceptual and a practical reason for the scarcity of information on the 
impact of border enforcement.
The main practical problem faced by this literature regards the difficulty 
of measuring directly the volume of flow and stock of illegal migration.1 
Records of aggregate apprehensions are available. However, only tentative 
inference can be made to estimate the magnitude of the illegal migration 
volume from this series, hence the impact of border patrol: in fact, under 
current U.S. migration law, the same individual may be arrested several 
times while trying to cross the border. If an apprehended illegal alien agrees 
on a voluntary departure, tha t person is simply driven back to the Mexican
1Warren and Passel (1987) use U.S. Census data to estimate the stock of undocu­
mented aliens. Massey and Singer (1995) obtain estimates of individual probability of 
apprehension to assess the magnitude of the net flow of illegal migration.
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side of the border. Thus number of arrests does not clearly represents the 
volume of apprehended m igrants.2 Borjas et al (1991) look at the relation 
between apprehensions and expenditure for border enforcement. Bean et 
al. (1990) assess the impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control 
Act. Espenshade (1994) tests the deterrent effect of the probability of bor­
der apprehension on the inflow of undocumented migration. Hanson and 
Spilimbergo (1999), estimate the elasticity of apprehensions with respect to 
border enforcement from a reduced-form aggregate apprehension function. 
Davila et al (2001) estimate the short and long-run deterrent effect of border 
controls.
On the conceptual side, the existing empirical literature has not fully 
acknowledged the necessity of considering enforcement’s impact on migra­
tion’s net flow, and has rather concentrated solely on the inflow, although 
there is increasing awareness of the link between migration costs and dura­
tion. All the aforementioned papers are concerned with the estimation of 
the migration inflow effect of border controls. Instead, no mention is made 
of the fact tha t rising migration costs may lengthen current illegal m igrants’ 
optimal migration duration. This fact is illustrated in Hill’s (1987) model of 
individual migration, where it is shown that higher enforcement may reduce 
the number of migrations while increasing their length. More recently, Cor­
nelius (2001) mentions the possibility tha t higher migration costs may result 
in lower mobility for undocumented individuals, once they have reached the 
destination country. The same point is made in a recent survey by The 
Economist (2002).
A notable exception in the empirical literature is constituted by the work 
of Kossoudji (1992), who uses a sample of repeated illegal Mexican migrants 
to assess the effect of past apprehension on current migration frequency and
2Espenshade (1995b) estimates the relationship between aggregate attempts and appre­
hensions using a repeated trials model of illegal migration and presents a way of obtaining 
estimates of the flow of undocumented aliens by observing the fraction of repeated ap­
prehensions of the same individuals. However, collection of this piece of information has 
been discontinued since the late 1980s.
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duration. However, the data  set she uses does not permit to distinguish 
interior from border apprehension. Furthermore, being a sample of sole 
migrants, it does not permit to estimate the deterrent effect of enforcement 
(i.e. the size of the individuals discouraged from attem pting to migrate by 
the high level of controls).
A branch of the literature questions the policy effectiveness on differ­
ent grounds from the one made above. Advocates of interior enforcement 
suspect tha t inspections to  firms in undocumented labour-intensive sectors 
might prove more successful in the eradication of illegal migration. The 
very rationale of border controls is challenged by a work by Hanson and 
Spilimbergo (2001). Their paper suggests tha t border enforcement may be 
the product of conflicting interests, as it is relaxed when the demand for 
illegal labour is high. Davila et al. (1999) argue that the disproportionate 
resource allocation favouring border versus interior enforcement is consistent 
with budget-maximizing behaviour, rather than with trying to minimize the 
stock of illegal U.S. residents.
As regards migration and individual heterogeneity, theories range from 
positive migrant self-selection in unobservables because of motivational rea­
sons to negative one, when migrations take place from a country with a wide 
income distribution (such as Mexico) to a less unequal one (Borjas (1987)). 
As concerns migration duration, the extremes of the spectrum of existing 
theories are target earning behaviour, which postulates an inverse relation­
ship between labour market skills and length of stay in the host country, and 
demand-side selection in skills, according to which unsuccessful migrants are 
forced to leave before successful ones.
2.3 The data
Table 2.1 describes the data  used, providing their means and standard de­
viations for the period of interest.
The data  used come from several different sources: border enforcement 
and aggregate apprehension data  are from unpublished records of the Immi­
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gration and Neutralization Service (INS), the Department of Justice agency 
managing border enforcement. U.S. wage and unemployment data are from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Mexican unemployment rate is from World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) data. The other Mexican macroeconomic vari­
ables used are from the Mexican National Statistical Institute (INEGI).3 
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999b) describe both enforcement and macroeco­
nomic data  in great detail.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used, November 1998 data.
1972-1993
Name Mean St. Dev. Description
Linewatch hours 2.15 0.51 Million annual hours of border control
Illegal migrations 0.037 0.188 Proportion undertaken illegal migrations
Returns 0.546 0.497 Proportion of returns from illegal migrations
US unemployment 6.84 1.30 U.S. unemployment rate
US wage in pesos 29.53 5.86 U.S. real hourly wage rate in the 
private sector, 1990 pesos
MX wage index 1.09 0.16 Mexican real hourly manufacturing wage 
index, production (1990=1)
DEA budget 495.25 241.91 Drugs Enforcement Agency real budget, 
1990 million dollars
Legalizations 25.95 43.86 Annual MMP71 Mexican legalizations
Apprehension 540.54 216.09 annual INS border apprehensions (xlOOO)
In the MMP71 sample, a panel is created from individual retrospective 
information collected from 71 communities in 13 different Mexican states 
between 1987 and 1998. Every year a number of different Mexican com­
munities (normally 5) are selected in such a way as to represent a range of 
diverse characteristics (size, ethnic composition, location and economy). In 
each of them, a randomly drawn sample of 200 households is interviewed 
between December and January.4 Heads of household are asked about their
3W ith the exception of the devaluation rate, which is from aggregate MMP71 data.
4In these months migrants tend to return home for Christmas.
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migratory experience and their labour history. Interviewees include individ­
uals with past spells of migration (both legal and illegal ones) as well as 
others who never migrated. Each year, a series of U.S.-based non-random 
follow-up interviews are undertaken in the summer months, using snowball 
sampling5. This much smaller group is discarded from the analysis because 
it is selected through a non-probabilistic sampling methodology, although 
Massey and Zenteno (1999) analyze the quality of the data, and conclude 
th a t they are generally a representative source of information on Mexico- 
U.S. migration. Further details about the study design can be found in 
Massey (1987). Valid cases are selected by looking at individual age and 
physically able to migrate: people aged outside the 16 and 55 interval and 
receiving a disability pension during the recall period are excluded from the 
valid sample.67 The upper cut-off year is 1993, because the available data 
for the last five years of the sample (1994 to 1998) consist of too few obser­
vations to be included. In such way an unbalanced person-year panel with 
both entries and exits is obtained.
Since individuals are interviewed in Mexico, I only observe complete 
spells of migration, and I do not have information on current migrants. The 
excluded individuals may not be a random sub-set of the illegal migrant 
population. The issue of the potential non-randomness in the sample and 
its implications regarding the bias in the estimates of the effect of enforce­
ment on the probability of both migrating illegally and returning from an 
undocumented migration will be discussed in detail in the next section.
After the described arbitrary truncations, two groups are formed. One 
is composed by 9,990 individuals and 143,851 person-year units, observed 
when they are in Mexico until an illegal migration takes place. Observed 
migrations are recorded by a variable that takes the value of zero whenever
5A method whereby interview subjects are indicated by previous interviewees.
6The results from the econometric specification are robust to the inclusion or exclusion
of women, who are much more unlikely to migrate. Roughly 25 percent of males from the
valid sample migrate illegally, versus 6 percent of women.
rThe maximum age requirement applies only to potential migrants.
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the individual is in Mexico, and of one when the individual migrates to the 
United States. All subsequent years spent in the U.S.A. are recorded as 
missing. About 85% of the sample never migrates in the observed years, 
with a maximum of 22 migrations being undertaken. Mean migration for 
the whole sample is 0.59, while average number of migrations for those who 
migrate is 2.49.
The other group consists of 2,316 migrants (and 8,986 person-year units) 
who stay in the United States at least once. In this case, the interest is on 
the likelihood of returning from a migration. Hence, a variable records with 
a zero each year spent in the U.S.A., taking instead the value of one in the 
year the migrant returns home. The variable is missing for all years spent 
in Mexico between intermediate migrations.
As regards aggregate data, border enforcement’s upward sloping trend 
(measured along the whole U.S. Mexico border) and its higher steepness in 
the second half of the 1970s and since 1986 can be noticed in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Border Patrol - million linewatch hours
Average intensity of border controls between 1986 and 1993 is 20% higher 
than the 1977-1985 one as a consequence of the implementation of the 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Indeed, one of the A ct’s var­
ious measures to curb illegal immigration is the increase in border policing8,
8Border patrol budget, which has been increasing continuously since 1986, does not
27
together with sanctions for the employment of undocumented labour and 
with an amnesty to legalize a large group of current illegal U.S. residents. 
The implementation of IRCA is partly a reaction to the increased migration 
incentives caused by the economic and financial crisis tha t hit Mexico in 
the early 1980s. W ith high inflation levels eroding the purchasing power of 
wages9 and periodic peso devaluations, more individuals are induced to seek 
jobs illegally in the United States.
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Figure 2.2: U.S. hourly private sector wage in 1990 pesos (left) and Mexican 
real manufacturing hourly wage index (1990=100)
Figure 2.2 shows the change in the peso value of both U.S. and Mexican 
wages caused by the high inflation and by the currency devaluations both 
during and before the Mexican crisis. W ith higher expected benefits from 
migration, a higher enforcement level is required to discourage individuals 
from making an illegal U.S. trip.
reflect the 1988 sharp linewatch hours decrease. One possibility is that funds might have
been allocated to other enforcement-related activities.
9Mexican real minimum wage decreases by 74% in the first half of the 1980s (Hanson
and Spilimbergo, 1999).
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Figure 2.3: Mean annual migration (as proportion of potential migrant pop­
ulation)
The impact of the Mexican economic crisis on incentives to migrate is 
also noticeable in Figure 2.3, where average annual migration is expressed 
as proportion of overall population of potential migrants. Although the size 
and growth rate of the underlying population is unknown10, the proportion 
of individuals who migrate nearly doubles between 1972 and 1986, with a 
peak in 1985-1986, when rumors of the incoming amnesty cause a rush to 
the United States. The rising migration trend reverses from 1986. Part 
of this effect is supposedly a consequence of the IRCA amnesty granted to 
more than  two million U.S.-based illegal Mexicans migrants: a large group 
of individuals simply switch from illegal to legal sta tus.11 The improvement 
of the Mexican economic conditions, the toughening of border enforcement 
and the introduction of employer’s sanctions are expected to be further de­
term inants of the trend reversal. Figure 2.4 shows average annual returns 
from illegal migrations (expressed as proportion of U.S.-resident Mexican
10W ith a positive growth rate of the Mexican population and a deterioration of low- 
income household living standards during the 1980s, the number of potential illegal mi­
grants is expected to rise, unless outbalanced by legalizations.
n INS estimates a total of 2,600,000 Mexican legalizations (Statistical Handbook on U.S.
Hispanics, 1992), while Bratsberg (1995) reports nearly 2,200,000 ones.
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undocumented population). The pre-IRCA upward sloping part is consis­
tent with the hypothesis of an increase in short-term temporary migration, 
favoured by lower individual apprehension probability brought by a rising 
migration volume and a roughly constant border enforcement.
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Figure 2.4: Annual returns from illegal migrations (as proportion of U.S.- 
resident Mexican undocumented population)
The sharp decrease in 1986 and 1987, which coincides with the rise in 
border patrol activities, is probably exacerbated by the lower mobility of 
amnesty applicants (as well as by the tighter border controls). In fact, it 
is likely th a t amnesty applicants refrain from returning to Mexico while 
waiting for their legalization application to be processed, i.e. approximately 
between 1986 and 1988.12 The last 5 years do not show a clear trend in 
returns from illegal migrations. Average returns are now proportionally 
higher than pre-IRCA ones.
Two measures of wages are available: for the U.S.A., average hourly min­
imum and private sector wages; an index of average production manufac­
turing hourly wage, or monthly average minimum wage for Mexico. On the 
one hand minimum wages seem to be more appropriate, since repeated mi­
12This result is obtained summing the 12-month interval allowed to apply for the legal­
ization and further few months for the authorization to be granted to the year of IRCA 
implementation (1986).
30
grations regard mainly unskilled individuals: average education level for the 
population of potential migrants is 5.1 years, whereas Hanson and Spilim- 
bergo (1999b) report th a t mean school years for individuals employed in 
manufacturing in Mexico was 8.1 in 1990. Moreover, low-skilled, illegal 
migrants are likely to be offered low wages. On the other hand, though, 
minimum wages are consistently associated with a higher degree of multi- 
collinearity in the regressions.13 For this reason, U.S. private-sector wage 
and Mexican manufacturing wage index are instead used. Their trends are 
not too dissimilar from their respective minimum wages.
2.4 A  m odel o f repeat m igration
This section models multiple migration choices of heterogeneous agents. The 
model is used to understand how the decisions of migrating illegally and of 
returning from a migration are affected by border controls, and to derive 
the testable hypotheses and the appropriate econometric specification. In 
addition, it sheds light on how the survey design may bias the estimates of 
the parameters of interest.
While it is understood why people migrate (Sjaastad (1962)) and why it 
may be optimal to return to the home country even given the higher foreign 
wage (see, for instance, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), Stark et al. (1997) and 
Dustmann (2003)), less is known about repeated migration. Since moving 
is costly, it is not clear why individuals may refer multiple, short-termed 
migrations to a single, longer one. Multiple migrations have been linked by 
the literature to imperfect information or shocks (Da Vanzo (1983)). In my 
view, however, repeated migrations over the life cycle can arise also as the 
optimal decision of agents with complete information. Given the vast scale 
of Mexican migration to the United States and the existence of migration 
networks, it is believed tha t access to information is relatively easy and
13Analysis of the correlations between both sets of wages and the other variables used 
in the econometric model show that the multicollinearity arising from the use of minimum 
wages cannot be directly related to any pairwise correlation.
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costless.
Two main determinants of repeated Mexican migrations over the life 
cycle are: labour demand and costly absence. The former explains the exis­
tence of cyclical migration patterns as the consequence of seasonal changes 
in labour demand. One obvious example is the increased demand for agri­
cultural workers during harvest time, or the one for hotel staff during peak 
season. The latter, instead, is based upon the concept that being away from 
home has a positive cost. This can be thought of as absentees’ positive 
likelihood of losing claims on current and future ownership of family assets 
(such as land and properties) increasing with time spent abroad, or as indi­
viduals being homesick. The longer the absence, the looser the tie with the 
family members left behind. Such hypothesis is consistent with the alter­
native views of remittances being used as a means to retain a tie with the 
household in the home country, or being a manifestation of altruism. The 
hypothesis that time away from home may be costly is consistent with the 
observed evidence from the MMP71 data: the likelihood of returning from 
a migration is ceteris paribus higher for parents and married migrants, and 
is increasing with the number of children and hectares of land owned.
The current model of repeated migration is based on the latter hypoth­
esis. While further research on the issue is clearly needed, I believe tha t 
the model sketched here captures some existing features of Mexican repeat 
migration. In any case, the implications of the model regarding the effect of 
border enforcement on the intensity and duration of illegal migration could 
have been equally derived from a wide class of alternative determinants of 
multiple migrations.
An additional feature of this model is tha t it endogenises migration du­
ration. Hill (1987) models multiple migration over the life cycle assuming 
that migration duration if fixed.
I assume that migration costs are heterogeneous. This may arise because 
of different reasons. Individuals may be endowed with different levels of abil­
ity to cross the border, or they may have access to private information. The
32
data provide evidence of heterogeneity in border-crossing ability. The num­
ber of observed apprehensions within a single trip in fact varies considerably, 
ranging between 0 and 15, although 78 percent of migrants manage to cross 
the border at first attem pt, and 16 percent with up to three. Alternatively, 
individuals may face varying degrees of financial constraint, hence financing 
similar trips may entail different costs. Finally, costs may vary because of 
distance from the border and different levels of community-specific network 
effects. Modelling alternative sources of heterogeneity, such as differences in 
labour market-related skills, results into different types of individuals being 
selected in and out of migration. Nevertheless, the impact of border controls 
on their net inflow in the U.S. would be the same irrespective of the type of 
heterogeneity (in sign, if not in magnitude).
Assume a continuum of potential illegal migrants with heterogeneous mi­
gration costs deriving from different ability endowments. Agents treat wages 
and border enforcement (bp) as given. There is no uncertainty. Assume the 
existence of a utility function representing individual preferences. Such func­
tion depends on consumption (c > 0) and on the fraction of time spent in the 
host country (t ) and it is assumed to be continuously twice differentiable, 
additively decomposable both in consumption and time and over time. In­
dividuals choose the optimal migration duration in both periods given the 
positive wage differential between U.S. and Mexican wages (w us  > w MX), 
the strictly concave disutility from staying away from home (u t14 < 0 and 
Vtt <  0)? their appetite for consumption (uc > 0 and ucc < 0)15, and the 
sunk cost associated with the illegal migration (Me)- The latter is a pos­
itive function of border enforcement (bp), Mcbp > 0, and a negative one 
(Mca  <  0) of an individual-specific parameter (a E (0,1)) capturing hetero­
geneity in costs, a varies continuously among the agents. This param eter 
will be from now on referred to as ability in crossing the border. I assume 
capital market perfection, r  is the interest rate paid on savings (S) and (3
14Partial derivatives are sub-indexed with respect to the argument, hence d v / d t  =  v t .
15 The assumptions on the utility function ensure that the agents’ optimization problem
has a maximum.
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is the inter-temporal discount factor. 
The maximization problem is:
max
c i>c2lS ,ti€[0)l],t2e[0,l]
U(ci,C2 , t i , t 2 ,S ;a )  = u(c \(ti, 5, a) , t\)-\-/3u(c2(t2, S, a) , £2)
where
t i w ^  +  (1 -  t 1)w fIX -  M c {bpi,a)1[tl>0} -  S
t 2 W%S +  (1 -  t2) w ? x  -  M c (bp2,a)1{t2>Q.tl<1} +  (1 +  r )S
w,US > wM X
Given the parameters of the model, different ability endowments will be 
associated with varying optimal migration durations, including t \  =  =  0
and permanent migrations. In the current analysis, however, I restrict the 
valid solutions to include only return migrants, i.e. t £ € [0,1) and G [0,1).
The model could be easily extended to allow for future migration costs 
being a negative function of past migrations or for agents being unable to 
borrow. The conclusions reached would be unaffected, although the magni­
tude of the migrant flows would differ.
2.4.1 D eterrent effect
Given preferences, wages, some continuous ability distribution and enforce­
ment, agent with different ability levels will choose a different combination
16The second-order condition matrix is negative semi-definite.
The first-order conditions16 for migrants in both periods, i.e. individuals 
for whom t \  > 0 and t£ > 0, are:
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of current and future migrations. Individuals whose ability level exceeds 
a certain threshold (a > ah) will migrate in both periods. Those with a 
sufficiently low ability (a < a1) will never migrate. The impact of changes in 
migration costs on the inflow of migration can be studied by observing how 
the ability threshold levels change due to higher enforcement. If I prove that 
the values of the existing thresholds are augmented by a marginal increase 
in border controls, then I have shown that higher enforcement is associated 
with a lower migration inflow.
Agents’ behaviour cannot be predicted without assuming an explicit form 
of the utility function or without making restrictions on the range of values 
taken by the parameters of the model. Indeed, the model is such that 
agents choose in each period whether to migrate or not, and for how long. 
Using H  and M  to indicate home stay and migration, there will be four 
possible outcomes: HH , H M , M H , M M  and various ability threshold for 
individuals indifferent between alternative inter-temporal choices. There are 
six potential thresholds (the six possible pairwise combinations of the four 
different outcomes). Only a sub-set of them will be valid, depending on the 
values of the parameters and on the type of utility function.
I may illustrate the impact of higher migration costs on the ability thresh­
olds by performing comparative statics exercises for all possible cases. I 
believe tha t this is unnecessary, given tha t higher migration costs will in no 
circumstance result in higher aggregate migration. Since the effect of tighter 
enforcement on immigration is not ambiguous, I prefer to choose one specific 
case to illustrate this point formally.
I consider the case in which the values of wages and enforcement are 
identical in both periods and {3(1 +  r) =  1. In such case, optimal migration 
duration will be the same in both periods (t^ =  ££) and there will be no 
savings. Since the two periods are identical, agents will either migrate op­
timally in both periods or stay always in Mexico. Hence, there is a unique 
ability threshold (i.e. ah = a1 = aT). Consider the agent indifferent between
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migrating in both periods and not migrating in either
M M ( a T) -  H H (aT) = 0 (2 .1)
In this scenario, any current or future increases in border controls will 
induce the agent to favour the zero migration outcome. Formally, I can 
compute the sign of the enforcement effect on ability threshold (aT) from 
(2.1) using the implicit function and the envelope theorems:
daT . (  uc*(dMc/dbpi) \
dbpi 9 ^  (uc* + Puc*) {pM c/da ))  > °
daT . (  (3uc*(dMc/dbp2) \
dbp2 Slgn (  («c. +  0uci) (d M c /d a ) )  >
The effect of a current enforcement increase is larger than the one of a 
future cost rise because of discounting. Permanent enforcement increases 
will result in a more marked rise in the ability threshold.
While the simple case presented above is sufficient to make my point, 
more realistic assumptions on variation in costs and benefit of migration 
and in inter-temporal preferences will result in agents with varying ability 
endowments being indifferent between alternative options. Such alternatives 
may imply different responses to current or future enforcement changes. All 
possible cases show that higher enforcement is associated with positive (or 
at most non-negative) changes in the minimum level of ability required to 
migrate.
One case worth mentioning is when the anticipation of higher future costs 
of migration results in migrations being undertaken in period one rather 
than  in period two. Consider the individual who is indifferent between 
migrating once, irrespective of when the migration occurs: M H  — H M  =  0. 
This individual will be induced to migrate in the first period by a marginal 
increase in future migration costs. The reverse is true in case of an increase 
in current enforcement levels.
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2.4.2 Optim al m igration duration
Unlike the migration decision, optimal migration duration is a function of 
both current and future enforcement level. While higher levels of border 
controls deter some prospective migrants to attem pt to reach the United 
States, reducing the inflow of illegal migration, the average migration du­
ration of current migrants will increase, given the higher migration costs. 
Comparative statics shows tha t the optimal migration length is a positive 
function of both current and future levels of border enforcement:
= sign  ( - (1  +  r)uc*c*(uc*c*ut*q -  2uc*c*A2)) > 0 (2.2)
=  sign [f3uclclut*t* +  w |c*A2(2 +  r ) )  >  0 (2.3)
where A indicates the wage differential.17 These results are intuitive: the 
higher the costs of migrating, the longer the time that must be spent abroad 
to reap positive returns from the migration. Changes in border enforcement 
influence the behaviour of current illegal migrants as well. Indeed, migration 
duration is also a positive function of future migration costs. Comparative 
statics shows tha t for individuals who migrate in both periods, a marginal 
increase in future enforcement levels will increase optimal current migration 
duration. This means that, while prospective migrants may be deterred 
from migrating by an increase in border patrol, current ones will lengthen 
the duration of their present migration spell. In practice, given the large 
stock of undocumented resident U.S. migrants, the latter effect may be of a 
relevant size.
Equations (2.2) and (2.3) are particularly interesting, given the objective 
of the current exercise, because they show how increases in border policing, 
although reducing the inflow of undocumented migration, extend the length 
of permanence in the United States for those who decide to migrate and for 
current illegal migrants.
17I also assumed that wage differentials are identical in the two period. This simplifies 
the notation without changing the signs of the partial derivatives.
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To summarize, modelling the effect of border enforcement on choice and 
duration of repeated tem porary undocumented migrations shows how the 
former has a deterrent effect: higher enforcement levels correspond to fewer 
migrations. However, rising migration costs affect also the length of the 
permanence in the receiving country through an increase in both current 
costs, which require migrants to stay longer before they can benefit from 
the investment, and in future ones, which induce present migrants to delay 
their return in view of the higher difficulty of the next illegal trip.
The effect of an increase in border policing on the net inflow of illegal 
migration is ambiguous and depends on the size of both prospective and cur­
rent migrants and on how sensitive both groups are to changes in migration 
costs.
Some implications of these findings are: first, policy-induced changes in 
illegal migration inflow differ from changes in its stock, because the policy 
has also a significant effect on migration outflow. Second, the estimated 
effect of the policy observing only migration inflow is always larger than the 
true one (in absolute value). Third, considering migration inflow only results 
in a sub-optimal resource allocation, where too much spending is devoted 
to border enforcement and too little to alternative policies. Fourth, for each 
level of prospective migrants, the optimal level of border enforcement is a 
function of the stock of current U.S.-based illegal migrants.
2.5 Em pirical specification and estim ation  issues
The model has clearly highlighted the ambiguous effect of border enforce­
ment on the net inflow of illegal migration. I now proceed to estimate 
the observed magnitude of such effect for the 1972-1993 time period. My 
empirical approach consists of estimating the effect that changes in border 
controls have on the individual probability of transition between different 
states: from staying in Mexico (m = 0) to becoming an illegal migrant 
(m  =  1); and from being an undocumented U.S. resident (r =  0) to return­
ing home (r =  1). Time is discrete and the unit is the year. I model the two
38
transitions separately, i indicates the i-th. individual and t the year.
2.5.1 Estim ating th e likelihood of m igrating illegally
The previous section has shown two facts that will be used to build the em­
pirical specification. First, migration decision is a function of current and fu­
ture values of the parameters. Second, an increase in current border enforce­
ment has a direct negative effect on current illegal migrations and an indirect 
positive effect through its impact on expectations of future migration costs. 
I use a latent regression model linear in parameters to specify the conditional 
likelihood of migrating at time t, given that the individual is in Mexico at 
the end of the previous period, Pirnu  =  =  0) =  P{m*t >  0), as a
function of the parameters of the model:
T
m l  =  TmMcit +  7“ X , +  £  {S?E (M *.)  +  tt? E  (X.)] +  f ?  +  h? +
S = t+ 1
where M e  indicates migration costs, as before, and X  contains macroeco­
nomic differentials tha t influence the migration decision and are potentially 
correlated with border controls. T  indicates the number of future periods’ 
parameter values that affect the current migration decision. /  and A rep­
resent all individual- and time-specific factors tha t influence the migration 
decision and are not captured in the theoretical model, e is some white-noise 
parameter. If I further assume that migration costs can be expressed as a 
linear function of enforcement and of an individual-specific parameter,
M cit =  9bpt +  4>ai (2.4)
I can rewrite the latent model as
T
m l  =  0 ”'bpt +  7mX t +  Y ,  K E ( b p a) + * ? E ( X a)] +  n ?  +  \ ?  + e’S (2.5)
S = t+ 1
where =  r m6>, <  =  6?9, and (i™ =  f™ +  cS^a*.
The effect of a change in the current enforcement level on the migration
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likelihood is the combined effect of the former’s direct and indirect effect, 
via changes in expected future migration costs,
d P (m it = l \m it- 1 = 0 )  dE(bps)
  p  +  £ +1 (2 6)
considering a linear probability model for simplicity. I expect the first term 
j3 to be negative, and the following ones positive, although the net effect 
should be again negative.
A static model estimates (2.6) directly, without the need to make explicit 
assumptions on how agents form expectations. Its disadvantage is that it 
does not permit to assess the impact of (expected) future enforcement levels 
on current decisions. I will estimate both a static model and one where I 
condition explicitly on future levels of border controls. The object 
in this latter case is estimated as the coefficient of a regression of future 
on current enforcement level, conditioning on all the other macroeconomic 
variables. Given tha t the parameter of interest is identified only through 
time variation, I assume that T  =  t +  1.
Lagged values of enforcement and of macroeconomic variables are also 
added to (2.5) in order to control for potential omitted variable bias. A 
higher past enforcement level, for instance, might induce the agents to post­
pone the migration decision and to increase savings to finance a future trip.
Current and future border control levels may be endogenous, as the en­
forcement level and expectations may be correlated to unobservable shocks 
to migration. This point was first made by Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999b). 
In order to control and test for endogeneity, Drugs Enforcement Adminis­
tration (DEA) budget is used. Drugs are smuggled in massive quantities 
through the U.S. Southern border, and one of the aims of border patrol is 
also to curb narcotics trafficking.
Border linewatch hours and DEA budget show a high and significant pos­
itive correlation (85%) and the coefficient of DEA budget in the first-stage 
equation is always positive and strongly significant. When both current and 
future border enforcement are added in (2.5), I use the smallest number
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of necessary lags of the instrumental variable to identify the parameter of 
interest. There is a clear trade-off between adding further leads of linewatch 
hours and macro variables and having to use additional lags of DEA budget 
and further conditioning variables in the first-stage equation, especially con­
sidering that both measures of border enforcement and of the instrument 
vary only over time. A large number of instrumenting variables may prevent 
the separation of the endogenous from the exogenous component of border 
controls.
A ttem pts to use alternative instruments were made. Dummies to control 
for the political party of the outgoing U.S. president, and a variable that 
indicates whether both Senate majority and U.S. president are Republican 
were both included. The significance of these latter variables suggests that 
border enforcement resource allocation may be influenced by the political 
cycle.18 However, it is not clear whether the former variables do not affect 
m igrants’ propensity to move to the United States. Experiments were also 
made using the number of years to a presidential and congressional elec­
tion as additional instruments. However, the significance of these further 
regressors is not very high in the first-stage regression.19 The result section 
reports only output obtained using DEA budget as instrumental variable.
An additional issue is posed by the selection of interviewees caused by 
the sample design. As explained above, there is no information on migrants 
when the whole household moves. If migrants are selected in unobservables 
in some way related to border enforcement, this will result in a correlation 
between the mean of p™ and bp. However, in practice one expects the 
magnitude of the bias to be small, if not negligible. This occurs for a number 
of reasons. First, the bulk of Mexican migration appears to be constituted 
by temporary moves. Individuals tend to migrate on their own, leaving their
18There is a significant higher enforcement level when both majority senate and presi­
dent are Republican. Moreover, patrol of the border is lower in presidential election years,
when the outgoing president is Republican.
19When I use monthly levels of border enforcement rather than annual one, the signifi­
cance level of year-to-election variables is much higher.
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Figure 2.5: Drugs Enforcement Administration budget, 1990 million USD
family behind. Second, as enforcement tightens, both out-migrations and 
returns will decrease, partly offsetting each other. Third, actual migrations 
are only a small fraction of the overall sample.
Shocks to migration may be serially correlated. Not only the impact 
(or the information) may reach the farthest regions with a lag, but also 
individual reaction to it may be delayed. Individuals geographically closer 
to the border will react before those in more distant states or communities 
(distance may also be related to  access to information). Furthermore, such 
shocks may exhibit some degree of persistence. Serial correlation is tested 
and controlled for appropriately according to the type of estimator used.20
The macroeconomic regressors included (X ) are U.S. private sector hourly 
real wage rate in pesos and an index of Mexican manufacturing real hourly 
wage, together with U.S. unemployment, to capture the probability of find­
ing a job once in the United States. Number of obtained legalization is 
added as well (I). Since legalizations and enforcement increase at the same 
time in the second half of the 1980s, as they are both IRCA provisions, it 
is im portant to disentangle these two effects. The higher the legalization
20I also experimented with more general specifications of the within-panel correlation 
structure, which turns out not to be perfectly represented by an AR(1) process. These 
results are not presented but are available upon request.
42
number, the lower the volume of both actual and potential illegal migrants. 
Thus, part of the post-IRCA decline in both undocumented border crossings 
and returns from illegal migration is simply the result of a status change, i.e. 
becoming a legal resident21, rather than the direct consequence of tougher 
enforcement. This effect may be substantial, since more than 2 million Mex­
icans are estimated to have benefited of the IRCA legalization program.
I estimate the individual likelihood of migrating illegally at time £, condi­
tional of being a potential migrant in £—1, using alternatively the linear (OLS 
and within group) and non-linear (probit) probability models, relying on dif­
ferent parametric assumptions on the distribution of the error term. The 
former is computationally less demanding for what concerns the estimation 
of endogenous regressors. However, it has some well-known shortcomings, 
such as constant marginal effects, predicted probability not constrained to 
vary between the [0,1] interval, and heteroskedastic errors. Robust standard 
errors are computed (also for the probit estimates) and the observations are 
clustered at the individual level. The estimated coefficients are interpreted 
as local linear marginal effects.
The alternative estimator relaxes the assumption that the conditional 
probability is linear in the parameters. I address the endogeneity issue in a 
non-linear framework by adopting Blundell and Smith’s (1986, 1989) value 
function approach and I compute block-bootstrap estimates of the coefficient 
standard errors of both border controls and residuals from the first-stage 
regressions.
211 used alternatively both applications and obtained legalization. The former is as­
sumed to proxy changed incentives to mobility, with applicants remaining in the U.S.A. 
until their request is processed, while the latter accounts for status change. Since legal­
izations always perform better than applications, I interpret this result as evidence of 
the higher importance of changes in the pool of illegal migrants than incentive changes, 
probably in part because the latter’s effect are only concentrated in two years.
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2.5.2 E stim ating the likelihood of returning from an illegal 
m igration
The empirical specification contains the main two features of the theoretical 
model. These are: first, optimal migration duration is a function of cur­
rent and future values of the parameters of the model. Second, changes in 
current enforcement levels affect the length of the current migration spell 
by changing individual expectation of future migration costs. I express the 
relationship between migration costs and duration in terms of the individual 
likelihood of returning home. Hence if migrations are lengthened by higher 
costs, I expect the return probability to be a negative function of the latter.
For individual i in time period t, the probability of returning from an 
illegal U.S. trip, conditional on being an undocumented U.S. resident at the 
end of the previous period, is described by the following latent regression 
model
T
r*t =  S'Me* +  ir'Xt +  £  [S'E (Me*) +  n'sE  (X,)] + f ' +  K  +  e't
S =  t+l
T
=  P'bpt +  *rX t +  J 2  K E ( b p a) +  i C E ( , X . ) ] + r i + > i + ^  (2-7)
S= t-\~ 1
where T  > 14-1 and (3r =  5r9. The second equality uses (2.4). =  5rs9
and =  f \  4- The parameter of interest is the sum of the
direct and indirect effect of changes in border enforcement on the likelihood 
of returning to Mexico.2223
dP{Tit = -  =f>r + E  (2-8)dbpt dbpt
Both /3r and the are expected to be negative. Again, (2.7) is esti­
mated both as a static equation, and adding one lead and one lag of the
22 The parameter /3r captures both the effect of enforcement on those who have migrated 
in the same period, and any indirect effect it may have on the return decision on those 
who had migrated before. It turns out from the empirical analysis that this latter effect 
is null.
23Again, the next formula uses the linear probability model for simplicity.
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enforcement and macroeconomic variables. The advantages and disadvan­
tages of both specifications have been discussed in the previous section. All 
the econometric and identification issues discussed above are valid for the 
return equation, and are tackled analogously. In addition, in this case the 
correlation between unobservable individual heterogeneity and (current and 
expected) linewatch hours might seriously bias the estimate of the parame­
ters of interest. Both the decision to migrate and the one to leave depend 
on the intensity of border controls. Hence, current m igrants’ unobservables 
are correlated with the enforcement level. This issue is dealt with by using 
within-group and conditional logit estimators. The latter estimator reduces 
considerably the valid sample size.
Alternatively, I can re-write the latent regression model as 
t  k T
r^  = /3'-bpt+^Xt+J2(vrjyj)+J2^d‘+ E  [ ^ ( W  + CSPWl+tf+AT+Cit
j = t o  l—l  S = t + 1
(2.9)
yj are year-of-arrival dummies (for migrations occurred between to and 
t) and capture the average unobservables of individuals who migrated in the 
same year. The dummies di group individuals who have spent I years in the 
same spell of migration at time t. I believe that controlling for year of arrival 
and migration duration reduces the correlation between the enforcement 
variables and the residual unobservable heterogeneity. The advantage of 
using (2.9) is tha t I can indirectly observe the effect of enforcement on 
selection on unobservables by adding the yj and di dummies sequentially 
and observing how the enforcement coefficient changes.
The other regressors are those described in the previous section. As 
before, it is im portant to condition on legalization number to control for the 
reduced mobility of amnesty applicants and the status change of successful 
ones (both resulting in fewer returns to Mexico contemporaneously with the 
post-IRCA border enforcement increase).
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2.6 R esults
2.6.1 Probability of m igrating illegally
I first estimate the likelihood of undertaking an undocumented migration 
using the linear probability model. Border control levels measured in mil­
lion linewatch hours. Table 2.2 reports the coefficients of the static model 
from different estimators. The Durbin-Watson test provides evidence of pos­
itive serial correlation. Even columns treat enforcement as endogenous, and 
report the results from IV estimation.
The results are in line with the prediction of a negative effect of cur­
rent enforcement on the likelihood of migrating illegally. The significance 
of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test provides evidence of the inconsistency of 
the linewatch coefficients, when the endogeneity of enforcement is not taken 
into account. The results suggest that there is a positive correlation be­
tween border patrol and aggregate shocks, consistent with the conjecture 
that the level of enforcement is set according to the expected intensity of 
the migration flow.
The coefficients from OLS and within-group estimators do not differ 
(columns 2 and 4). This fact is interpreted as evidence that the sample 
design does not bias the parameter of interest.24 The values of the parame­
ters of interests are comparable in sign and magnitude to the ones obtained 
clustering observations by year. I further tested for the result robustness 
by changing the set of conditioning variables and the available years. For 
instance, I included Mexican unemployment rate, which is available only 
since 1980, and further controls (state of origin, capturing travel expenses 
to reach the border, dummies for size of community of origin to measure the 
dimension of the local labour market, and proportion of male labour force 
in agriculture to control for varying incentives to migrate to differentiate the 
source of labour income).25 The estimated coefficients are stable across the
24The coefficient from pooled probit is smaller, but this may be due to the different
sample size, distributional assumptions or approach to deal with endogeneity.
25Results not shown but available upon request.
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various specifications and data  sub-sets.
The coefficients of border enforcement from the lead and lag specifica­
tion are generally in line with expectations, although the results are less 
robust. I suspect that this is partially due to the fact that longer lags of the 
instrumental variable are used in the first-stage regressions. The very high 
R-squared values suggest th a t the first-stage may not appropriately separate 
the endogenous from the exogenous variation of enforcement. Nevertheless, 
the results from Table 2.3 remain interesting insofar as they confirm that 
agents are sensitive to expected increases in future enforcement, which in­
duce them to anticipate the migration. This is shown by the positive sign of 
the coefficient of future border enforcement levels (although this is not the 
case in the within-group estimates).
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Table 2.2: Probability of illegal migration, static model
OLS-AR(l) IV-AR(l) 
(1) (2)
WG-AR(l) IVWG-AR(l) 
(3) (4)
Probit IV-Probit
(5) (6)
Linewatch hours (bp) -.0009 -.005*** -.002* _ 005*** -.002** -.009***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Observations 136159 133861 143871
Durbin-Wu-Hausman [.000] [.000] [.002]
First-stage R2 .73
l st-stage IV significance [.0000]
The estimated regression is the one described in the previous section. Robust standard errors in brackets. *=  significant at 90% confidence level; 
=  significant at 95% confidence level; *** =  significant at 99% confidence level.
Table 2.3: Probability of illegal migration, lag and lead of bp
OLS-AR(l) IV-AR(l) W G-AR(l) IVW G-AR(l) Probit IV-Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linewatch hours (bp)
t-1 .002 - 012** .001 ,_014*** .005 -.014**
(.002) (.005) (.002) (.005) (.002) (.006)
t -.009*** 014*** -.004** .004 -  012** -.018***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003)
t +1 .008* .022*** * 007*** -.005 .006** Q24***
(.002) (.004) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.005)
H0: \bpt \ ^  |6pt+1| [.115] [.461] [.349]
Observations 136159 124426 137577
Durbin-Wu-Hausman [.000] [.000] [.002]
First-stage R2
t-1 .94
t .92
t +  1 .94
l st-stage IV significance [.0000]
Robust standard errors in brackets where applicable. Block-bootstrap standard errors in (5) and (6). *, **, ***= significant at 90%, 95%, 99% 
confidence level.
I interpret the negative sign of the coefficient of lagged linewatch hours as 
suggestive of slow response to enforcement, both because of the lag between 
the acquisition and the response to new information, and because tighter 
enforcement translates into longer waits before a successful border crossing.
Table 2.4 provides estimates of the parameter of interest under the differ­
ent specifications and estimators used (left panel) and presents the output of 
a time series regression of border patrol on its lagged values26 (right panel). 
These are built following (2.6), using the coefficients from Tables 2 and 3 
and the coefficient of lagged border patrol from the two-lag regression below 
( i . e .  =  (0.561)fc).
Note how the parameters estimated using the linear probability model 
and the probit one are similar in size.
The estimated parameters of interest suggest that a one million increase 
in annual linewatch hours reduces the likelihood of undertaking an undoc­
umented migration by 0.5 to 0.9 percentage points, considering the results 
from the static model. Given tha t the average annual migration volume 
amounts to 3.7 percent of the Mexican adult economically active population 
with no US green card, such linewatch hours increase reduces average Mex­
ican illegal migration by 13 to 25%. Since mean enforcement is 2.15 million 
linewatch hours, the implied average enforcement elasticity of deterrence is 
negative but larger than minus one.
2.6.2 Probability of returning from an illegal m igration
Table 2.5 shows within group, conditional logit and pooled probit estimates 
of the enforcement coefficient on the likelihood of returning from and undoc­
umented U.S. trip. As in the previous case, I specify the linear probability 
model residuals as represented by an AR(1) process. The estimated coeffi­
cients are in line with expectations, suggesting that tighter border patrol re­
duces the likelihood of returning from an illegal migration. The Durbin-Wu-
26The results are roughly unchanged after conditioning on U.S. wages and unemploy­
ment.
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Table 2.4: Effect of a marginal increase in current enforcement on the like­
lihood of migrating illegally
Model Static Lag and lead of bp bp
dP(mit = l|mif_i =0)
dbpt
IV A R (1) _ 005*** -.002*
t-1 .561**
(.217)
(.001) (.001) t -2 .351
Probit _ 009*** 
(.001)
-.004*
(.003)
(.249)
Block-bootstrap standard errors. Intercept included in the time series in the right panel, 
as well as controls for macroeconomic variables. *, **, ***= significant at 90%, 95%, 99% 
confidence level.
Hausman test provides evidence of the consistency of the IV coefficients. The 
enforcement coefficients from the non-instrumented regressions are upward- 
biased. This may be due to positive shocks to migration inducing the policy 
maker to increase border controls.
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Table 2.5: Probability of returning from an illegal migration, static model
WG-AR(l) IVWG-AR(l) CLogit IVCLogit IVProbit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) o r
Linewatch hours -.086*** -106*** 174*** -.199*** -.054 437*** -.165***
(bp) (.029) (.031) (.001) (.001) (.036) (.071) (.042)
Observations 6816 5246 8911
Durbin-Wu-Hausman [.070] [.046] [.670] [.087] [.750]
Year-of arrival No + +
Duration dummies No No -
First-stage R2 .76 .76 .93 .95 .94
l st-stage IV signif. [.0000] [.0000] [.0000] [.0000] [.0000]
Robust standard errors in brackets where applicable. Block-bootstrap standard errors in (3) to (7). *, **, ***= significant at 90%, 95%, 99% 
confidence level.
The last three columns start from the basic static specification and add 
year-of-arrival and migration duration dummies sequentially. The base cat­
egories are the ’’oldest” migration year and length of stay of less than one 
year. The signs of the coefficients are indicated at the bottom of the table, 
and show that more recent cohorts are more likely to return from an ille­
gal trip, while longer spells of migration reduce the likelihood of returning. 
The reduction in the magnitude of the enforcement coefficient and its later 
increase when adding first the year-of-migration and then the duration dum­
mies suggests tha t migrants are positively selected in unobservables by the 
tighter border controls: as controls intensify, ’’better” individuals manage 
to migrate. At the same time, higher enforcement is positively correlated 
with migration duration.
However, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test cannot be rejected. This may 
depend on the high first-stage regression R-squared, caused by the addi­
tional regressors included in the specification (year-of-arrival and migration 
duration dummies). The same caveat as before applies to the interpretation 
of the results when the values of the R-squared of the first-stage regressions 
are very close to one. In any case, once the two sets of dummies are added, 
the enforcement coefficient is in line with the magnitude of those obtained 
from within group and conditional logit estimators.
Also in this case, enforcement coefficients in the various specifications 
are not sensitive to changes in the set of conditioning variables27 or to the 
interview years used.
The coefficients from the lead and lag specification are consistent with 
expectations. Both current end future enforcement levels reduce the like­
lihood of returning from an illegal migration, as shown in Table 2.6. The 
results are not as robust as in the static version, though. The positive sign 
of lagged linewatch hours suggests that high past enforcement may increase
2rI experimented adding different subsets of the following variables: Mexican unem­
ployment (later discarded because of dubious validity), mean age at migration, mean 
education, and characteristics of the community of origin (size, proportion of labour force 
employed in agriculture, state dummies).
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Table 2.6: Probability of returning from an illegal migration, lag and lead 
of bp model
W G-AR(l) IVW G-AR(l) CLogit IVCLogit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linewatch hours (bp)
t-1 .072** 1.349*** .072 -.346
(.037) (.525) (.079) (1.242)
t _ 093*** -.131*** -.169*** -.136*
(.030) (.042) (.060) (.081)
t+1 .008* -.685*** -.066 -.203
(.005) (.262) (.049) (.652)
Observations 6816 5246
Durbin-Wu-Hausman [.009] [.736]
First-stage R2
t-1 .93
t .92
t+1 .94
l st-stage IV significance [.0000]
Robust standard errors in brackets where applicable. Block-bootstrap standard errors in 
(3) and (4). *, **, ***= significant at 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level.
the return from a trip through higher savings.
The coefficients obtained from the different estimators and specifications 
vary in size, although not in significance, probably due to the smaller sam­
ple size. In Table 2.7 I use (2.8) and the obtained coefficients to compute 
estimates of the overall marginal effect of border controls.
My favorite set of estimates are the ones from the static model, given the 
higher variability of the coefficients from Table 2.5. They reveal tha t a one- 
unit increase in border controls decreases the individual likelihood of leaving 
the United States by 10 to 20 percentage points, according to the estimator 
used. Since each year 55% of the population of U.S. resident illegal migrants
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Table 2.7: Effect of a marginal increase in current enforcement on the like­
lihood of returning from a migration
Model Static Lag and lead of bp
a P ( r it =  l | r i t_ 1=0)
dbpt
WG AR(1) -.106*** -.515***
(.031) (.155)
Clogit -.199*** -.136*
(.001) (.081)
Block-bootstrap standard errors for logit estimates. *, **, ***= significant at 90%, 95%, 
99% confidence level.
leave the country to return to Mexico, such one-unit enforcement increase 
would decrease average returns by 18% or 36%. The associated elasticity (- 
0.4 to -0.8) is negative, but larger than -1, implying that a marginal increase 
in linewatch hours is associated with a less than proportional reduction in 
returns from illegal trips.
The values of the parameters of interest for the transitions from poten­
tial to current migrant status and vice versa cannot be directly compared, 
because they refer to two different populations (the set of all potential illegal 
migrants, in the first case, and the sub-set of actual migrants, in the sec­
ond). In the present section, the results from the econometric estimations 
will be discussed separately. In the next section, estimates of the size of 
the underlying populations will be obtained, perm itting the comparison of 
border enforcement’s effect on migrant inflow and outflow.
2 .6 .3  S u rv ey  d e s ig n  an d  s e n s it iv ity  a n a ly sis
The sample used for the estimation is a panel built from retrospective in­
formation provided by Mexican-based household heads interviewed between
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1987 and 1998.28 The first available year is the one for which I have valid 
instrumental variables, i.e. 1972 (the year in which DEA was created). 
Hence, the 1972-1990 migration history of individuals interviewed in 1990 
is included in the sample, as well as the 1972-1991 information provided by 
1991 interviewees and so on.
Information on household heads’ migration history is collected interview­
ing close relatives, when the former person is absent. However, no informa­
tion can be collected when the whole family is absent, resulting in migrants 
being under-represented in the sample. If unobserved individuals differ from 
observed ones in a way that is correlated with border enforcement, the esti­
mated parameters of interest are biased.
One can think of unobserved migrants as being composed of to groups: 
those who have ’’just left” and those who have ’’not yet returned” . The 
likelihood of both migrating illegally and returning from an undocumented 
trip is some negative function of border enforcement. Hence, for each level 
of border patrol, the individual who migrates (’’just left”) has a higher 
ability than the observed one who stays, while the (observed) individual 
who returns from an illegal migration is more able than the one who is still 
abroad (’’not yet returned”). The net effect depends on how comparatively 
sensitive the probability of migrating and returning home are to changes 
in border enforcement and on the sizes of both prospective and current 
migrants in each time period, which are not known a priori.
I now proceed to the comparison of observed apprehension rates of mi­
grants from the Mexican and the U.S.-based sample (the group excluded 
from the analysis). As already mentioned, each year a small-group of U.S.- 
based migrants are tracked and interviewed, following the indication of the 
Mexican interviewees. This group is discarded from the sample used in the 
empirical analysis. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show trends in average annual appre­
hension rates and proportion apprehended at least once for illegal migrants
28 Some individuals are interviewed in 1982. The 1978-1982 valid cases from that panel 
are included as well.
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interviewed in Mexico and in the U.S.A., while Table 2 .8  provides respective 
means and standard deviations.
mean arrests -  MX interviewees-----* -—  mean arrests -  US interviewees
1.4 -
year
Figure 2.6: average apprehensions for Mexico and US-based interviewees
prop >-1 arrest -  MX interviews — a—  prop >=1 arrest -  US interviews
.25 -
.05 -
1981
year
Figure 2.7: proportion apprehended at least once - Mexico and US-based 
interviewees
Although the annual size of U.S.-based interviewees is quite small, visual 
inspection of the data  does not reveal apparent differences between the two 
series, with few exceptions. Differences in initial and final years are more 
marked probably due to the fewer available observations for the U.S.-based
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Table 2.8: mean apprehensions and proportion arrested at least once for 
Mexican- and U.S.-based interviewees, 1972-1993
Apprehensions Proportion arrested at least once
Interviewees: Observations Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Mexican-based 5207 0.532 1.483 0.233 0.423
U.S.-based 982 0.592 1.578 0.256 0.436
group. Table 2.8 confirms th a t no major difference between the two groups 
can be detected. Indeed, there is no statistically significant difference be­
tween both average apprehension rates and proportion apprehended at least 
once in the three groups. This result suggests that estimates of the effect of 
border enforcement on the likelihood of migrating illegally returning from an 
undocumented migration may not be biased by the absence of some illegal 
migrants from the MMP71 sample. The result has to be interpreted with 
caution, given the non-randomness of the U.S.-based sample.
2.7 Interpretation and policy im plications
In order to measure the impact of border enforcement on net illegal migra­
tion flow, an estimate of the amount of annual migration must be computed. 
The latter can be obtained by comparing the MMP71 and total border ap­
prehensions, provided the following assumptions hold. First, the observed 
average apprehension rate is representative of the rate for all illegal Mex­
ican migrants. Second, sample apprehension non-responses are random. 
Third, non-Mexican migration is constant (proportionally to Mexican ones) 
throughout time and negligible (in 1996, 97 percent of total apprehended 
border crossers were Mexican nationals, and this figure includes also appre­
hensions along the Northern U.S. border), or average border-crossing ability 
is identical among Mexican and non-Mexican migrants.
Then, knowledge of sample average annual apprehension rate a =  a /m ,
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where a is total sample apprehensions and m  is sample undocumented mi­
grations, and of aggregate yearly apprehensions A  permits to estimate the 
annual illegal migration volume:
^  A  M  =  —
a
The corresponding estimated volume of illegal migration ranges between 
234,00029 and 2,570,000 individuals in the years between 1972 and 1993, with 
an average of 1,265,000. The estimated volume of illegal Mexican migration 
is consistently lower than the one computed by Massey and Singer (1995) 
using early waves of MMP data: it ranges between 35 and 77% of their 
estimates. Early MMP households were sampled from high-migration com­
munities. Villages were migration was a relatively new phenomenon were 
added later, and are included in the sample (unlike Massey and Singer’s) 
because I use retrospective information. I suspect that this is the reason 
behind their higher migration estimates. Still, the trends of the two series 
are not dissimilar, although migration growth in the first half of the 1980s 
is more marked using Massey’s and Singer’s figures.
The means for an alternative robustness check of the estimated vari­
able is provided by Espenshade (1995b), who notes how there is a roughly 
stable proportion between undocumented migrations and total border ap­
prehensions between 1977 and 1988, with a ratio of 2.2. The resulting mi­
gration flow computed using aggregate apprehensions would range between 
1,075,000 in 1978 and 1,303,000 in 1988, with a mean of 1,323,000. Mean 
undocumented migrations for the same period using the current estimates 
amounts to 95% of the Espenshade-based figure. The similarity between the 
two series is striking, and the difference might be entirely imputed to non- 
Mexican illegal migration. This comparison is consistent with the hypothesis 
of small or negligible sample selection in the illegal migrant sample used in 
the current analysis. Moreover, it indirectly suggest that the MMP71 data 
may be representative of Mexican illegal migrants at large.
29All figures have been rounded.
59
As an additional robustness check, average annual illegal migration in­
flow is computed omitting the 1987, 1992 and post-1993 survey years (corre­
sponding to im portant policy changes), on the grounds that the interviewees 
in those years may be non-randomly selected. The two series are nearly iden­
tical up to 1987, and differ between 1988 and 1991, when, however, there 
are few available observations for the smaller sample. This is a further con­
firmation of the sample reliability.
Massey and Singer (1995)  4-----MX-based MMP71 -  sub-sam ple
Espenshade (1995)  MX-based MMP71
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Figure 2 .8 : comparison of various estimates of illegal migration inflow (in 
thousands)
Aggregate returns can be calculated by computing the annual depar­
ture rate of the sample of current illegal migrants in the United States and 
comparing it to the estimated illegal migration volume. The population of 
U.S.-resident undocumented Mexican migrants is extremely mobile. In fact, 
annual illegal departures for the observed years amount to 95% of undocu­
mented annual entries for the MMP71 sample, corresponding to 1 ,2 0 2 ,0 0 0  
mean yearly departures. INS estimates can be used to check the consis­
tency of the estimated variable. The INS calculates that the population of 
U.S.-based Mexican illegals between 1988 and 1992 grew by 154,000 units 
per year. Departures from the MMP71 sample constitute 95% of entries 
for the corresponding years, while average undocumented migration for the
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Table 2.9: estimated impact of average annual border enforcement growth 
on illegal Mexican migration flow, 1972-1993
Change in inflow Change in outflow Net change
Impact of: (1)“ (2)b (3)a (4)b (5 )= (l)-(3 )
1 extra
LPM -342 (-205; -477) -238 (-95; -384) -104
policeman Probit/CLogit -605 (-471; -738) -457 (-454;-461) -148
Note: column a ’s estimates are computed using the estimated parameters of interest from 
the static models. Column b’s estimates are obtained from the 2 standard deviation 
interval around the respective coefficients. Column (5) is the difference between columns 
(1) and (3). The first row reports estimates from the linear probability model, the second 
one from the probit/conditional logit estimates.
1988-1992 interval is 2,208,000. Hence, its 5% is 110,500, not too dissimilar 
from the corresponding INS estimate. Moreover, sample average net inflow 
amounts to 87,000 individuals, strikingly similar to the 90,000 average an­
nual inflow computed considering the estimated size of undocumented U.S. 
residents of Mexican origin (1 .1  millions in 1980 and 2 millions in 1990).
I estimate the magnitude of the marginal affect using the enforcement 
elasticities from the static specifications and considering the impact of hiring 
an additional patrolling agent. These results are presented in Table 2.9.
Consider the case of an employee working 40 hours per week, 50 weeks 
per year. This translates into 2 ,0 0 0  additional yearly linewatch hours. Such 
increase implies a drop in inflow equal to 342 to 605 people and a reduction 
in outflow of 238 to 457 individuals.
It is worth stressing the multiple conclusions from the above exercise. 
First, gross undocumented migration greatly overestimates the size of the 
net one, as migrants are highly mobile and a large proportion of migrations 
are temporary. It has been estimated that, on average, nearly 1,265,000
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Mexicans manage to cross the U.S. border each year between 1972 and 
1993. At the same time, migrant outflow is nearly as large, averaging 95% 
of annual inflow in the MMP71 sample. This point has long been recognized 
by the existing literature (see, for instance Massey and Singer (1995)).
Second, border patrol’s deterrent effect on prospective undocumented 
migration is sizeable. Given the estimated values, and assuming linearity 
for a sufficiently large interval around the mean marginal effect, the average 
annual increase in border enforcement of 77,500 linewatch hours discour­
ages 13,000 to 23,000 individuals per year from crossing the border illegally 
between 1972 and 1993.
Third, the size of the deterrent effect is substantially reduced (decreased 
by 70 to 75%) by the induced lower mobility of current undocumented mi­
grants: some illegal resident aliens are dissuaded by the enforcement increase 
from returning home, since the tougher controls rise current and future mi­
gration costs, and lengthen their stay in the host country.
Nevertheless, the influence of border controls is still an overall decrease in 
the annual flow of undocumented Mexican migration, although quite small 
in size. The net effect of the average annual increase in linewatch hours is 
a reduction in net inflow of 4,000 to 5,600 people. The effect of hiring an 
extra patrolling agent is a decrease in migrant net flow of 104 to 148 units. 
This translates into high marginal costs to reduce the net flow of illegal 
migration. Assuming a gross cost of $50,000 for the employment of an extra 
patrolling agent, the associated net flow reduction of 104 to 148 migrants 
implies a unit cost of 340 to 480 dollars.30 The cost is even higher if one 
considers that on average only 59 percent of work time is spent patrolling 
the border (GAO, 1996)
The outcome of this analysis raises interesting policy issues. Tight bor­
der enforcement seems to involuntary create a more and more permanent 
population of illegal resident aliens. This might hinder the attem pt of erad­
30This computation ignores the benefit of the patrolling agent in apprehending drug 
smugglers.
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icating illegal migration even more than having a larger number of highly 
mobile undocumented workers. The establishment of U.S.-based illegal mi­
grant enclaves may decrease migration costs for prospective migrants (short­
term  migrants may lack both possibility and interest in helping others out). 
Moreover, participation to welfare programs might be a positive function 
of time spent in the United States. This additional indirect cost should 
be considered in any welfare analysis of the impact of border enforcement 
policies.
2.8 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the existing literature on Mexican illegal migration 
to the United States and its border enforcement. It recognizes the limita­
tion of studying the impact of the policy on the inflow of undocumented 
migrants only by proving that border controls affect the behaviour of both 
prospective and current illegal migrants, resulting in an ambiguous net ef­
fect. Predictions on the effects that increases in enforcement have on both 
inflow and outflow of illegal Mexican migration are derived by modelling 
the repeated decision of undertaking illegal trips to the United States. It is 
shown how rising enforcement intensity has a deterrent effect for prospective 
illegal migrants because it makes the trip more costly, yet these same higher 
costs (both current and future) lengthen the U.S. permanence of current 
undocumented workers.
I present a model were agents may prefer shorter, multiple migrations 
to a single longer one. The model adds to the existing literature in two 
ways. First, it endogenises migration duration in a repeat migration set­
ting. Second, it generates optima with multiple spells of migration without 
introducing shocks or imperfect information. The latter ones are the nor­
mal assumptions made by the related theoretical literature to justify the fact 
that individuals choose to bear the sunk cost of migration more than once. I 
provide alternative explanations for the observed multiple migrations based
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on changes in labour demand and on the hypothesis that absence from home 
bears a positive cost that grows over time. I concentrate on the latter, ex­
plaining this cost both in terms of the positive probability of losing claims on 
current or future asset ownership, and in terms of migrants feeling nostalgic 
or homesick. Both explanations are consistent with the large observed level 
of remittances and by the fact that the probability of returning form a mi­
gration is a positive function of the number of offspring and of the hectares 
of land owned by the household.
The necessity of looking at both inflow and outflow of migrants has not 
been sufficiently acknowledged by the literature, partly because of the scarce 
availability of direct information on undocumented migrants. Such difficulty 
is overcome here by merging data on individual repeated illegal migrations 
with unpublished records of linewatch hours along the Mexico-U.S. border.
The impact of border controls on the behaviour of both prospective and 
current illegal migrants is then estimated modelling the likelihood of un­
dertaking an undocumented migration and of returning from an illegal U.S. 
trip. I provide some evidence to support the robustness of the obtained esti­
mates, despite the failure to observe current illegal migrants in the MMP71 
sample.
I calculate the volume of illegal Mexican immigration in order to com­
pute the marginal effect of border policing on the net inflow of migrants, 
comparing sample average apprehension rates with INS data on annual ag­
gregate arrests. The produced estimates are consistent with those obtained 
applying Espenshade’s methodology (1995b). The resulting figures suggest 
that border controls reduce the total flow of undocumented U.S. foreign 
workers. The annual decrease of illegal immigrations caused by a marginal 
increase in border policing is roughly twice as large as the reduction in 
outflow due to current U.S. illegal residents lengthening their permanence 
abroad. I estimate that the observed annual growth of 77,500 linewatch 
hours is associated with a decrease in the illegal migrant net inflow of 4000 
to 5600 units, and tha t an extra patrolling agent results into a net inflow
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lower by 104 to 148 individuals.
I present some back-of-the-envelope measure of the cost of reducing the 
net flow of illegal migration. I estimate that an extra 340 to 480 dollars were 
needed to reduce net flow by one unit between 1972 and 1993.
These findings have interesting policy implications. First, they show 
that if the intensity of enforcement is chosen without considering its impact 
on the U.S. permanence of current illegal migrants, it results in too high 
levels of border control. This may contribute to explain the disproportion­
ate resource allocation to border versus interior enforcement. Second, the 
findings suggest tha t tight border policing may contribute to the creation of 
a more permanent unauthorized U.S. resident population. More research is 
needed to understand border control’s comparative cost effectiveness.
65
Chapter 3
Aid and Migration: an 
analysis of the impact of 
Progresa on the tim ing and 
size of labour migration
3.1 Introduction
Migration from developing to industrialized countries has been increasing in 
the last few decades, both in Europe and in America. Efforts are made in 
developed countries to limit the migrant flow, composed mainly of unskilled 
labour and in most cases entering the destination country through illegal 
channels. Individuals migrate when the associated benefits exceed both its 
direct and opportunity costs. Migration policies in developed countries aim 
at discouraging unskilled and illegal migration primarily by decreasing its 
benefits (from employers’ sanctions for hiring illegal labour to reduced access 
to welfare programs for broad categories of illegal and legal aliens) or by in­
creasing its direct cost (through measures ranging from border enforcement 
to lengthy or costly visa application procedures).
One possible alternative to discourage migration is to increase its oppor­
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tunity cost by making the prospective migrant better off at home. One mean 
to achieve such objective is by channelling resources through aid programs. 
The relationship between aid and migration is complex, though. On the one 
hand, transfers are expected to improve economic conditions a t home, re­
ducing the economic disparity with the destination locations, hence lowering 
the incentives to leave. On the other hand, if the observed migration level is 
inferior to the desired one because of financial constraints, subsidies may be 
used to fund new trips .1 Aid programs will affect the likelihood of migrating 
by changing both income differentials and the possibility of financing trips.
In the last few years a specific type of aid policy has been adopted by 
a number of Latin American countries. This program, called Progresa in 
Mexico, is aimed at improving education, health and nutrition of poor rural 
households. The objective of the current analysis is to understand the rela­
tionship between this program and migration, both intra- and international. 
The focus of the analysis is on Mexican migration and it is dictated by data 
availability. However, the conclusions reached may be easily extended to 
other sets of countries.
Progresa is an ongoing program that targets poor Mexican rural house­
holds (and has been recently extended to urban locations under the name 
of Oportunidades). Among the various components of the program, there 
are a (smaller) unconditional nutrition support grant, and some (cumula­
tively larger) schooling subsidies, conditional upon attendance of the last 
four grades of primary school and first three grades of secondary school. All 
grants are paid bimonthly, and the schooling subsidy is received upon proof 
of attendance of at least 85 percent of classes. The size of the transfer grows 
with the school grade, and is estimated to correspond to two thirds of the 
wage earned by a teenager in full time employment (Schultz, 2004).
I argue that, although similar in type, primary and secondary school sub­
xThe relationship between aid and migration for households facing liquidity constraints 
and having a home bias has been explored, among others, by Faini and Venturini (1993, 
1994, 2001). Examples of the use of preference for home consumption to justify return 
migration may be found in Djajic and Milbourne (1988) and Dustmann ().
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sidies have different implications in terms of their impact on the recipients’ 
time allocation. Indeed, the subsidy to primary school attendance is roughly 
equivalent to an unconditional transfer, since primary school enrolment is 
very high. The secondary school grant conditionality constraint is instead 
binding for the m ajority of potential recipients, as secondary school enrol­
ment is much lower. Some eligible schoolchildren are potential migrants. 
About 20 percent of the observed international migrations occurring in the 
sample are undertaken by individuals aged 13 to 19.
I study the impact that Progresa has on labour migration only, defined as 
the act of leaving one’s hometown to seek employment elsewhere. Progresa 
enters the decision process of prospective migrants in beneficiary households 
by changing their opportunity costs, their financial resources and their ex­
pected wages.
I group the three monetary components of Progresa into unconditional 
and conditional transfers. The former refers to the nutrition support and 
the primary school grant; the latter is the subsidy to secondary education. I 
show that the two types of grants have different impacts on migration. The 
unconditional transfer may reduce migration, if individuals have a prefer­
ence for consumption at home or, more generally, if migration (intangible) 
costs depend positively on household income. This effect regards the least 
poor households. At the same time, the unconditional grant may result 
in higher migration levels because it relaxes financial constraints for the 
poorest households. The latter fact may have sizeable effects, given that 
the imperfection of capital markets is one acute problem faced by indigent 
families in developing countries.
The conditional transfer may reduce migration in the short term  by re­
quiring recipients to stay in the home country: prospective migrants may be 
deterred from migrating, provided that the size of the grant is high enough. 
W hether beneficiaries revert to migrating at the end of the program depends 
on skilled wages a t home and in the destination locations. In addition, the 
secondary school subsidy may provide migration incentives to individuals
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who would have not left home before the program implementation. The 
short-run impact of the two types of transfers on migration are estimated 
separating the pure income effect from the conditionality one. I distinguish 
the effect on domestic and international migration.
An interesting feature of the program is that 186 of the 506 sampled 
villages are randomized out. Eligible residents of these villages are not ad­
ministered the program until 2 0 0 0 . Eligibility is determined by poverty 
status, which is defined on the basis of household-specific information col­
lected in the pre-program September 1997 census of Progresa localities. All 
residents of both control and treatm ent villages are then interviewed a t reg­
ular intervals. Detailed data on migration are collected on an annual basis. 
This provides us with information on households in both control and treat­
ment villages observed both before and during the implementation of the 
program. I exploit the exogenous variation induced by the randomization 
to obtain a valid counterfactual for treated households, in order to assess 
the impact of the various program components on migration.
The empirical analysis confirms that unconditional cash transfers are 
associated with increased migration, while secondary school grants reduce 
short-term migration.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 uncovers the 
relationship between migration and aid, in the form of both unconditional 
and conditional transfers, by sketching a model of migration and schooling 
choice. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 
4 describes the specification used and discusses the identification of the 
estimable parameters. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6  comments 
on some policy implications and concludes.
3.2 A id and migration: theoretical considerations
Mexican migration, especially international one, tends to be temporary in 
nature, rather than permanent. Household resources are pooled to finance 
the migration of one or more of its members, normally young males, who
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leave their family in the community of origin and spend time away, remit­
ting money at regular intervals, or bringing back their savings with them. 
Remittances are often a sizeable proportion of migrant households’ income.
Virtually all children attend primary school before the program imple­
mentation, as shown in the next chapter. Hence, since most kids would have 
attended school even without the transfer, the eligibility constraint is not 
binding and the subsidy has a pure income effect for the near totality of 
households.
This is not the case for secondary schoolchildren. While re-enrolment 
rates are quite high for kids with some secondary schooling, the likelihood 
of beginning high school is low: before the program, less than 40 percent of 
children aged up to 16 with complete primary school enrol to high school 
(Attanasio et al, 2 0 0 1 ). Three possible factors may explain the low tran­
sition rate from primary to secondary education, which are both free in 
Mexico. One is the higher distance from school, not often available in the 
village of residence (unlike primary schools, present in most localities). The 
second one is the higher opportunity cost, as forgone earnings are likely to be 
higher for teenagers than for younger children. This is especially true given 
that teenage offsprings are potential migrants. In November 1998, one third 
of all migrants from poor households in the control group were up to 19 
at migration. 78 percent have some primary school education. 50 percent 
of migrants have completed primary school when they migrate. A further 
3 percent has some secondary education, while 16 percent has completed 
junior high school.
Progresa’s schooling grant is conditional upon school enrolment and a t­
tendance of at least 85% of classes. Thus, the constraint for transfer eligibil­
ity is binding for the majority of households with secondary schoolchildren. 
Given the differences in pre-program enrolment rates, I consider both in­
come support and primary school grants as unconditional trasnfers, and the 
secondary school subsidy as a conditional one.
The effect of a transfer to poor rural households on migration is going to
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differ according to its eligibility requirements. The effect of an unconditional 
transfer for these families may be a decline in migration, provided that agents 
sufficiently dislike moving abroad (which, in turns, may be a function of their 
wealth). However, the transfer may relax the financial constraint faced by 
poor households: if families could not reach the desired migration level 
before the program because of borrowing constraints were coupled with the 
impossibility to save, they may use the cash subsidies to fund additional 
trips. Overall, then, the net effect of the unconditional transfer depends 
on wealth and on access to the credit market, as well as on the ’’standard” 
variables from any migration model, and cannot be predicted a priori.
In the case of the conditional school subsidy, if household consumption is 
sufficiently far from subsistence level, and if the returns to secondary educa­
tion are high enough, children may move from employment (and migration) 
to schooling. Grant size for grades 7 to 9 amounts only to approximately 
two thirds of the wage a child of the corresponding age might earn if working 
in the village of residence2 (Schultz, 2004), however secondary education is 
expected to provide access to better-paid jobs. The short-term migration 
reduction might be offset by an increase in the medium run, after secondary 
school is completed. Once the education cycle is completed, the individual 
will move to the location that pays highest relative wages, net of moving 
costs.
3 .2 .1  E ffect o f  an  u n c o n d itio n a l tran sfer
The above considerations can be illustrated with the help of a simple model. 
The effect of an unconditional transfer can be captured in a static framework. 
Assume there is a continuum of poor households whose utility (u) depends 
positively on consumption. Households’ pooled resources are labeled Y  >  0  
(income) and are continuously distributed along their support, with some
2The size of the transfer rules out the possibility that a child is enrolled in secondary 
school purely to finance the migration of a family member, if the likelihood of finding a 
job is very high.
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density function F(Y) .  Suppose as a starting point that the only source of 
heterogeneity across households is Y  > 0 .3. Household members include one 
child who attends one of the subdisied primary school grades and another 
one who may be eligible for the secondary school grant. There are two 
locations, ’’home” and ’’away” . While the younger child attends school and 
does not work, the elder may choose between working at home (m =  0 ), 
earning a wage w h, and migrating (m =  1 ), where a wage wa >  w h is 
earned. I rule out any form of intra-household bargaining for the allocation 
of resources or of strategic behaviour by assuming that all members care 
equally for each other.
Migration has a positive cost. This cost is composed by a monetary 
element K  (such as travel expenses), which is exogenous to the migrant, 
and by an intangible one, which is a positive function of potential home 
consumption. Assume for simplicity tha t intangible migration costs equal 
(Y  +  w h) / a , with a  > 1 . The wealthier the household, the larger is the 
intangible cost of not being together. This can be thought of as individu­
als suffering from being (or consuming) apart (as supposed in the previous 
chapter). 1 / a  measures the comparative dislike for ’’away” consumption, 
or for not consuming together at home. The smaller the fraction, hence 
the larger a, the smaller is the disutility from consuming away from home. 
When a  —► oo, household members are indifferent between the location 
where consumption occurs, and care only about its maximization .4
I represent financial constraints by ruling out saving and borrowing. All 
income earned is consumed in the current period. I further assume that the 
migration cost is borne up-front, at the beginning of the period. Hence, only 
households with sufficiently high income (Y  > K ) are able to finance the 
migration, since there cannot be negative consumption. I also assume for 
simplicity that utility is a linear function of the parameters of the model.
3This assumption is not required in the empirical analysis
4The latter is a broad version of the standard opportunity cost argument, including all 
types of goods that cannot be enjoyed while abroad.
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The maximization problem is
max u = Y  +  (1 -  m )w h +  m(wa — K  — (Y  + wh) / a ) 
m = { 0 , l }
All households may potentially benefit from the migration, but only 
those with income such that Y  > K  and Y  < (wa — wh — K ) a — wh will 
undertake it. Very poor families (with income Y  < K )  are unable to finance 
the trip, while the least poor ones (Y  > (wa — wh — K ) a — w h) have too 
high an intangible cost. They are already sufficiently wealthy tha t the higher 
income associated with the migration is offset by the cost of being apart.
An unconditional transfer (T) in the form of a nutrition support or a 
primary school subsidy has a twofold effect. It increases household income, 
relaxing the financial constraint of some of the families for whom migra­
tion was precluded in the baseline case. Hence, some households who were 
previously credit constrained will be able to pay for the migration. These 
are families with income Y  € [K — T; K).  At the same time, the transfer 
increases migration costs, K  +   ^ < K  +  (y+T^ )+7\  Households with
incomes close to the upper threshold will stop migrating. This holds for 
families with income Y  G [(wa — w h — K ) a  — wh — T ; (wa — wh — K ) a  — wh).
The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on F(Y) .  However, the 
more stringent the financial constraint and the poorer the households, the 
higher the likelihood that there will be a net increase in migration. 5 6
3 .2 .2  E ffect o f  a  c o n d itio n a l tran sfer
I now proceed to illustrate the effect of a secondary school subsidy. The 
nature of this problem is dynamic, because current education is associated 
with higher future earnings. I capture the dynamic effects by adding a sec­
ond period to the model and by modelling explicitly the schooling choice
5In the absence of intangible migration costs linked positively to income, the effect of
the unconditional transfer is an unambiguous increase in migration.
6Modelling temporary migration by letting individuals leave for a fraction of the period
(i.e. m  G [0,1]) yields the same ambiguous impact of unconditional transfer on migration
flow, while it reduces migration duration.
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of the adolescent son. This choice is discrete (s =  0 , 1), hence school can 
be attended for the whole period only and is not compatible with migra­
tion. School attendance has a positive price, p, which represents both its 
direct (e.g. travel expenses) and its opportunity cost (forgone earnings). 
Given the borrowing constraints, only households whose income exceeds 
education costs (Y  > p ) are able to finance education. Each pupil is ex­
ogenously endowed with the ability to transform schooling into particular 
types of skills, which are rewarded differently at home and away. Hence, 
each student in the second period has pairs of home and away-specific hu­
man capital, k = (k h, ka)', which will determine wages in both locations 
(wh(k) and wa(k)). Schooling is associated with skilled wages, w^(k) > vji , 
for j  =  h, a and for all k. Wages are identical in the two periods for indi­
viduals with no secondary education. Education changes the incentives to 
migrate by increasing next period home and away wages and by raising the 
intangible cost of migration (through the higher home wage). The intensity 
of these effects is a function of individual-specific returns to education, and 
the decisions will vary depending on households’ income levels.
The maximization problem becomes
max u\  +  u2
m = { 0 , l } , s —{ 0 , l }
u\ =  Y  +  (1  — m i) (w h — ps) -f m\{wa — K  — (Y  4 - wh)/a)
u2 = y  +  (1 -  m 2 )wh{k) +  m 2 [wa(k) - ( K - ( Y  + w h(k1 {s=1 }) ) / a ) 1{mi=0}]
There are six potential outcomes, depending on whether one migrates or 
not in either period and on the schooling choice in period one. The associ­
ated utility is represented by the triplets (m i , m 2 , s), where each parameter 
can take two different values (0  or 1 ). Hence, a household where the teenage 
son goes to school in the first period and migrates in the second one has a 
utility of (0 ,1 ,1). Different outcomes are chosen according to family income 
and returns to education at ’’home” and ’’away”. These are summarized in 
Table 3.1, and discussed below.
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Table 3.1: Inter-temporal schooling and migration decisions
Y <p Yz ( p , K) Y e ( K, Y ) Y > Y
Low k (0 , 0 , 0 ) (0 , 0 , 0 ) (1 . 1 , 0 ) (0 , 0 , 0 )
High enough kh (0 , 0 , 0) (0 , 0 , 1) (0 , 0 , 1) (0 , 0 , 1)
High enough ka (0 , 0 , 0 ) (0 , 0 , 0 ) (0 , 1 , 1) (0 , 0 , 0 )
The poorest families with Y  < p will neither have their teenage child mi­
grate nor go to school. Those with income Y  G (p, K ) will choose whether to 
continue education depending on the level of skilled home wages. Consider 
a deterministic world where individuals know their human capital produc­
tion function. Agents will go to school if the following disequality holds: 
wi  (k ) — wh > p for j  = h, a if Y  > K  and for j  =  h if Y  < K.  It follows that 
for households with income Y  G (p , K ), (0,0,1) >  (0,0,0) for sufficiently 
high k h.
Since wa > w h, agents who choose not to purchase education will mi­
grate in both periods, provided that they are not financially constrained. 
This occurs because once the migration cost has been borne, consumption
is maximized by staying away for as long as possible. This implies that
(1,1,0) > (1 , 0 , 0 ) and (1,1,0) > (0 , 1 , 0 ). Hence, migrants who are not fi­
nancially constrained will choose one of the three outcomes: (1 , 1 , 0 ), (0 , 1 , 1 ) 
or (0 ,0 ,1) according to their location-specific human capital. For instance, 
outcome (1 , 1 , 0 ) will be chosen by households with pairs of human capital 
k and income Y  such that
2 wa — K  — (Y  +  w h)/ot > wh{k) — wh — p (3-1)
i.e. (1 , 1 , 0 ) > (0 , 0 , 1 ), and
2wa > wa(k) +  wh(a +  l ) / a  — wh(k) /a  — p (3.2)
i.e. (1 , 1 , 0 ) > ( 0 , 1 , 1 ).
Three classes of individuals do not migrate in either period. Those with 
very low income, Y  < K\  those with high enough kh to make ’’home”
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skilled wages preferable to migrating in one or two periods; the wealthiest 
households. This latter group is composed by families with income Y  > Y ,  
where
Y  = [wa(k) — p — wh — K]a — w h(k) /a  (3.3)
for individuals with high k a (whose alternative is to go to school in order to 
access the ’’away” skilled wage wa(k)) and
Y  =  [2 (wa — wh) — K]a — w h/ a  (3.4)
for those with low k (whose second best is to migrate in both periods).
The education subsidy reduces the price of education by an amount Ap. 
The general effect of the subsidy of course is to increase attendance of sec­
ondary education. Regarding its effect on migration, the schooling subsidy 
unambiguously reduces short-term  migration. This happens because the 
lower cost of education induces some individuals to move from a two-period 
migration to education. Thus, the subsidy is associated with a reduction in 
the number of (1 , 1 , 0 ) choices in favour of (0 , 0 , 1 ) and (0 , 1 , 1 ) outcomes.
The subsidy’s medium-term effect on migration is instead uncertain. In 
fact, individuals with sufficiently high ’’home” return to education will not 
leave in the second period, i.e. they will switch from (1 , 1 , 0 ) to (0 , 0 , 1 ), as 
shown by (3.1). Agents with a large enough ’’away” skilled wage will instead 
go to school in the first period in order to migrate in the following one and to 
access ’’away” skilled wages, moving from (1 , 1 , 0 ) to (0 , 1 , 1 ), as illustrated in 
(3.2). In addition, the lower price of education will induce children in some 
of the least poor families (the ones with high ’’away” returns to education) 
to attend secondary school in order to migrate in the second period, moving 
from (0, 0, 0) to (0,1,1), as noticeable from (3.3).
Although the net effect of the secondary school grant on medium-term 
migration is not clear, it is possible to make some general considerations to 
understand its potential overall effect. Given that the program targets poor 
rural households, it is expected that ’’home” returns to higher education are 
not as high as ’’away” ones. It is probable that individuals who switched
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from migration to education in the first period will then leave the village 
in the second one. However, multiple migration destination are possible, 
depending on comparative net benefits from a domestic migration to urban 
areas and an international one. The comparative advantage of an interna­
tional versus a domestic migration is lower for educated than uneducated 
migrants, if individuals can only enter the U.S. illegally, since it is likely that 
wages in the secondary segment of the U.S. labour market are less sensitive 
to changes in migrants’ education level. Considering in addition the higher 
migration cost, it is not certain whether migrants with secondary schooling 
will migrate abroad or remain in Mexico.
In short, the effect of Progresa on migration cannot be inferred with 
certainty. This is due various facts. First, the program’s different compo­
nents may provide opposite incentives to migrate. Second, the same type 
of subsidy may affect household’s migration level differently according to 
their degree of poverty, of credit constraints and their children’s compara­
tive skilled wages a t ’’home” and ’’away” . Third, the effect of the conditional 
component of the program may vary in the short and in the medium run.
Modelling the effect of Progresa on migration has highlighted the follow­
ing points. The unconditional grant links current migration to poverty by an 
inverse u-shaped function: it increases emigration of some poor households 
by relaxing their credit constraints, while reducing the incentives to leave of 
the least indigent recipients. Given the poverty level of program recipient, 
though, one expects tha t the loosening of financial constraint associated with 
the program recipience dominates the higher intangible migration costs, re­
sulting in a net migration increase. Contemporaneous migration appears to 
be a negative function of the conditional grant, instead, as both the high 
school subsidy and the future access to skilled wages provide incentives to 
stay a t home. Hence, I expect the conditional and the unconditional pro­
gram components to have opposite effects on the likelihood of migrating.
The volume of future migration depends positively on ’’away” skilled 
wages and negatively on the ’’home” one. If the latter is sufficiently high,
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some individuals will refrain from migrating also in the second period. How­
ever, given the comparative scarcity in skilled labour demand in rural areas, 
one may expect migration to increase in the second period. W hether in­
dividuals will migrate to Mexican urban areas, or will prefer to go to the 
United States depends on the comparative net benefits, which are functions 
of wages and costs, which in turn depend on the type of international mi­
gration (legal or undocumented) . 7
The estimation of the observed net impact and the effect of the program’s 
various components is the subject of the next sections.
3.3 T he Progresa data
Progresa targets Mexican poor rural households and provides grants to im­
prove education, health, consumption and the role of women in the house­
hold. Its main monetary component, apart from a smaller nutritional sub­
sidy, is in the form of a schooling subsidy to children attending the last third 
grades of primary school and the three grades of secondary school. Transfers 
are made to women only (normally the spouse of the household head), and 
are conditional upon regular visits to health centres, to ”platicas” where 
women are taught about health and nutrition issues, and to a school a t­
tendance rate of at least 85% of term time. An interesting feature of the 
program is that, in order to permit the evaluation of its impact, 186 of the 
506 villages sampled for evaluation purposes are randomized out. Poor resi­
dents of these villages are not administered the program until 2000. House­
holds are classified into poor and non-poor according to the information 
collected in the pre-program September 1997 census of Progresa localities.
7Progresa is likely to influence migration through two further channels: changes in 
income distribution and risk. Transfers to poor households reduce both their relative 
deprivation (i.e. their rank in the community income distribution) and income variation. 
Since migration is a mean to smooth risk and improve one’s relative, as well as absolute 
income, then Progresa will result in an unambiguous migration reduction through these 
channels.
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All residents of both control and treatm ent villages are then interviewed 
at biannual intervals. Detailed data are collected on health, consumption, 
income and employment, education and migration at least in one of the two 
annual surveys.8
One shortcoming associated with the implementation of Progresa is the 
presence of a group of eligible households who were ” forgotten” . This means 
that a proportion of households randomized in the program did not receive 
the due benefits initially .9 The likely explanation for this fact is attributed 
to administrative delays and mis-classifications. These were likely caused by 
the dual round of selection of eligible households. In fact, a group of house­
holds initially classified as non-poor were later included in the beneficiary 
group. This process, known as densificacion, took process at the beginning 
of 1998 and increased the proportion of eligible households in treatm ent 
villages from 52 to 78 percent.
The absence of an observable counterfactual for ” forgotten” eligible house­
holds complicates the estimation of the program impact on treated subjects. 
It is studied in the next chapter, where I show a set of conditions under which 
it is possible to estimate the average program effects for all households in 
the Progresa sample. However, such approach is not pursued here because 
of the smaller sample sizes of the relevant groups and the very few migra­
tions occurring within each category. Thus, I restrict my sample to the sole 
households classified as poor in 1997, who constitute 52 percent of the sam­
ple, as already mentioned. Further details on the data are provided both in 
the next sections and in the following chapter.
I consider labour migration only. Both the 1998 and the 1999 surveys 
(unlike the 1997 one) record the motivations for leaving one’s household 
of origin. I distinguish between domestic and international migration. I 
will refer alternatively to international or U.S. migration, since this is the
in form ation on migration is collected in the September 1997, October/November 1998
and November 1999 waves, i.e. rounds 1, 3 and 5 of the survey.
9The difference with the ’’standard” dropout issue is that here the choice of not being
treated is exogenous for ’’forgotten” households.
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most likely destination for international migrants. 95 percent of all trips 
occur when the individual is aged between 14 and 40. Thus, I consider the 
sole subset of people within this age interval as potential migrants. Older 
and younger individuals are discarded from the analysis. As a result, en­
tire households are dropped from the valid sample, which is composed of 
approximately 27,000 individuals from 10,000 households. About 17,000 in­
dividuals (7,000 households) belong to the treatm ent group, as shown in 
Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Sample size of sub-groups
1997 1998 1999
All B F NC B F NC
Treatment
Individuals 16,877 16,532 27 594 15,590 25 464
Households 7192 6617 6 260 6136 5 194
Control
Individuals
Households
10,278
4314
10,295
4096
10,029
3909
B=beneficiary; F=forgotten; NC=non-complier. 1998 data.
The treatm ent group in 1998 and 1999 is split according to transfer 
recipience: B  stands for actual beneficiaries, while F  and N C  indicate for­
gotten and non-complier subjects, respectively. Only 6  families in 1998 are 
not administered the subsidies, although entitled to, irrespective of compli­
ance with program requirements. The number of non-compliers is larger, 
but still quite small when compared to the size of the treatm ent group. In­
deed, the sum of the two groups who do not receive the transfers among 
1997 poor amounts to around 3 percent of total potential beneficiaries in 
the post-program years.
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3.4 Econom etric analysis
The small size of non-compliers and the absence of pre-program significant 
differences in average migration rates between control and treatm ent group 
simplify the econometric analysis greatly. The major advantage of the ran­
domization is that control and treatm ent group do not differ in terms of 
unobservable characteristics. Hence cross-sectional analyses can provide 
consistent estimates of average program effects. Although group means pro­
vide unbiased estimates of the program effect, regression analysis may be 
performed to increase the estimate precision and to control for relevant vari­
ables (such as the presence of shocks, which may not occur randomly in case 
of natural disasters occurring in specific geographic areas).
3 .4 .1  E stim a b le  p a ra m eters
Two parameters commonly estimated in the program evaluation literature 
are intention to treat and average treatm ent on the treated effects (T T E s ). 
The former is estimated by comparing all eligible individuals in the treat­
ment and control groups. This parameter can be interpreted as measuring 
the average program effect for all eligible households irrespective of actual 
treatment.
E[m\T  =  1] -  E[m\T  =  0 ] (3.5)
T  =  {0 ,1 } for subjects in control and treatment villages, respectively. 
m  is some measure of migration to be discussed later.
T T E  measures the average impact of the program on actual beneficiaries. 
Since non-compliers are quite scarce in the considered group, amounting 
to approximately 3 percent of the sample, I expect the difference between 
treatm ent availability and use to be negligible. 10
10The results from the empirical analysis do not change if these two groups are omitted.
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E[m\T = 1] — E[m\T = 0 ]
=  0.97 {E[m\T  =  1 ,5  =  1 ] -  E[m\T  =  0 ,5  =  1]}
+0.03 {E[m\T  = 1 , 5  =  0 ] -  E[m\T  =  0, B  = 0 ]}
“  5 [m |T  =  1 ,5  =  1] — E[m\T  =  0 ,5  =  1]
B  refers to being a program dropout, or actual beneficiary, (=  1 ) or not
(=  0). In the remaining sections I will only refer to TTEs, although the
parameters tha t I am actually estimating are the intention to treat ones.
The actual grant received by beneficiaries is not observed. Not all eligible 
children may end up going to school. Thus, I will use potential grant size and 
composition when estimating the effects of the program components. Never­
theless, the resulting parameters have a clear policy significance, since they 
measure the impact of what is under the control of the policy maker, rather 
than parameters depending on households’ acceptance of the treatm ent.
3 .4 .2  P ro g ra m  effect: sp e c ifica tio n  an d  id en tifica tio n
The identification of average T T E s  relies on the village randomization and is 
based upon the claim that eligible individuals do not differ from control ones 
in terms of unobservable characteristics. Thus, unbiased counterfactuals of 
the above parameters are given by their sample analogs ( % ,  T  =  0 , 1 ). The 
simplest way, and natural starting point, is to compute simple group means 
and test for their statistical difference.
E[m\T  =  1] — E[m\T  =  0 ] =  fh\ — mo
In the case of a dichotomous variable these are the difference in average 
likelihood of migrating due to Progresa. I adopt this approach to estimate 
the overall program effect on migration, alternatively pooling migrations 
and distinguishing between domestic and international ones.
The theoretical model highlights how the conditional and unconditional 
components of the transfer may impact migration differently, hence how a
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grant of a given size may affect households in varying ways, depending on 
beneficiaries’ and households’ characteristics. A simple way to test these 
hypotheses is to condition on potential grant size and composition. I create 
a variable tha t measures the potential size of the grant to which households 
would be entitled, were all their children to attend school. Potential grant 
size varies between 190 and 230 pesos and is capped to a maximum of 1250 
and 1500 pesos (in November 1998 and 1999, respectively). The increases 
in grant levels are such that the value of the subsidy is constant over time. 
I also compute the proportion of potential grant associated with eligible 
males’ secondary school attendance. I consider males only because they are 
more likely to be migrants than females in the same age group . 11 At most 
83% of total potential grant may come from male secondary scholarships 
because of the income support provided to all eligible families. 12
I group subjects according to the household grant size (g) and composi­
tion (p ). g takes two values: 0  for low grant sizes, up to its mean, and 1 for 
larger than average transfers, p  has three levels: 0 , for households with all 
unconditional grant; 1, for up to 50% conditional grant, which is the median 
for households with secondary male schoolchildren (the mean is 51%); 2, for 
more than 50% conditional grant. I first test whether there are significant 
differences in the migration propensity of treatm ent and control households 
grouping them by grant size and composition. In other words, I estimate 
the following effects:
TTEgk = E[m\T = l , g  = k] -  E[m\T = 0,g = k\
TTEpj = E[m\T = l , p  = j] -  E[m\T = 0,p = j]
k = 0,1 j  =  0,1 ,2
11 However, for robustness checks I perform the empirical analysis considering also grant 
composition in terms of female secondary school subsidy. The latter does not appear to
be related to migration as much as the former.
12 Further details regarding the creation of these variables, the presence of a common
support among control and treatment households and the amount of variation within the 
two variables are provided in the Appendix.
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There are five such effects. Define m* the dependent variable of the 
latent regression model that determines the migration choice according to 
the following equality: Pr{m,i =  1 ) =  Pr(m* > 0) ,  where m, indicates 
whether the migration is undertaken or not. In the case of discrete g and p :
m *  =  o:o +  a i T i  +  a 2gi  +  ^  <*3jPij +  <*4 +  7 X i  +  it* .7 =  1 , 2  (3 .6 )
j
X  represents additional control variables, u is some white-noise error 
following some fully-specified parametric distribution. The subscript i indi­
cates the i-th individual, i = 1 , ..,iV. When g =  0 and T  = 0 are the omit­
ted groups and the regression is estimated by linear probability model13, 
T T E gi =  0:1 +  <24 and T T E g0 =  0 1 . Inverting g and p provides estimates 
of the T T E s  for the composition effects. These parameters permit to com­
pare different groups of households, but they do not permit to understand 
whether any difference in migration propensity is attributable to size or 
conditionality effects.
To disentangle the two effects, I then proceed to estimate the impact 
of each component, conditioning on the other one, i.e. interacting both by 
the treatm ent dummy. Thus, I measure the income effect testing whether, 
conditioning on grant composition, the effect of the grant on migration is 
larger for larger grant sizes. For instance, suppose that households face 
severe financial constraints, and use the grants to fund additional migrations. 
After conditioning on grant composition and other variables tha t capture 
the overall migration propensity in the family, it is expected that migrants
with more funds will be more likely to migrate than those with little money
transferred to. In other words, one expects the following equation to be 
positive.
[E[m\T  =  1,3 =  1] -  E[m\T = 0,g =  1]} (3.7)
-  {E[m\T  =  1 , 5  =  0] -  E[m\T -  0,g = 0]}
=  T T E g i o  =  T T E g i  -  T T E g o
13For nonlinear models, the coefficient has to be multiplied by the value of the cdf at 
the specific variable levels.
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The same applies to the composition effects, hence the labels T T E pji, 
with j,  I =  0 ,1 ,2 and j  ^  I. The subscripts j  and I refer to the three possible 
pairwise comparisons of the conditional grant proportions (p=zero, low and 
high, as explained above). In the case of discrete g and p:
m* = p\Ti +  fa Qi +  fejPij +  04 QiTi +  ^ 2  fejPijTi +  j X i  +  u* j  = 1 ,2  
j  j
(3.8)
The coefficient on interacted grant size from (3.8), # 4, provides an unbi­
ased estimates of (3.7). The coefficients capture the impact of program 
conditionality on migration: @ 51 < 0  and /?52 < 0  support the view that, 
given grant size, migration is lower among household where the program 
requirements are binding.
In all regressions, I add a set of conditioning variables that are expected 
to capture different migration propensities of households with different de­
mographic composition (a detailed explanation follows in the result section). 
Furthermore, I estimate (3.8) conditioning on continuous g and p , assumed 
alternatively to be linear and quadratic. In this case, the above coefficients 
are measuring the change in migration propensity caused by a marginal in­
crease in the money received (in the case of g) or in the proportion of the 
grant due to male secondary scholarships. Identification in this case hinges 
on the explicit functional form assumptions.
The magnitude of the grant’s income effect depends on its relative size, 
when compared with average migration costs. Average monthly grant size 
for families with children is 348 pesos14, and 250 pesos for childless house­
holds, while the male secondary school subsidy varies between 200 and 250 
pesos in 1998 and 1999. I expect costs to vary with distance from the chosen 
locality, and to be highest for international migrations also for an additional 
reason: the vast majority of international migrations are illegal and tend to 
hire smugglers to cross the border (77 percent of illegal migrants resorted 
to hiring a smuggler in the 1980s and 1990s, paying on average 540 1990 
dollars for the years 1993-1998). Given these high U.S. migration costs, it is
14One dollar was roughly 10 pesos in 1998 and 1999.
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unlikely tha t the cumulative grant in November 1998 is sufficient to finance 
an international trip.
The program may provide incentives to return from a migration. Look­
ing at average remittances, the direct financial incentives appear to be low 
for U.S. migrants, but sizeable for domestic ones. International and domes­
tic migrants remit on average 80 and 400 pesos per month, respectively, and 
households with migrants have on average 1.5 members away. 15 No direct 
information is available on return migrants in the 1998 and 1999 waves. 
However, data on migrants’ stocks are collected. I order to obtain an esti­
mate of the program impact on migration net flows I compare the stocks of 
labour migrants in the treatm ent and control groups. Given the absence of 
pre-program mean difference in migration levels between control and treat­
ment households, any difference in stock can be attributed to differences in 
net flows:
S & - S &  =  S^7 - S g  + N F ^ - N F g  = N F i a - N F g  
if Sg? = Sgy
where S  and N F  indicate migrant stock and net flow, the subscripts refer 
to the relevant year and the superscripts to treatm ent and control group. 
When comparing migrant stocks in 1999, I am looking at the difference in 
net flows in the two years after the pre-program data are collected.
3 .4 .3  D o e s  th e  ra n d o m iza tio n  w ork? P re-p ro g ra m  m ean s
The identification of the parameters of interest is based on cross-sectional 
variation. Thus, it relies on the validity of the randomization, meaning that 
there are no unobservable differences in migration patterns among treat­
15Average Progresa subsidy size data are from Albarran and Attanasio (2001), infor­
mation on smuggler hiring and associated cost has been computed from data collected 
by the Mexican Migration Project. Migrant number and monthly remittances have been 
computed from the November 1998 Encel survey, using average values for the control 
group.
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ment and control groups.16 One possible way to insure that time-invariant 
unobservable individual effects are not driving the result may be to perform 
some difference-in-difference analysis. However, labour migrations are not 
identified in the 1997 data. All household members who are away at the 
time the interview is carried are classified as migrants, including those who 
left to get married and to go to study. While Progresa is expected to in­
crease labour migration, the other types of migrants may decrease, given 
the higher incentives to stay in treated villages. If the two effects offset each 
other, the program may not appear to affect labour migration, even though 
it might actually do.
Alternatively, one can test for pre-program different migration levels. 
Given the interest in the effect of the grant for different household compo­
sition, one has to control whether there are significant differences in pre­
program migration levels for families with different number and type of 
schoolchildren. Extensive evidence will be provided of the absence of signif­
icant differences in the migration rates of various sets of households in the 
treatm ent and control groups.
I classify migration according to its location, computing three different 
variables (total migration, domestic and international one). For each of these 
variables, I consider: average individual migration, proportion of families 
with at least one migrant and average household migration (for households 
with a positive number of migrants).
Average pre-program migration rates along these three dimensions are 
presented in Table 3.3. No significant differences are detected between treat­
ment and control subjects. As migration motives are not known in 1997, 
the values below include not only labour migrations, but also trips for edu­
cational purposes (very few ones) and to get married.
Although true labour migration rates are inflated, the number of in­
dividuals who leave the household in 1997 is extremely low. Fewer than
16This assumption is especially crucial in light of the few migrations occurring in the 
sample.
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Table 3.3: Pre-program mean migration levels
Valid 1997 observations 
A ll US m ig M X m ig
Individuals .0174 .0071 .0103
(.0019) (.0012) (.0014)
T reatm ent H ouseholds (% m ig> 0) .0129 .0055 .0076
(.0016) (.0010) (.0012)
H ouseholds (m ean) “ 1.505 1.475 1.472
(.0730) (.1299) (.0848)
Individuals .0149 .0053 .0095
(.0025) (.0011) (.0023)
Control Households (% m ig> 0) .0118 .0044 .0076
(.0019) (.0011) (.0015)
H ouseholds (m ean) “ 1.588 1.650 1.484
(.1424) (.1596) (.1902)
“computes mean migrant number for household with at least one migrant. Standard 
clustered at the village level.
one percent of the sampled individuals are foreign migrants, the proportion 
rising only slightly for domestic migration. The low migration rate is con­
sistent with the financial constraint hypothesis: some profitable migrations 
may not have been funded because of the impossibility to borrow.
Table 3.4: Pre-program migration differences for various percentiles
Grant size C om position0
p-value o f difference migUS migM X m igUS m igM X
25-th percentile 0.678 0.499 0.263 0.886
50-th percentile 0.160 0.719 0.263 0.886
75-th percentile 0.291 0.473 0.263 0.886
90-th percentile 0.229 0.813 0.355 0.345
a : grant composition measured as proportion of grant due to male secondary school 
attendance. Standard errors clustered at the village level.
The computation of T T E s  for several sub-groups of individuals and the 
interaction with family demographic characteristics (as measured by propor­
tion of grant due to secondary school grant for males) means that one needs 
to test whether the pre-program distribution of migration differs among 
control and treatm ent villages. Mean equality in this case is not a sufficient 
condition. I test for difference migration rates for households at the 25-th, 
50-th, 75-th and 90-th percentile of both potential grant size and grant com­
position measures. The results, which are reported in Table 3.4, show that 
there are no significant differences in pre-program migration rates. I report 
results at the individual level only, since they convey the same message as 
the household-level ones.
To further test for the absence of significant differences in pre-program 
migration levels, I regress (3.6) computing the pre-program equivalent of 
TTEgS and TTEps using 1997 data. All parameters but one are not statis­
tically different from zero.
Table 3.5 reveals that households with a high proportion of secondary
89
Table 3.5: Pre-program migration difference for various household types
m igUS
Individual
migM X migALL m igUS
Household
m igM X migALL
T T E fl0 .0006 .0009 .0015 .0005 .0011 .0017
(.0015) (.0023) (.0030) (.0011) (.0015) (.0021)
T T E sl .0024 -.0002 .0024 .0011 .0002 .0009
(.0017) (.0021) (.0027) (.0015) (.0019) (.0028)
TTEpo .0015 .0000 .0016 .0006 .0005 .0012
(.0013) (.0020) (.0026) (.0009) (.0014) (.0020)
t t e p1 .0003 .0016 .0025 -.0003 .0023 .0009
(.0031) (.0039) (.0049) (.0023) (.0037) (.0052)
t t e p2 -.0003 .0050 .0055 .0903*** .0038 .0080
(.0051) (.0050) (.0075) (.0317) (.0041) (.0071)
Standard errors clustered at the village level.
school children (4% of the total 1997 sample) are significantly more likely to 
have foreign migrant members if they are based in Progresa villages. This 
corresponds to two families among the group of 334 households in treatm ent 
villages having foreign migrants, while no household among the 161 control 
ones has international migrants. Hence, the significant difference may be 
due to the small size of the cells and to the very few international trips 
within cell. In the remaining part of the analysis, particular care will be 
taken in comparing migration rates for groups that are potentially different 
in 1997. Finally, I estimate (3.8) using 1997 data: the coefficients (3^  and 
/?5j  are never statistically different from zero. 17
3.5 A id and migration: results
This section presents estimates of the program impact on various migration 
measures, both at the individual and at the household level. The advantage 
of using individual-level data is that the larger sample size increases the
17This latter set of results is not shown, but it is available upon request.
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precision of the estimates. Its potential drawback is that it may not truly 
represent the decision-making process, because number and type of migrants 
may be chosen simultaneously at the household level. Thus, I also estimate 
the impact of the program components on migration using families as the 
unit of analysis. I look at the program effect on the likelihood of having 
at least one migrant in the household using a probit model. I estimate 
the individual likelihood of being a domestic or international migrant by 
multinomial logit, the ones at the household level by bivariate probit, and 
the likelihood of being a migrant irrespective of the destination by probit 
for both individual- and household-level data.
In order to improve the precision of the estimates, I add the following set 
of conditioning variables to all regressions. Number of household members 
aged 14 to 40; size of owned land; dummies for whether household suf­
fered from a series of ’’shocks” during the interview year; age of household 
head (or spouse, in case of missing information). This first set of regres­
sors is added to both individual- and household-level regressions. Age (as 
second-order polynomial), gender and number of domestic and international 
migrants (excluding self) are added to individual-level specifications only. I 
also experimented with additional regressors, such as presence of disabled 
individuals; individual temporary migration experience; village migration 
intensity; type and number of animals owned; federal state dummies. In­
cluding these variables does not change the results and has no sizeable effect 
on the standard errors. All household-specific variables are from the 1997 
survey, excluding shocks.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level, since localities 
are the primary sampling units and the randomization is performed at the 
village level.
3 .5 .1  A v era g e  p rogram  effect on  m igra tion
Table 3.6 provides group means of the three measures of migration, for do­
mestic, international and pooled labour migrants. Average U.S. migration
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Table 3.6: 1998 and 1999 average migration levels
Valid 1998 observations Valid 1999 observations
All US mig M X mig A ll US m ig M X m ig
Treatm ent
Individuals .0455 .0112* .0342 .0317 0.0078 .0230
Households (% m ig> 0) .0324 .0141* .0192 .0322 .0150* .0187
H ouseholds (m ean) 1.487 1.407 1.471 1.465 1.353 1.459
Control
Individuals .0464 .0070* .0393 .0360 .0097 .0264
Households (% m ig> 0) .0239 .0088* .0153 .0260 .0087* .0188
H ouseholds (m ean) 1.504 1.552 1.454 1.383 1.486 1.291
P-value of m ean difference0 0.878 0.065* 0.338 0.283 0.703 0.258
P-value of m ean difference6 0.107 0.100* 0.364 0.268 0.070* 0.989
P-value of m ean difference0 0.884 0.389 0.920 0.420 0.441 0.151
computes mean migrant number for household with at least one migrant. 
ap-value of the m ean difference at the individual level.
’^cp-value of the mean difference at the household level6=proportion; C=mean).
is significantly higher for the treatm ent group both at the individual and at 
the household level. Average U.S. migration is 1 .1 % for treatm ent individu­
als and 0.7% for control ones. Hence, program availability is associated with 
a 60 percentage point increase in average migration rate. The proportion 
of households with at least one international migrant rises from 0.9 to 1.4, 
corresponding to a 60 percentage point change. However, average household 
migration does not differ between the two groups.
I interpret this fact as evidence that the program transfers are associ­
ated with new households beginning to send their members abroad, rather 
than households with existing U.S. migrants intensifying their members’ mi­
gration rates. This may be either because families with pre-program U.S. 
migrants were either less financially constrained than others to begin with.
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Alternatively, the presence of migrants and their remittances may loosen 
the previously existing financial constraints. This may imply that no mi­
grant ” rationing” occurred in households with migrants before the program 
implementation (I abstract from causality issues here). The difference in 
proportion of households with international migrants persists in 1999. In 
November 1999 treatm ent households have a 0.72 percentage point higher 
likelihood of having at least one U.S. migrant than control households. How­
ever, the difference in individual migration rates is no longer statistically 
significant.
I find the fact that the program may be associated with higher U.S. 
migration already few months after its beginning very interesting, because 
very little money had been transferred at that time. The first grants were 
distributed in May 1998 and, given that there is no schooling in the summer 
months, the more substantial cash component of the program - the schooling 
subsidy - is received (for the first or second time) in October-November. The 
existence of the program and the certainty of eligibility may have loosened 
financial constraints for poor households also through general equilibrium 
effects. The link between program availability and loosened financial con­
straints may operate through two channels: first, the higher liquidity in the 
communities brought about by the program’s cash injection may have in­
creased credit availability. Second, the stream of certain earnings associated 
with program eligibility may be used as a collateral to borrow. These issues 
are not further investigated here because they go beyond the scope of the 
current analysis. However, they clearly deserve more attention. Domestic 
migration rates do not differ between the control and treatm ent group. This 
fact is consistent with domestic migrations being less costly than interna­
tional ones. Hence, trips within Mexico may be financed more easily than 
U.S. ones.
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Table 3.7: 1998 individual migration difference for various household types
m igUS
Individual
m igM X migALL m igUS
Household
m igM X m igALL
T T E 5o .0004 -.0001 .0003 .0022 .0029 .0053
(.0008) (.0025) (.0030) (.0018) (.0040) (.0047)
T T E fli .0010* .0026 .0048* .0039** -.0045 .0006
(.0006) (.0025) (.0028) (.0019) (.0049) (.0053)
TTEpo .0005 .0010 .0016 .0021 .0006 .0030
(.0007) (.0022) (.0027) (.0016) (.0038) (.0043)
T TE pi .0017* .0051 .0088** .0050 .0032 .0101
(.0009) (.0036) (.0039) (.0029) (.0067) (.0073)
T TE p2 .0005 -.0042 -.0031 .0063 -.0066 -.0018
(.0014) (.0045) (.0052) (.0044) (.0092) (.0102)
Standard errors clustered at the village level. Tests of the IIA assumption show that odds 
are independent of other alternatives.
Table 3.8: 1999 migration difference for various household types
m igUS
Individual
m igM X migALL migUS
Household
m igM X migALL
T T E ff0 -.0008 -.0030* -.0048 -.0018 -.0046** -.0074***
(.0010) (.0018) (.0027) (.0017) (.0022) (.0031)
TTEp! .0004 .0003 .0011 -.0010 .0016 .0002
(.0008) (.0015) (.0021) (.0015) (.0020) (.0026)
TTEpo .0006 -.0022 -.0017 -.0007 -.0010 -.0022
(.0008) (.0016) (.0022) (.0013) (.0019) (.0025)
TTE pi -.0013 .0027 .0014 -.0026 -.0003 -.0016
(.0011) (.0024) (.0031) (.0037) (.0033) (.0044)
T TEp2 -.0014 -.0016 -.0041 -.0032 -.0062 -.0123**
(.0013) (.0030) (.0038) (.0048) (.0049) (.0062)
Standard errors clustered at the village level. Tests of the IIA assumption show that odds 
are independent of other alternatives.
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3 .5 .2  H ete ro g e n e o u s  tre a tm e n t e ffects
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the T T E s  for households with similar size and 
type of offspring obtained from (3.6). In this way, one can observe which 
group is affected by the program.
This exercise reveals that in 1998 treated households with above average 
grant amount are significantly more likely to have U.S. migrants than similar 
families in the control group. Further investigation reveals that, although 
all large transfer recipients have higher migration rates than the control 
group, the difference is particularly marked among households with a low 
to medium proportion of conditional grant (i.e. those with p  =  1). One 
possible interpretation of these results, consistent with the credit constraint 
hypothesis, is that families entitled to sufficiently large transfers may use 
them to fund international trips either directly or as collateral to borrow 
against (hence the absence of treatm ent effects for low grant sizes). However, 
this does not happen when subsidies are linked to the home stay of potential 
migrants (hence the absence of treatm ent effect for recipients of large grants 
due mainly to secondary scholarships). Since the evidence in Table 3.7 is 
insufficient to disentangle the two effects, I will return to this point when 
commenting the next set of estimated parameters.
Whichever the driving force behind the significant differences in 1998, 
they disappear in 1999. According to Table 3.8, in fact, not only large grant 
recipients stop having different migration rates than control individuals. 
Also, recipients of low levels subsidies present a significantly lower rate of 
domestic migration. The next sets of results will shed more light on this 
issue. To conclude, note that the significant negative sign of T T E p2 is 
consistent with the predicted conditionality effect.
I now proceed to assess the impact of the two program components - 
conditional and unconditional transfers. I test their impact by regressing 
the individual and household migration likelihood on controls for poten­
tial household grant size and its proportion due to male secondary school 
attendance, as in (3.8).
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Table 3.9: Marginal effects of program components - individual-level 1998
data
(1) (2) 
M ultinom ial logit
(3) (4) 
Logit
m igUS migM X m igUS migM X migALL migALL
treatm ent dum m y .0009 .0000 .0011 .0002 .0043* .0062
(.0009) (.0036) (.0017) (.0054) (.0025) (.0040)
proportionSM .0017 -.0054 .0163** .0298 -.0012 .0182
(.0019) (.0064) (.0086) (.0227) (.0054) (.0170)
proportionSM 2 -.0243* -.0564* .0314
(.0138) (.0337) (.0264)
hh grant (xlO 4) -.0079 .0303 -.0107 .0345 -.0401 -.1130
(.0118) (.0419) (.0126) (.0521) (.0392) (.1472)
hh grant2 (xlO 4) -.0564 -.1810 .4290
(.0692) (.2038) (.6731)
The above continuous variables have been interacted by the treatment dummy. Standard 
errors clustered at the village level. Tests of the IIA assumption show that odds are 
independent of other alternatives.
Table 3.9 presents the estimates of the parameters of interest when I 
consider the variables as first- and second-order polynomials, alternatively. 
The coefficients from the linear specification for both domestic and interna­
tional migration are not statistically significant. The quadratic specification 
instead reveals that U.S. migration among the treated group is a positive 
function of grant composition, for households where less than one third of 
the transfer is linked to male secondary school attendance (for whom the 
individual foreign migration likelihood is 0 .2  percentage point higher than 
the control group). Beyond that value the relationship is inverted: the 
higher the proportion of the grant due to male secondary scholarships in 
the household, the lower the likelihood of being an international migrant. 
People from families with the highest proportion of conditional grant are 0.3
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percentage points less likely to be abroad. A possible explanation for this 
specific functional form may be that the grant income effect dominates the 
composition one initially because the money is mainly transferred uncon­
ditionally. When the proportion of conditional grant increases, households 
shift their offspring’s time allocation from migration to schooling.
Table 3.10: Marginal effects of program components - household-level 1998 
data
(1)
B ivariate P robita
(2) (3) (4) 
Probit
m igUS m igM X m igUS migM X m igALL migALL
treatm ent dum m y -.0031 .0106** .0037 .0107 .0074 .0138
(.0039) (.0051) (.0067) (.0087) (.01354) (.2448)
proportionSM -.0003 .0196 .0085 .0586 .0193 .0750
(.0088) (.0152) (.0266) (.0389) (.0179) (.0489)
proportionSM 2 -.0138 -.0631 -.0895
(.0393) (.0567) (.0713)
hh grant (xlO 4) .1080* -.1680** -.1883 -.1599 -.0457 -.3268
(.0574) (.0857) (.2811) (.3634) (.1038) (.4668)
hh grant2 (xlO4) .2253* -.1997 1.9159
(.1357) (.8528) (3.3612)
The above continuous variables have been interacted by the treatment dummy. Standard 
errors clustered at the village level. a: rho is positive and significant.
The likelihood of being a domestic migrant decreases more than propor­
tionally as the proportion of conditional grant goes up. From Table 3.9, 
individuals in households with maximum conditional grant are 4 percentage 
points less likely to migrate than those in families with no eligible secondary 
school males. Analysis at the household levels reveals that Mexican mi­
gration is also a negative function of grant size: 1 0 0  extra pesos decrease 
migration by 0.16 percentage points. However, most eligible households 
have higher domestic migration rates than control ones, as shown by the
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significance of the treatm ent dummy coefficient. Only households with a 
potential grant size exceeding 630 bimonthly pesos have an overall decrease 
in Mexican migration.
Household-based data analysis also reveals a pattern broadly consistent 
with the predictions of the model, although not necessarily with the evi­
dence from individual-level data. Bivariate probit estimates show a positive 
correlation between grant size and international migration. The coefficient 
from the first column of Table 3.10 implies that 100 extra pesos increase 
the likelihood of having international migrants in the treated group by 0 .1  
percentage points (corresponding to a 7% increase at mean values). The 
effect is even smaller when using the result from the quadratic specification.
To sum up, the results from 1998 show that Progresa is associated with 
an increase in international migration coupled with a reduction in domestic 
ones, to some extent. Both pieces of evidence are consistent with the view 
that credit constraints may influence the household migration decisions. As 
not all desired international migrations can be financed, some members will 
be allocated to domestic migration. The size of the effects is small, though. 
A possible explanation may be the recent implementation of the program: in 
November 1998, households had been receiving schooling grants (which con­
stitute the bulk of the financial assistance) only once or perhaps twice. The 
little money actually received may limit their scope for changes in migration 
intensity and destination.
The magnitude of the effect in 1999 does not appear to be larger, though, 
at least for international migration. The individual likelihood of being in 
the US is 0.23 percentage point lower for those in families where half of 
the grant is due to male secondary scholarship, and 0.38 percentage point 
lower for households with the maximum proportion of conditional grant. 
Moreover, the evidence from Table 3.11 (columns 2 and 4) is to some extent 
puzzling: for households with conditional transfers exceeding one third of 
the total, a higher proportion of conditional grant increases the likelihood of 
having one or more foreign migrants. This issue will be further investigated
98
Table 3.11: Marginal effects of program components - individual-level 1999
data
(1)
M ultinom ial logit
(2) (3) (4) 
Logit
m igUS migM X migUS m igM X migALL migALL
treatm ent dum m y -.0003 -.0015 -.0015 .0016 -.0062* .0001
(.0014) (.0025) (.0026) (.0039) (.0039) (.0071)
proportionSM -.0046** .0036 -.0083 .0320** -.0022 .0363
(.0023) (.0047) (.0065) (.0152) (.0071) (.0235)
proportionSM 2 .0049 -.0454* -.0601
(.0081) (.0239) (.0308)
hh grant (xlO4) .0179 -.0010 .0641 -.2486** .0663* -.0347
(.0185) (.0333) (.0745) (.1268) (.0408) (.3154)
hh grant2 (xlO4) .3257 1.6083* 1.8204*
(.7754) (.9162) (1.0002)
The above continuous variables have been interacted by the treatment dummy. Standard 
errors clustered at the village level. Tests of the IIA assumption show that odds are 
independent of other alternatives.
below. There is also a negative relationship between grant size and U.S. 
migration, for low potential grant levels. The relation is instead positive for 
bimonthly subsidies larger than 660 pesos and positive for low conditional 
grant proportions.
The effect of the program component on domestic migration is similar 
in sign and magnitude to the 1998 one. There are negative grant compo­
sition and size effects, both at the individual and at the household level 
(the quadratic grant function in Table 3.12, column 2 has a negative first 
derivative throughout its support). As in 1998, the reduction in Mexican 
migrations for beneficiaries of large grants is more than compensated by an 
increase in U.S. trips, resulting in an overall positive relationship between 
subsidy size and individual migration (Table 3.12, columns 3 and 4).
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Table 3.12: Marginal effects of program components - household-level 1999
data
(1) (2) 
Bivariate Probita
(3) (4)
Probit
m igUS migM X m igUS migM X migALL migALL
treatm ent dum m y -.0012 .0048 .0044 -.0057 .0035 -.0006
(.0046) (.0055) (.0084) (.0123) (.1375) (.2790)
proportionSM -.0016 -.0093 -.0559** .0653 -.0101 .0045
(.0033) (.0124) (.0299) (.0402) (.0147) (.0489)
proportionSM 2 .0881** -.1082* -.0223
(.0471) (.0605) (.0732)
hh grant (xlO 4) .0776 -.0191 -.4910* .4137 .0712 .2416
(.0448) (.0734) (.2974) (.4401) (.1031) (.5752)
hh grant2 (xlO 8) 3.6808** -3.4938 -.0922
(1.8402) (4.5971) (.3546)
The above continuous variables have been interacted by the treatment dummy. Standard 
errors clustered at the village level. a : rho is positive and significant.
To conclude, the evidence provided so far is consistent with the picture 
emerged from the theoretical model: increasing the income of financially 
constrained household may result in an increase of costly migration, which 
could not be funded before. This is shown both directly (significantly larger 
number of U.S. migrants) and indirectly (through the possible substitution 
of domestic for international trips). The magnitude of these effects appears 
to be quite small.
The current analysis presents two main shortcomings: first, it is hard to 
reconcile the positive relationship between the composition effect and 1999 
household U.S. migration with the theoretical predictions. Second, the two 
program components are never jointly significant in a single specification. 
This might be caused by the limited variation in the data caused by the 
few observed migrations. In order to test for the joint significance of the
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effect, and to test for the robustness of the results, I relax the functional 
form assumption and proceed with the estimation of cell means, as explained 
above.
Table 3.13: Marginal effects of program components - 1998
(1)
1998
(2)
Individual-level data H ousehold-level d ata
m igUS m igM X migALL m igUS migM X migALL
T T E g i o .0000 .0027 .0033 .0124** -.0088** -.0009
(.0012) (.0038) (.0044) (.0077) (.0044) (.0076)
T T  E pio .0015 .0024 .0055 .0025 .0174 .0205
(.0021) (.0052) (.0062) (.0079) (.0158) (.0174)
T T  E p 2 0 .0000 -.0054 -.0054 -.0020 .0085 .0054
(.0016) (.0032) (.0041) (.0047) (.0134) (.0132)
T T E P2i -.0010 -.0071 -.0093* -.0036 -.0047 -.0091
(.0012) (.0038) (.0045) (.0046) (.0069) (.0083)
Tests of the IIA assumption show that odds are independent of other alternatives. The 
correlation between the residuals from the household-level estimation is positive and sig­
nificant. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Regression estimates available 
upon request.
The T T E s  presented in Tables 3.13 and 3.14 are estimated from (univari­
ate or bivariate) probits of the likelihood of being a migrant, or of having 
migrants in the household, interacting the treatment dummy by the dis­
crete variables grouping grant level and composition, as described above. 
The estimated effects suggest that both domestic and U.S. migrations are a 
function of grant size and composition. The effects tend to be more marked 
in 1999, when more money has been distributed and households have had 
enough time to respond to the new set of incentives.
As regards international migration, the effect of the program on migra­
tion is larger for high grant sizes, i.e. the likelihood of having migrants in
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Table 3.14: Marginal effects of program components - 1999
(3)
1999
(4)
Individual-level data H ousehold-level data
m igUS migM X migALL migUS migM X migALL
T T E g i o .0039** .0020 .0073* .0243*** -.0096* .0030
(.0023) (.0026) (.0043) (.0103) (.0046) (.0088)
T T  E pio -.0023*** .0045 -.0010 -.0086*** .0155 -.0015
(.0006) (.0045) (.0042) (.0020) (.0157) (.0109)
T T  E p 2 0 -.0020*** -.0000 -.0042 -.0000 -.0046 -.0030
(.0005) (.0032) (.0031) (.0053) (.0055) (.0084)
T T E P2\ .0006 -.0033 -.0034 .0248* -.0112** -.0016
(.0016) (.0026) (.0037) (.0204) (.0039) (.0116)
Tests of the IIA assumption show that odds are independent of other alternatives. The 
correlation between the residuals from the household-level estimation is positive and sig­
nificant. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Regression estimates available 
upon request.
the household is a positive function of transferred resources. A household 
that receives a high grant level is (in 1998 and 1999, respectively) 1.2 and 
2.4 percentage points more likely to have at least one US migrant member 
than one that receives a low grant level (when both are compared with the 
respective control group). The same applies to individual data in 1999. This 
is consistent with the credit constraint hypothesis.
Conditioning the grant to secondary school attendance reduces contem­
poraneous U.S. migration. In 1999, individuals from households with at 
least one secondary school eligible male are 0 .2  percentage point less likely 
to be U.S. migrants than those in households where all transfers are uncondi­
tional. However, households with a high proportion of conditional transfers 
are more likely to have spells of U.S. migration than those with low to 
medium conditional grants. A similar conclusion had been reached when
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imposing explicit functional forms. A possible explanation of this migration 
pattern will be pursued below.
The relationship between domestic migration and grant size is negative. 
This fact may be interpreted in two different ways. Households may be 
shifting migrants from Mexico to the US, as they are able to fund the more 
expensive, yet potentially more rewarding international trips. Alternatively, 
this result may be evidence of the ’’home bias” effect: the additional income 
received through Progresa makes migration more costly (for instance because 
of the higher level of forgone home consumption), resulting in fewer members 
being away. The first interpretation seems more sensible. If the ” home bias” 
effect were the dominating one, there would not be a surge in international 
migration.
As far as the conditionality effect is concerned, there is evidence that 
higher proportions of conditional grants are associated with lower migration 
rates also for Mexican migration in 1999.
To test the robustness of the result, I tried to condition on different 
sets of households. Moreover, I included measures of the conditional grant 
proportion associated with female secondary scholarships. The results did 
not change in either case.
Effect o f a cap on m axim um  transfer size on international m igra­
tion
The previous analysis has revealed that households with a high proportion of 
conditional transfers are more likely to have spells of U.S. migration in 1999 
than those with low to medium conditional grants. Here I check whether 
this may be caused by the subsidy cap. The maximum bimonthly amount 
that households are entitled to is 1170 pesos in November 1998, and 1390 the 
following year. Households with a number of eligible children that exceeds 
the maximum subsidy have the individual school grants re-scaled to sum up 
to the maximum level. Hence, their monetary incentives to send members 
to school are lower, and the comparative incentives for migration higher.
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Visual observation of cell means confirms this intuition: mean U.S. migration 
for treated households - but not for control ones - decreases when capped 
households are excluded from the computation both in 1998 and 1999.
To test this hypothesis, I first interact the treatm ent dummy with a vari­
able taking the value of one for those households that are capped because 
they have an ’’excess” of secondary school males. I repeat the same exercise 
with a dummy for all ’’capped” households, irrespective of their school chil­
dren composition. The magnitude and significance of the estimated T T E s  
do not change in either occasion, though.
However, when I create a third grant size category to group capped 
households (hence the new g takes three values, 0 , for up to medium potential 
grant size, 1 , for higher than average grant size, 2 , for maximum grant size 
and an ’’excess supply” of eligible school children), the significance of T T E p2 \ 
becomes much weaker (with a p value of .133), and its magnitude slightly 
smaller, dropping to 1.9. This only holds when considering the households 
with ’’too many” eligible secondary school males, and not with all capped 
households. I interpret this fact as evidence that the presence of a cap on the 
maximum size of the transfer may increase migration (although other factors 
may be present too). This result confirms once more how the different modes 
and formats of aid to developing countries may have different impacts on 
household time allocation, even when the same amount of money is being 
transferred.
3 .5 .3  M e d iu m -te r m  m ig ra tio n
So far I have shown that Progresa is associated with a short-term increase in 
average international migration. I have inferred that this is due primarily to 
the existence of an unconditional transfer component, i.e. that households 
are transferred money without having to comply with requirements that 
force them not to migrate. However, I have also shown that conditional 
transfers targeting prospective migrants may achieve a migration reduction 
in the short run. In fact, households with a sufficiently high proportions
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of secondary school males may end up having lower migration rates than 
before the program implementation because of its ’’conditionality” effect 
(i.e. the necessity to comply with the program requirements in order to 
be eligible for the subsidy). However, it is possible that secondary school 
males may revert to migration after they complete secondary education. 
The model shows that their future choices depend on the location where 
their accumulated human capital reaps the highest return - and that such 
location may not necessarily be abroad, but rather in Mexican urban centres 
such as state capital.
One way to assess the medium-term program effect on migration is to 
look at choices of individuals who have completed the first three years of 
secondary school. I focus on the sub-set of individuals aged 15 to 18 with 
some or complete junior high-school education in November 1999. These 
individuals were potentially entitled to the program educational grant for 
the 1998-1999 academic year. I then look at whether children from treatm ent 
villages are significantly more likely to migrate than children from the control 
group.
I create two dichotomous variables that record migrations for two cat­
egories of teenagers: those with complete junior high school in 1999, and 
those with some level of secondary education. I focus on trips started in 
the six months between the end of the academic year, which I assume to be 
at the beginning of June, and the interview time, in November. The valid 
sample consists of 1567 individuals with completed junior high school, and 
of 3602 ones with a t least one year of secondary education.
Mean comparison of the individual likelihood of undertaking a migration 
shows that children from treatm ent localities do not have different migration 
propensities than those in control ones. Although the size of the sample is 
quite small, and the fact they do not migrate immediately after the end 
of the transfer does not prevent them from undertaking future migration, 
this result suggest that education support programs may not cause higher 
migration in the medium term. One shortcoming of the current analysis is
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Table 3.15: Average migration rate of 1999 secondary schoolchildren
Sub-sam ple C om plete junior high > 1  year secondary education
Treatm ent .024 .013
(.007) (.003)
Control .023 .014
(.006) (.004)
p-value of difference .933 .776
Standard errors clustered at the village level.
that ideally one would want to observe post-schooling migration behaviour 
of individuals who began to go to junior high school because of the program 
implementation, rather than those who took advantage of the scholarship 
while they had already started the schooling cycle. Unfortunately, the first 
such cohort graduates in 2001. In 1999 only the latter group is observed. 
More research is needed in this field.
3.6 Conclusions
The current exercise contributes to our knowledge of the relationship be­
tween aid and migration by analysing the impact of the development pro­
gram Progresa on domestic and international migration of poor rural house­
holds. In particular, I have tried to understand how different program com­
ponents may provide opposite incentives to migrate. The theoretical model 
has shown that unconditional transfers may increase migration rates by 
loosening the credit constraints faced by indigent households. The larger 
the poverty level, the higher the likelihood that this effect dominates any 
(supposed) ” home bias” , often described in the literature as a preference for 
home consumption. Conditional transfers that target potential migrants and 
require them to stay at home are associated with a migration reduction in 
the short run. Individual behaviour in the medium run and their migration 
choices depend on differentials in returns to the extra skills learned.
The empirical analysis, which considers migrations both as an individual
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and as a household decision, uncovers interesting facts. First, the program 
is associated with an increase in average international migration, confirming 
that fact that credit-constrained households may be forced to undertake 
a sub-optimal number of potentially profitable migrations because of the 
impossibility to finance the trips. Second, the extra cash is used to finance 
migrations in households who did not have any migrant previously, rather 
than increase average migration rates for all households. Third, average 
domestic migration levels are not affected by program availability, suggesting 
that it is mainly the more costly international trips that cannot be financed 
by poor households.
Fourth, the existence of the program may increase the level of borrowing 
among poor households, by injecting cash in the villages or by being used 
as a collateral to access the credit market. This is deduced by observing 
that international migration rates increase after very little money is trans­
ferred to households, and do not grow in a way correlated with the total 
amount of cash transferred over time (i.e. total program effect does not dif­
fer substantially for treatm ent poor between November 1998 and November 
1999).
Fifth, different households face varying migration incentives linked to 
their demographic composition. Those with a large grant proportion com­
ing from secondary school subsidies will migrate less than those for whom 
the program requirements are not binding (i.e. families with primary school 
children). One exception to this pattern is provided by 1999 U.S. trips 
(when modelled as decided at the household level, rather than at the indi­
vidual one), which appear to be higher for high than for medium conditional 
grant proportions. A partial explanation is given by showing that house­
holds where not all secondary school males are entitled to the school subsidy 
because of a cap on the maximum grant size are more likely to have U.S. 
migrants. However, additional (and yet uncovered) factors are likely to play 
a significant role in explaining this puzzling effect.
Sixth, as (potential) grant size increases, households substitute (cheaper
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but with lower return) domestic for (costlier but with a higher benefit) inter­
national migration. This fact provides additional evidence of the importance 
of credit constraints in developing countries. Nevertheless, the net creation 
of migration associated with Progresa is positive.
Seventh, the secondary school subsidy is not associated with a post­
program increase in migration. I observed the location choice of teenagers 
with completed junior high school in 1999. There is no significant post­
program different migration rate between individuals from treatm ent and 
control groups.
These findings have interesting policy implications. They show that it 
is possible to implement aid policies that do not result into higher interna­
tional migration. The way to insure that the transfers are used to finance 
extra migrations is to give emphasis to conditional grants such as subsidies 
for secondary education. This approach is already being pursued, albeit 
perhaps unintentionally. In fact, Progresa has been recently extended to 
cover Mexico’s urban areas (under the name of Oportunidades). There, the 
education transfer has been extended in order to subsidize also additional 
schooling years. It is possible that this type of transfer may result into a 
net reduction in short-term international migration. If skilled wages in ur­
ban Mexico are sufficiently high, the program may not even cause higher 
medium-term U.S. migration.
The current research has also pointed out directions for further investiga­
tion. One is to understand the effect of the program on access to credit. The 
other is to look at comparative effects of different policies on international 
migration, such as aid and border enforcement.
3.7 Appendix: variables creation
In this section, further information is provided on the creation of the vari­
ables of interest, potential grant size and composition.
No information is available on effective size of the received transfer. 
Hence, it is only possible to compute the potential transfer size. This ap­
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proach rules out endogeneity issues related to partial acceptance of the pro­
gram, while it permits the estimation of parameters with strong policy rele­
vance: the impact of the availability of a transfer (the policy maker cannot 
force individuals to comply with the program requirements). Its drawback 
is the difficulty of assessing the effective monetary impact of the program.
Potential grant size is computed considering all children aged 5 to 1818 
in the November 1998 survey using last completed school grade. I use 1998 
information rather than 1997 one because I would like to include current mi­
grants in the computed potential grant, given that some of them, especially 
those who are in the same state, may actually decide to go back to school. 
No information on schooling level of migrants is available in the September 
1997 survey. A consequence of this choice is that there will be differences in 
1999 potential grant size estimated using 1997 versus 1998 data. In the lat­
ter case, only children who completed the first year of primary school in the 
1997-1998 academic year will be considered eligible for the program in the 
academic year 1999-2000 (having assumed that they completed their second 
grade in 1998-1999). Potential grant size built projecting grade completion 
information for the 1996-1997 academic year, instead, must assume that 
all children aged 6  in September 1997 will have completed second grade by 
June 1999. Only if I match grade completion data with current enrolment 
for first-graders will the two measures coincide in 1999. A further difference 
is given by the fact that using 1998 information I do not have to assume 
that nobody fails in the 1997-1998 academic year.
Two implicit assumptions are made in the computation of potential grant 
size: first, grade completion is independent from existence of the program. 
The assumption is violated if the latter is a function of future program eligi­
bility. Children progressing to a subsidized grade may have higher incentives 
to pass, while those in the final subsidized grade may be more likely to fail 
to receive benefits the following year. Second, it is assumed that all students
1818 year old individuals are dropped from the computation in 1999. Children aged 5 
in November 1998 are included in case they reach third grade in the 1999-2000 academic 
year.
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pass the grade, independently of actual school attendance and of whether 
the child actually left the household. Again, any strategic behaviour has 
been hence ruled out.
Four measures of potential grant amount are built and used in the esti­
mations. Such measures are obtained by varying two parameters: the type 
of children included and the time dimension considered. As regards the for­
mer, in one case only November 1998 residents are included in the compu­
tation, hence omitting all children who are elsewhere for any sort of reason. 
The time dimension varies in the sense that in one case I estimate current 
bimonthly transfer size computed for both November 1998 and November 
1999, while in another case I compute total potential amount. In this way, 
emphasis is given to the fact that the cumulative grant, rather than the 
current one, matters for financially constrained households. There is some 
variation among the two only in 1999, given by families with children in the 
third year of junior high in the 1998-1999 academic year.
The figures shown below are computed excluding migrants. Moreover, 
for 1999 data, they only use the estimated value of potential current grant, 
instead of using the cumulative one. However, the results are robust to the 
use of the alternative measures of potential grant and its composition.
Table 3.16: Average pre-program potential grant size (at 1999 values) and 
grant composition
Variable Grant size Com position"
Treatm ent 560 .055
(8.2) (.003)
Control 562 .050
(10.3) (.003)
p-value of difference 0.906 0.286
a : grant composition measured as proportion of grant due to male secondary school 
attendance.
Standard errors clustered at the village level.
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Identification of the parameters of interest in the assessment of the effect 
of the program components is possible for the following reasons. First, the 
number and composition of eligible schoolchildren by households is very sim­
ilar among control and treatment villages and it insures that potential grant 
size has a common support for the two groups. I created potential grant size 
and grant composition measures also for the 1997 sample, using 1999 grant 
size. 19 There is no significant difference for both potential grant size and 
grant composition between control and treatment households. Second, there 
is a large variation in the number, gender and school level of eligible children 
by family also within treated households. Indeed the correlation between 
grant size and composition is positive and significant, amounting to 0.47 
(0.46 for treatm ent poor only) in 1997, but it is far from unity. Third, the 
specific grant amounts are such that different combinations of primary and 
secondary school beneficiaries yield the same potential transfer level. Hence, 
households entitled to roughly equivalent grant levels may vary substantially 
in the proportion of secondary school males.
19I.e. the size and composition of grant that one household would be entitled to in 1997, 
had the program been already implemented with 1999 scholarship levels.
Chapter 4
A note on the identification  
of counterfactuals in the 
experim ental sample of 
Progresa
4.1 Introduction
Progresa targets Mexican poor rural households and provides grants to im­
prove education, health, consumption and the role of women in the house­
hold. Its main monetary component, apart from a smaller nutritional sub­
sidy, is in the form of a schooling subsidy to children attending the last 
third grades of primary school and the three grades of secondary school. 
Transfers are made to women only (normally the spouse of the household 
head), and are conditional upon regular visits to health centres, to platicas 
where women are taught about health and nutrition issues, and to a school 
attendance rate of at legist 85% of term time. 186 of the 506 villages sampled 
for evaluation purposes are randomized out. Poor residents of these villages 
are not administered the program until 2000. Households are classified into 
poor and non-poor according to the information collected in the pre-program
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September 1997 census of Progresa localities. All residents of both control 
and treatm ent villages are then interviewed at biannual intervals. Detailed 
data are collected on health, consumption, income and employment, edu­
cation and migration at least in one of the two annual surveys. W ith a 
sample size ranging between 22,000 and 25,000 households in both control 
and treatm ent villages, complete coverage of all locality residents, a panel of 
up to five waves, of which one or two prior to the implementation of the pro­
gram, and the exogenous variation induced by the randomization, it is not 
surprising that the Progresa data have attracted the attention of scholars 
and researchers.
One shortcoming associated with the implementation of Progresa is the 
presence of a group of eligible households who did not receive any benefit 
by March 2000. Buddelmeyer and Skoufias (2003) report that this group 
amounts to 27% of the total eligible population in treatment localities. The 
likely explanation for this fact is attributed to administrative delays and 
mis-classifications. Albarran and Attanasio (2001) compare forgotten and 
beneficiary households, and find that there are significant differences in av­
erage observable characteristics, although no set of variables could identify 
either group with probability one.1 The absence of an observable counter- 
factual for eligible households who did not receive the transfer complicates 
the estimation of the program’s impact on actually treated subjects.
This issue has been seldom recognized and addressed appropriately by 
previous users of the Progresa data. In most cases, this estimation issue 
is ignored altogether. Schultz (2004) and Dubois et al. (2001), among 
others, do not mention it at all. Buddelmeyer and Skoufias (2003) use only 
a sub-sample of the available eligible poor. Albarran and Attanasio (2001) 
introduce additional assumptions to identify the effect of the treatm ent on 
the eligible non-treated.
This note reviews the approaches employed to estimate Treatment on 
the Treated Effects (T T E s ) in the presence of non-compliers and presents
Albarran and Attanasio (2001), p.9.
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an alternative estimating procedure to identify counterfactuals that requires 
no identifying hypotheses nor exclusion restrictions for users of the Progresa 
data. Although the focus of the current analysis is on mean effects only, the 
same logic can be applied to distributions.
4.2 Standard estim ation of TTEs  w ith non-com pliers 
or dropouts
Suppose one wishes to estimate the impact of Progresa on an outcome y. 
The program’s design is such that a random subset of the whole sample 
of participants is not administered the treatment, named control group in 
jargon. The associated mean outcomes are E[y\P = 1] and E[y\P  =  0] 
for poor households in the treatment (P  =  1) and control (P  =  0) groups, 
respectively. The randomization insures that the distribution of observable 
and unobservable characteristics among treatment and control subjects is 
the same. In such case, the control group is a valid counterfactual for the 
treatm ent one, i.e. if the treated agents had not received the program, their 
average outcome would have been E[y\P  =  0]. Hence, the treatm ent on 
the treated effect is simply the difference of mean outcomes among the two 
groups,
E[y\P  =  1] -  E[y\P = 0] (4.1)
Assume instead tha t a non-random sub-sample of the treatm ent group of 
size nt does not actually receive the program. In consequence, the effect 
of the program on potential and actual beneficiaries may differ and (4.1) 
would simply measure the intention to treat. Mean outcome for agents in 
the treatm ent group would be a weighted average of mean outcomes for 
actually treated and non-treated agents,
E\y\P  =  1] =  (1 -  n t)E[y\P =  1, C  =  b\ +  n tE[y\P  =  1, C  =  nc] (4.2)
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E[y\P  =  0] =  (1 — nc)E[y\P = 0, C  =  6] +  ncE{y\P  =  0, C =  nc] (4.3)
where C  equals b for de facto beneficiaries and nc for non-complying 
households and n c =  nt =  n  because of the randomization. In order to 
estimate the effect of the program on actual beneficiaries only, one would 
have to know who would be actually treated among control subjects. Since 
E[y\P  =  0, C  =  b] is not observed, the impact of the program on actually 
treated participants cannot be directly estimated.
Note that the described scenario is quite common in social experiments, 
as some individuals from the treated group may fail to comply with the eligi­
bility requirements or may drop out of the program. In these circumstances 
estimation of the parameter of interest has to rely either on some identi­
fying assumption or on some exclusion restriction. A standard identifying 
assumption employed by the literature in similar cases is that the program 
has no effect on non-beneficiaries in the treatment group:
E[y\P = 0  ,C  = nc]= E[y\P = 0 ,C  = nc] (4.4)
This implies that program impact for actual beneficiaries is a proportion 
of the difference in mean outcomes between treatment and control groups 
(irrespective of actual treatment)
E[y\P =  i] — E[y\P — o] (45)
n
as obtained by rearranging (4.2) and (4.3) after imposing (4.4). This is 
the assumption used by Bloom (1984). Heckman et al. (1998) explore the 
use of exclusion restrictions to identify the parameter of interest when the 
impact on non-compliers or dropouts is not expected to be null. However, 
they show how the results are sensitive to small changes in the underlying 
assumptions. More recently, Albarran and Attanasio (2001) rely on a weaker 
assumption in their study of the effect of Progresa on private transfers among
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poor households. They hypothesize that the effect of the program on eli­
gible subjects tha t ended up not being treated is equivalent to the general 
equilibrium effect on the non-poor population.2 Hence,
E[y\P  =  1, C  =  nc] — E[y\P =  0, C = nc] =
E[y\N P  =  1, C = nc] -  E[y\NP  =  0, C  =  nc] (4.6)
where N P  refers to poor and non-poor agents. In this way, the effect of 
treatm ent on actually treated households is given by:
& H = } ) .7 .E ¥ P. ~  ° ! - 1 —^  {E[y\NP = 1, C = nc] -  E[y\N P = 0, C  =  nc]}
4.3 Estim ation of TTEs  in Progresa
Progresa data permit to estimate T T E s  for all eligible poor without the 
need of identifying assumptions or exclusion restrictions. The estimable 
parameters bear potential economic and policy relevance.
In order to illustrate the point formally, it is necessary to briefly review 
the selection process of eligible households employed for the Progresa eval­
uation and to introduce some notation. The primary source of information
are the two reports by Skoufias et al. (1999a, 1999b), to which the interested
reader is addressed for further details.
In the first stages of the program implementation, in 1997, the selection 
method identified roughly 52 percent of all households (in both treatment 
and control villages) as eligible and the remaining 48 percent as non-poor.
Let’s call the former group ” 1997 poor”. The following year, a revision of 
the eligibility status was undertaken, since the previous method was felt to 
discriminate poor households with no young children. A group of house­
holds composed by individuals initially classified as not poor was included 
in the eligible set. This group accounts for a further 25 percent of the total 
population and it roughly halves the non-poor size. I label them ” den- 
sificados”, after the Spanish word used to indicate the eligibility revision
2Progresa targets poor households only. However, information is collected also on 
non-poor ones.
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(densificacion). A further set of households starts being recorded in the Oc­
tober/November 1998 survey in both treatment and controls villages. They 
belong to both poor and non-poor group. They are labeled ’’immigrants” . 
Further details on each group will be provided in the relevant subsections.
Table 4.1: Household categories by village type (absolute values and per­
centages), November 1998 data
treatment 
non-poor poor
control 
non-poor poor Total
1997 3233 7837 2048 4682 17800
(92.4) (63.6) (92.6) (61.4) (69.4)
densificados 0 3786 0 2491 6277
(0) (30.7) (0) (32.6) (24.4)
immigrants 254 667 155 437 1514
(7.2) (5.4) (7.0) (5.7) (5.9)
total 3487 12290 2203 7610 25590
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Table 4.1 presents a breakdown of households by the aforementioned 
groups for the 1998 data (round 3). Among poor households, the majority 
belongs to the ” 1997” group (63 percent in treatment villages, and 61 percent 
in control communities). Densificados amount to less than a third of all poor, 
while immigrants constitute 5-6 percent of the sample. At this stage of the 
analysis it is not clear whether immigrants are part of the sample of eligible 
individuals, because of their late appearance in the data sets. Assuming 
they do, outcomes for the treatment and control groups can be decomposed
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in the following way3:
E[y\P = t}=  p 9 7 E[y\P97 =  t] (4.7)
+pDE[y\PD  =  t] +  (1 -  pQ7 -  pn)E[y\PI = t]
where t — {0,1} indicates control and treatment group, respectively, and 
P 97, P D  and P I  refers to 1997 poor, densificados and immigrants. The 
shares of P 97 and PD, pg7 and pjj, are of equal size among treatm ent and 
control villages because of the randomisation. The proportion of immigrants 
in the two types of villages is identical, as shown below.
E\y\P  =  1] — E[y\P — 0] estimates the intention to treat effect, i.e. 
the average effect of Progresa on the eligible sample, irrespective of actual 
treatm ent. This parameter is of obvious policy relevance, as it measures the 
average effect that the program has on the targeted subjects, irrespective of 
the latter’s compliance, which in most cases cannot be directly controlled 
by the policy maker. However, estimating T T  parameters is of particular 
relevance to understand the impact of Progresa. This is because it turns out 
that the main source of difference between being a potential and actual ben­
eficiary is due to organisational errors among the program administrators, 
hence directly controllable by the policy maker. Indeed, households who 
received zero transfer in spite of their eligibility are actually composed by 
two different categories: true non-compliers, who chose not to participate in 
the program, and ” forgotten” households, who did not receive the transfer 
because of administrative errors. The latter group is much larger than the 
former. This suggests that, had these mistakes not occurred, the average 
effect of the program may have been different than it actually was.
Table 4.2 shows a breakdown of poor households in Progresa commu­
nities by group and compliance status. It reveals that only 73 percent of 
poor households in Progresa localities are actual beneficiaries.4 These are
3In case they did not, the last object in (4.7) would disappear and the other two terms
would be divided by (pq7 +  p d )-
4 Beneficiary households are all those families in which at least one member receives the
program. Non-compliers are households who choose not to participate to the program.
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Table 4.2: Poor households in treated villages by treatment status, Novem­
ber 1998 data
97 poor Densificados Immigrants
Beneficiaries 7470 1547 0
(95.3) (40.8) (0.0)
Forgotten 7 2191 688
(0.0) (57.8) (100)
Non-compliers 360 48 0
(4.5) (1.2) (0.0)
Total 7837 3786 688
(100) (100) (100)
Percentages in parentheses. Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding 
errors.
the households one needs to consider in order to estimate T T  effects. The 
parameter of interest, given by E[y\P = 1, C  =  b] — E[y\P = 0, C = 6], can 
be decomposed in the following way:
E[y\P = t ,C  = b] = 
(4.8)
-   /"iTb,’T E[y\P97 = t ,C  = b} + -  ■ E[y\PD = t ,C  = 6]
P97&97 +  P DOD P 97O97 +  P d ° d
as there are no beneficiaries among immigrants, b refers to being de facto 
treated, and 6 9 7  and bp are the proportions of household who receive the 
treatment. The estimation of TT  effects in this case is hampered by the 
difficulty of identifying a valid counterfactual among the control group, as 
one has to identify the subset of households in the control villages who would 
have been actually treated, had they been in the treatment group. The next 
sections deal with this issue, but first I will discuss the outcome from Table 
4.2.
All remaining eligible households are classified as ” forgotten”.
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The proportion of forgotten households is not constant across the three 
groups of 1997 poor, densificados and immigrants. As regards true non- 
compliers, only 360 1997 poor and 48 densificado eligible households de­
cided not to participate to the program for unknown reasons. The bulk of 
zero-transfer households belongs to the ’’forgotten” group, and that they are 
mainly concentrated among densificados and immigrants5. It appears that 
by March 2000, when the payment records were released, they had not re­
ceived the benefits, and it is not clear how much they eventually received and 
when the transfers did actually take place (Skoufias and Hoddinott, 2000). 
All these individuals with revised status were informed of their changed el­
igibility, though never entered in the program database (Coady, 2001). Un­
covering the different proportion of forgotten households by poverty groups 
is a first step towards the identification of valid a counterfactual for this 
category.
The division of zero-transfer recipients into two different categories sug­
gests that only in one case, and for a small set of households, the source of 
non-compliance is endogenous, i.e. individuals choose not to participate to 
the program. It is necessary to introduce some ad hoc assumption or to find 
some exclusion restriction in order to identify the program effect for this 
group.
For the majority of eligible individuals who did not receive the transfer, 
instead, de facto reception of the benefit is exogenous and is irrespective 
of compliance with program requirements. This suggests that one of the 
following cases must be true: being forgotten happens on a random basis; 
being forgotten happens on a non-random basis and one or more variables 
that predict its likelihood with probability one; being forgotten happens on 
a non-random basis and follows some criterion that permits to identify a 
valid counterfactual among the control group; being forgotten happens on a
5Again, it is not clear whether immigrants were incorporated in the program at all. 
The fact that none of the poor ones received the treatment is further support for the 
conjecture that they do not belong to the eligible group. Note that if immigrants are not 
incorporated in the program, then they do not belong to the forgotten row of Table 4.2
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non-random basis, but there is no criterion that permits to identify a valid 
counterfactual.
Albarran and Attanasio (2001) thought that the latter case occurred, 
before distinguishing among the aforementioned groups (1997 poor, densifi­
cados and immigrants) and categories (beneficiary, non-complier, forgotten). 
I will show below a criterion to identify counterfactuals for forgotten house­
holds. The following sections discuss identification of T T  effects for the 
various subgroups that constitute the sample of eligible households. The 
details regarding the identification of a counterfactual for forgotten house­
holds will be discussed in the densificado section. The assumptions required 
for the estimation of the program effect for non-compliers will be discussed 
in a separate section.
The next subsections discuss the hypotheses required for the identifica­
tion of counterfactuals for each group.
4.3.1 1997 poor
Forgotten households are hardly present among 1997 poor: Table 2 shows 
that only 7 out of 7837 ” 1997” poor families are not treated6, amounting 
to 0.08 percent of the total. Because of the negligible size of non-compliers, 
the average effect of Progresa on 1997 poor simplifies to:
E[y\P97 =  t] =  fg7E[y\P97 =  t, C =  /]
+  ng7E[y\P97 — t, C  =  n) +  (1 -  fg7 -  n 97)E[y\P97 = t ,C  = b]
=  n97E[y\P97 = t, C = n\ +  (1 -  n 97)E[y\P97 =  t, C  =  b]
C — { /, n, 6} indicates the category the household belongs to (forgotten, 
non-complier, actual beneficiary), while fg7 and ng7 refer to the proportion 
of households in the first two categories. This parameter measures the pro­
gram’s impact on the poorest treated households. ng7 = 0.0008, and the 
corresponding 7 households can be simply dropped from the valid sample.
6These forgotten households live in four different localities in the state of Guerrero.
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Hence, the effect of the program on actual beneficiaries is given by 
E{y\P97 = t ,C  = b} = — !— E[y\P97 =  tj -  ^ — E\y\P97 = t ,C  = n]
1 —  7297  1 —  n 97
Some identifying assumptions or valid exclusion restrictions are necessary to 
estimate the effect of Progresa on non-compliers. These are discussed below.
4.3.2 Densificado  poor
As concerns densificados, only 1.2 percent are true non-compliers, corre­
sponding to 48 families. If one were willing to discard non-compliers because 
of their small sample size, the only identification issue would regard the pres­
ence of forgotten households, who account for 57.8 percent of densificados. 
If forgotten households were a random sub-sample of such group, one could 
use the whole set of densificados in control villages as a valid counterfactual, 
since
E[y\PD  =  0, C = b\ =  E[y\PD = 0, C  =  /] =  E[y\PD = 0]
Again, this approximation is possible because the proportion of non- 
compliers is so small to be supposedly negligible. However, the comparison 
of the distribution of a large group of variables from the pre-program 1997 
wave (round 1) shows that there are significant differences in key variables 
such as wealth, employment and earnings, education and schooling. These 
results are reported in the Appendix.
By looking at village of residence of forgotten densificados, it appears 
that entire communities where missed out: all households with revised eli­
gibility in 115 localities out of 302 failed to receive the treatment. Hence, 
village of residence predicts actual treatment for densificados with probabil­
ity one.
Nevertheless, villages are not missing at random: forgotten localities 
have on average a significantly lower level of the marginalization index. This 
index summarises the degree of poverty of each locality, with higher values 
corresponding to more severe poverty levels. It was computed with the pur­
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pose of identifying eligible villages.7 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms 
that the distribution of the index at the village level is not equal between for­
gotten and treated densificados. 8 Indeed, nearly 68% of forgotten localities 
have a marginalization index lower than the smallest (-0.093) among bene­
ficiary villages, hence forgotten households belong to the least poor villages, 
as can be noticed in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Densificados - distribution of village marginalization index for 
control, treated beneficiary and forgotten households
I tested whether, conditional on the marginalization index, no other 
sets of variables differ significantly between forgotten households and actual 
beneficiaries, but this hypothesis is not supported by the data.9
7Purther details on the creation of the marginality index can be found in Skoufias et 
al. (1999a).
8Whereas the null hypothesis of distribution equality cannot be rejected for all treat­
ment and control villages.
9I estimated the likelihood of being forgotten as a function of the household-specific 
variables contained in the Appendix tables, additionally conditioning on marginalization 
index expressed as a linear and third-order polynomial, alternatively. I also grouped 
villages with similar marginalization levels by creating sets of dummies (no villages have
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One possible approach to identify valid control villages for treated den­
sificados is to group them by the village marginalization level. Naming this 
index M  and setting its realization m  = —0.093
E[y\PD = t ,C  = b]
=  P r(M  > m \PD  = t ,C  = b)E[y\PD =  £, C = b, M  > m\
+  P r(M  < m \PD  = t ,C  = b)E[y\PD = t ,C  = b ,M  < m)
— E[y\PD — t ,C  =  b, M  > m)
i.e. one can use control villages with marginalization index larger than
-0.09 as counterfactual for actual beneficiaries. The hypothesis of equal dis­
tribution of the village-specific index cannot be rejected, when only villages 
above the threshold are compared.10 If one is willing to ignore non-compliers, 
the above equation permits to estimate the second object to the right of the 
equal sign in (4.8).
In the same fashion, it is possible to estimate the effect of the program on 
forgotten households. In this case, though, Pr(M  < m \PD  = t ,C  = f )  — 
0.68. While the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is significant when the two groups 
of households below and above the m threshold are pooled, it cannot be 
rejected when considered separately, both for treated and forgotten families.
The T T  approach suggested here relies on the village randomisation. Its 
main shortcoming is that the randomisation is designed for a larger sample 
of villages, so there is a weaker case for its being valid also for the relevant 
subset of villages. For this reason, I compare the distribution of variables 
from the 1997 survey and from the March 1998 consumption module using
the same index level). The remaining variables are either individually or jointly significant.
10Note, however, that when we compare the individual poverty level computed by Pro- 
gresa staff to distinguish poor from non poor, the equality of distribution between treat­
ment and control households is sometimes not rejected. Localities are grouped into seven 
regions of different size, and different levels of the household poverty index were used 
as poverty threshold. I compare the distribution of the household poverty index at the 
regional level because densificado and forgotten households are not distributed homoge­
neously across them.
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the groupings described. Overall, it appears that the hypothesis of random 
program allocation within eligible densificados is supported by the data, 
once households are matched using the marginalization index. The aver­
age rejection rate from the analyzed variables is smaller than both the one 
obtained by comparing intended treatment and control households11, as in 
Behrman and Todd (1999), and the one from ’’unmatched” densificados (i.e. 
comparing all actual treated with all control households). All relevant tables 
are in the Appendix.
The distribution of the marginalization index among Progresa villages 
is such that communities with an index lower than -0.093 are forgotten 
with probability 1, while localities with an index higher than -0.093 have a 
positive but less than one probability of being forgotten. The local effect of 
the program around the marginalization index threshold may be estimated 
using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD). However, while the 
quasi-experimental nature of this estimation method may insure that villages 
around the discontinuity do not differ systematically, nothing guarantees 
that households in those communities do not differ both in observable and 
unobservable characteristics. No attem pt to pursue this approach is made 
in the current exercise.12
4 .3 .3  ” Im m ig ra n ts”
It is not clear how to interpret their absence from the first two surveys, which 
contain the same number of interviewed households. One possibility is that 
these are individuals arrived in the villages after March 1998. However, 
there is no difference in the proportion of immigrants moving in treatment 
and control villages, neither among poor nor non-poor ones. One would 
expect poor households to move strategically to treatm ent localities, while 
this does not seem to occur. Moreover, sampled households do not appear 
to be particularly mobile, in the sense that no out-migration from either
11 And it is even smaller when comparing means, rather than distributions.
12For further details on the use of RDD for the Progresa data, see Skoufias and Bud-
delmeyer (2003).
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type of locality is recorded in the data (poor in control localities may be 
expected to move to treatment ones). An explanation consistent with these 
facts may be that this group is composed of newly-formed households. Yet, 
immigrants and 1997 poor have similar number of children per household. 
Alternatively, these households may have not been included in the first two 
rounds of the survey because of administrative errors. Whatever their origin, 
this latter group will be labelled ’’immigrants” in the current analysis.
No household belonging to this group and living in Progresa villages 
receives the treatment. Still, it may be interested to test whether there 
are significant differences in variables directly affected by Progresa (school 
enrolment, consumption, health among others) among households in control 
and treatm ent communities. The estimation of the program impact for this 
group is straightforward, provided that their arrival in Progresa and control 
localities (or their absence from the first two waves) happens on a random 
basis.
E[y\PI = t }= E [ y \P I  = t ,C  = f}
In this way one is estimating the overall general equilibrium impact of the 
program on ’’immigrants” including potential differences between those in 
control and treatm ent communities. However, one wouldn’t know whether 
the impact is due to ex-ante underlying differences between control and 
treatm ent ’’immigrants” , or to ’’true” general equilibrium effects. Testing 
for absence of underlying differences between treatment and control ’’immi­
grants” is hindered by the absence of pre-program observations. Neverthe­
less, the fact that there is no difference in the proportion of ’’immigrants” in 
treatm ent and control villages is consistent with the hypothesis of random 
omission of this group from the first two rounds of interviews. The dif­
ferences may be in quality, rather than size of ” immigrant” families in the 
various communities. Informative predetermined household characteristics 
(such as member age, gender and household size) may be used to compare 
first poor ’’immigrants” in treatment and control localities. Table 4.3 shows
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means of some demographic variables and reports the p-values of the test of 
mean equality between immigrants in control and Progresa villages.
Table 4.3: Means and p-values of differences, 1998 data
hh hhh hhh age sons sons m ax hectar
size age sex“ [6; 16] [6; 16] [0;5] grade PP
Control 4.76 39.49 0.78*** 10.41 1.33 0.96 3.32 0.17
s.e. 2.31 16.73 0.41 0.12 1.61 0.90 2.41 0.55
Treatm ent 4.54 40.31 0.71*** 10.54 1.18 0.91 3.53 0.32
s.e. 2.29 17.99 0.45 0.10 1.55 0.93 2.55 2.90
p-value 0.111 0.444 0.008 0.397 0.391 0.111 0.117 0.284
°: proportion males. School grade and mean age do not differ also for males and females 
separately.
Comparison of mean household characteristics of control and treatm ent 
poor ’’immigrants” reveals that there is no significant difference in demo­
graphics, apart from the fact that there are 7 percentage points more female­
headed families in control villages. Quantity of land owned has a large 
variation among households in treatment communities and does not differ 
significantly between the two groups.
The lack of differences in the above variables provides some support for 
the hypothesis that ” immigrants” in control and treatment localities do not 
differ in observable characteristics unrelated to the program. Using this fact, 
and the absence of differences in the proportion of such households in control 
and treatm ent villages one may suppose that these households do not differ 
in unobservables either. Since the evidence in favour of this hypothesis is 
quite weak, I will condition on a set of household observable characteristics 
in the empirical application, as explained below .
4 .3 .4  N o n -co m p liers
Addressing the issue of non-compliers requires the introduction of either 
identifying assumptions or exclusion restrictions, unless either non-compliance
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occurs on a random basis, or it is possible to predict with probability one 
which households among the control group are the appropriate counterfac- 
tual.
No explanation is provided for households’ non-compliance. Looking at 
pre-program patterns of school enrolment and child labour does not help. 
Indeed, schooling enrolment rates do not differ substantially between non- 
compliers and beneficiaries, as shown by the table below. Attendance rates 
are lower among non-compliers, though 90 percent of enroled children have 
a sufficiently high attendance rate to be entitled to the grant. Moreover, 
there are no apparent differences in schoolchildren’s extra-curricular working 
activities. Nearly twice as many densificado non-compliers report being hit 
by some shock during the year, compared to beneficiaries, while among 
”1997” poor, non-compliers are hit by shocks less often than beneficiaries. 
Skoufias et al. (1999a) suggests that true non-compliers are households who 
were about to leave by the end of 1998, although quite a few of them are 
still in the sample in November 1999 (round 5). This is partially confirmed 
by the comparison of the 1998 and 1999 November surveys, from which it 
may be noticed the higher ’’emigration” (or disappearance) rates among 
non-compliers.
It is possible that non-compliance may be linked to parental absence from 
the household or ill health. In 1997, fathers from non-compliers’ households 
are 13 percent more likely to be away than treated beneficiaries. However, 
mothers are as likely to be present. In November 1998, instead, no non­
complying household has absent parents. There is a higher illness rate, 
although this refers only to the 4 weeks prior the interview.
Non-compliers are unevenly distributed across states. 70 percent of the 
360 ”1997” non-complying households live in the state of Guerrero (a quarter 
the size of ” 1997” beneficiaries living in the same state) and 18 percent in Ve­
racruz. Guerrero and Veracruz are the states with the highest poverty level, 
as measured by the marginalization index.13 Densificado non-compliers are
13With an average level of 1.31 and 0.72, while the wealthiest state, Michoacan, averages
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Table 4.4: Enrolment, attendance, child labour and shock rates for non- 
compliers and beneficiaries
1997 D ensificado
Variables (%) beneficiary non-complier beneficiary non-com plier
enrolm ent 86 81 83 87
low attendance 2 3 9 9
working schoolchildren 1 1 4 3
shock“ 44 41 33 70
Sam ple size
Septem ber 1997 4682 360 2491 48
Novem ber 1998 4682 360 2491 48
November 1999 4188 208 2272 25
“ : idiosyncratic shock at the household level. Percentages are from the September 1997 
wave.
more evenly distributed.
In any case, no set of variables that predicts the likelihood of not partici­
pating to the program with probability one could be found. Thus, unless one 
is willing to ignore non-compliers altogether, some assumptions are needed 
to estimate the XT effect for 1997 poor. The abundance of estimable pa­
rameters suggests several candidates, as shown below.
E[y\P97 = 1, C  =  n] -  E[y\P97 = 0, C  =  n]
0
E[y\NP  =  1] -  E[y\NP  =  0]
E[y\PI  =  1] -  E[y\PI  =  0]
One may assume that them effect of Progresa on non-compliers is null, 
as in Bloom (1984). This corresponds to (4.9) above. Alternatively, they 
may be the same as those for non-poor, as in (4.10). This as suggested
0.07.
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(4.9)
(4.10)
(4.11)
by Albarran and Attanasio (2001). However, given the different wealth of 
this group, a better approximation may be obtained estimating the effect of 
the program on immigrants, as in (4.11). As already mentioned, the main 
limitation of this approach is that there is no pre-program information for 
this group. One concluding remark: the use of forgotten densificados does 
not seem appropriate, because the households in this group were informed 
of their inclusion in the eligible set. Thus, it is likely that their behaviour, 
especially in the initial stages of the program implementation, may have 
changed to comply with the program requirements.
4 .3 .5  E con om ic  relevance o f  th e  e s tim a b le  p aram eters
The possibility to separately estimate the effect of the program on the three 
groups has interesting economic and policy relevance. In fact, first of all 
it permits to estimate TT parameters for the whole sample, as well as for 
its sub-groups individually. Second, we can distinguish the direct program 
impact on different types of poor that vary both in the degree of poverty 
and in the program component they most benefit from: ”1997” households 
are poorer and have more eligible children than densificados, so they may 
comparatively benefit more from the school subsidy than the latter group. 
Table 4.5 shows the group means of some demographic and wealth-related 
variables, as well as the overall poverty measure computed by the Progresa 
staff to separate poor from non poor households.
Indeed, densificado households (both forgotten and actually treated ones) 
have a different demographic composition, from 1997 poor. Their household 
head is on average ten years older; subsequently, they have fewer young chil­
dren, especially of pre-school age. Furthermore, 1997 and densificado poor 
differ also in their overall poverty level. The latter group has a higher in­
come (computed from earnings from main occupation), land and number of 
rooms than the original group of poor. All these variables are calculated in 
per capita terms. They are also consistent with differences in the poverty
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Table 4.5: Household characteristics by group
Group hh
size
hhh
age
hhh
sex
sons
[6,16]
sons
[0,6)
income
PP
hectares
PP
room
PP
Poverty
index
Poor 97 5.91 42.55 0.92 1.85 1.04 2027.27 0.32 0.31 639.13
(2.44) (15.02) (0.28) (1.70) (1.05) (2317.54) (0.71) (0.27) (82.54)
Beneficiary 4.36 52.60 0.83 1.01 0.38 2966.42 0.66 0.60 788.24
Densificados (2.69) (18.51) (0.38) (1.45) (0.70) (3675.69) (1.89) (0.64) (72.85)
Forgotten 4.00 52.25 0.83 0.74 0.31 4272.06 0.63 0.70 834.50
Index<-.093 (2.37) (17.71) (0.38) (1.20) (0.62) (5875.97) (1.67) (0.63) (92.76)
Forgotten 4.50 52.32 0.86 0.99 0.27 3213.32 0.75 0.59 810.83
[-.093; 1.29] (2.68) (16.05) (0.34) (1.35) (0.60) (3677.84) (1.29) (0.50) (70.70)
Note: hh=household; hhh=household head; pp=per person. Standard errors in parenthe­
ses. 1997 data.
indicator 14 levels computed by the Progresa staff (lower values indicate a 
higher degree of indigence). Hence, a comparison of TT effects for densifi­
cados and 1997 poor is a first step towards testing for the heterogeneity of 
program im pact15.
Lastly, the possibility to estimate average impacts for various types of 
non-participants may provide a better understanding of the impact of devel­
opment programs on the receiving communities. An example of the types of 
applications for these parameters is the effect of Progresa on consumption 
smoothing. Progresa may help households smooth consumption through 
several channels: by increasing households’ income; by providing a certain 
stream of future earnings (at least for a limited number of years) that may 
be used as collateral to borrow; by increasing liquidity at the locality level, 
hence the possibility to lend money. However, by looking at the effect on 
beneficiaries only, one cannot disentangle the individual impact of the above
14For details on the computation of the overall poverty index, see Skoufias et al. 1999a 
and 1999b.
15Although given that these two groups differ along at least two dimensions,what may 
be driving the differences would not be clear.
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effects. Instead, by looking at the relationship between Progresa and con­
sumption smoothing for the various sample sub-groups, additional informa­
tion may be obtained. The effect on immigrants would measure the role 
played by the liquidity injection in the village. The one on forgotten house­
holds would sum the former to the effect of the entitlement to the program 
as a means to borrow. The estimation of these parameters may shed light 
on important issues for governments of developing countries which have to 
decide how to redistribute scarce resources efficiently.
4.4 An application: the effect of Progresa on school 
enrolment
In the remaining part of the paper, I estimate T T E s  of Progresa on child 
school enrolment. Progresa provides scholarships to attend grades 3 to 9, 
corresponding to the last four years of primary school ad the three years of 
junior high school. The subsidies increase with school grade and are higher 
for females than males at the secondary school level in order to particularly 
encourage female school attendance. Transfers are made on a bi-monthly 
basis, provided that the eligible recipient has attended at least 85 percent 
of classes, as confirmed by the teacher. It has been estimated that the size 
of the largest school subsidy corresponds to 44 percent of the male day- 
labourer’s wage and approximately two thirds of the child full-time wage 
(Schultz, 2004).
The effect of Progresa on school enrolment is analyzed by Schultz (2004), 
who compares enrolment rates of 1997 poor in treatment and control vil­
lages, providing estimates of the ’’intention to treat” effect, rather than 
T T E s .  The current analysis complements Schultz’s by estimating the pro­
gram effect on all groups of households discussed above and presenting both 
intention to treat and TT effects under alternative hypotheses. The possi­
bility to estimate program effects for different types of actual beneficiaries, 
for eligible households who did not receive the subsidies and for non eligi-
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ble families living in treatment communities provides interesting insights on 
the heterogeneity of treatment and general equilibrium effects. Densificados 
differ from 1997 poor along two dimensions: they have fewer children and 
a lower poverty level. Hence, they are likely to have a comparatively lower 
advantage from complying with the Progresa eligibility requirements. The 
effect on children from forgotten households is ambiguous, and it largely 
depends on whether families expect to begin receiving the missing grants 
soon or not. Enrolment is going to change according to one’s perception or 
knowledge of whether and when the late payments are going to occur. Chil­
dren in non-eligible poor families (immigrants) do not benefit directly from 
Progresa. Any significant difference may be attributable to indirect program 
effects. They may work in either direction (higher enrolment may decrease 
resources per pupil, hence teaching quality, although the extra funds to 
schools in Progresa areas may offset this phenomenon).
Progresa subsidies are expected to increase school enrolment of eligible 
children. However, it is likely to observe an enrolment increase also for the 
earlier primary school grades, as there are (weaker) financial incentives also 
for school attendance of younger pupils. Indeed, a child starting primary 
school in 1998 would reach the subsidized grade by 2000 (families are told 
that the program may only last for three years).
The program effect is expected to be larger for secondary than for pri­
mary school, because of the lower enrolment rate in the former, and for 
females than males, because of the larger school grants for girls. Given 
these considerations, I performed the analysis both for pooled children and 
separate genders. I also group children by their age16, creating three dif­
ferent categories: children aged 6 to 9, 10 to 13, and 14 to 16. Moreover, 
I only consider children who were living in the household at the interview 
time.17 I further restrict the sample to children who are sons or daughters
16Grouping children by age rather than by grade completion is preferred, because the 
latter is a choice variable that is influenced by the program availability. Comparing chil­
dren by school level would result in different individuals being compared over time.
17I drop all those children who were reported to be away or to live in the household
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(natural and adopted), nephews or nieces or grandchildren of the house­
hold head, excluding more distant relations and married individuals.18 I use 
the September 1997, October/November 1998 and November 1999 waves 
(rounds 1,3 and 5) in order to have one observation per child for the three 
different academic years, of which the first one is prior to the beginning of 
the program.
4 .4 .1  M ea n  d ifferen ce in  en ro lm en t rates for a ll sa m p le  su b ­
grou p s
Pre-program enrolment rates vary considerably between age group. Virtu­
ally all children aged 6 to 9 are enrolled in 1997, while a little less than 90 
percent among children aged 10 to 13 are. The lowest enrolment rates are 
for the eldest individuals, varying between 40 and 50 percent. Enrolment 
means are reported in the Appendix. The gender gap, virtually non-existent 
for the youngest group, varies proportionally with age, it approaches the 10 
percentage point for children aged 14 to 16. Note that my classification of 
children excludes married individuals, hence it is likely that female enrol­
ment rate is lower if one includes wives as well. 1997 rates do not seem to 
differ substantially among the various household groups, including non-poor.
Table 4.6 shows differences in average enrollment rates between treat­
ment ad control groups before and during the program implementation by 
age group and gender.
only temporarily.
18I consider the relationship to the household head because a sizeable proportion of 
individuals in the valid age group is either married or has children.
Table 4.6: Difference in enrollment rates by age group, year and gender
1997 1998 1999
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
All poor in Diff [6;9] -0.0014 -0.0037 0.0005 0.0036 0.0045 0.0028 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052
Progresa [0.0024] [0.0027] [0.0035] [0.0036] [0.0049] [0.0034] [0 .0030]* [0.0032] [0.0041]
villages n 15387 7820 7562 15487 7904 7904 14616 7437 7158
Diff [10; 13] 0.001 0.0124 -0.012 0.0349 0.0396 0.0294 0.0335 0.0307 0.0354
[0.0107] [0.0124] [0.0136] [0 .0 1 0 8 ]*** [0 .0 1 2 7 ]*** [0 .01 25 ]** [0 .0 0 9 6 ]*** [0 .0 1 1 2 ]*** [0 .0 1 1 2 ]***
n 15558 8015 7540 14876 7603 7273 13766 7048 6691
Diff [14;16] 0.0259 0.0255 0.0221 0.0708 0.0766 0.0632 0.0604 0.0519 0.0721
[0.0244] [0.0291] [0.0276] [0 .0 2 3 9 ]*** [0 .0 2 8 5 ]*** [0 .02 67 ]** [0 .02 44 ]** [0 .0295]* [0 .0 2 5 3 ]***
n 10953 5887 5064 10151 5368 4783 9248 4919 4298
Poor 97 Diff [6;9] -0.0036 -0.0051 -0.0026 0.0064 0.0062 0.0065 0.006 0.0053 0.0067
[0.0029] [0.0033] [0.0038] [0.0046] [0.0055] [0.0045] [0.0039] [0.0041] [0.0054]
n 10930 5572 5355 10731 5482 5249 10267 5216 5046
Diff [10;13] 0.0068 0.0104 0.0021 0.0447 0.0469 0.042 0.0507 0.0474 0.0531
[0.0120] [0.0135] [0.0168] [0 .0 1 1 8 ]*** [0 .0 1 4 4 ]*** [0 .0 1 4 4 ]*** [0 .0 1 0 8 ]*** [0 .0 1 2 4 ]*** [0 .0 1 3 0 ]***
n 10008 5193 4813 9554 4916 4638 9220 4710 4501
Diff [14; 16] 0.0063 0.0067 0.0037 0.0874 0.0797 0.0926 0.0835 0.0612 0.1148
[0.0279] [0.0333] [0.0322] [0 .0 2 7 6 ]*** [0 .03 25 ]** [0 .0 3 1 5 ]*** [0 .0 2 7 9 ]*** [0 .0334]* [0 .0 3 0 9 ]***
n 5528 2996 2530 5591 3001 2590 5569 2987 2563
table continued on next page
table continued from last page
1997 1998 1999
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Beneficiary Diff [6;9] 0.0076 -0.0087 0.0245 -0.0092 -0.0119 -0.0065 0.0053 0.0062 0.0043
[0.0109] [0.0068] [0.0202] [0 .0052]* [0.0092] [0.0046] [0.0105] [0.0122] [0.0161]
n 1219 612 607 1148 582 566 1063 538 522
densificados Diff [10;13] -0.0382 -0.0386 -0.0425 -0.0023 -0.0036 -0.0002 0.0085 0.0211 -0.0063
[0.0239] [0.0261] [0.0378] [0.0208] [0.0264] [0.0282] [0.0192] [0.0226] [0.0280]
n 1515 770 745 1289 674 615 1206 645 557
Diff [14;16] -0.0686 -0.0175 -0.1299 -0.0049 -0.0322 0.0187 -0.0249 -0.0631 0.0239
[0.0598] [0.0712] [0.0792] [0.0528] [0.0656] [0.0695] [0.0539] [0.0665] [0.0662]
n 1175 640 535 1068 571 497 883 464 419
Forgotten Diff [6;9] 0.0179 0 0.0352 -0.0062 -0.0157 0 0.0183 0.0137 0.0231
[-.093; 1.29] [0 .0106]* [0.0000] [0 .0204]* [0.0063] [0.0144] [0.0000] [0 .00 80 ]** [0 .0078]* [0 .0123]*
n 757 385 372 714 343 371 630 297 332
Diff [10;13] 0.0165 0.0197 0.0013 0.0628 0.0668 0.0536 0.0045 0.0342 -0.0308
[0.0394] [0.0347] [0.0695] [0 .0 2 0 2 ]*** [0 .0 2 2 2 ]*** [0.0352] [0.0327] [0.0276] [0.0574]
n 955 499 456 814 450 364 759 408 348
Diff [14;16] 0.107 0.1644 0.0233 0.1219 0.1473 0.107 0.1208 0.1695 0.0712
[0.0770] [0 .0990]* [0.0985] [0.0763] [0 .0871]* [0.0981] [0 .0722]* [0 .08 32 ]** [0.0943]
n 781 444 337 703 350 353 595 320 275
table continued on next page
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1997 1998 1999
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Forgotten Diff [6; 9] 0.0052 0.0128 -0.003 -0.0173 -0.0055 -0 .03 -0.0022 -0.0044 0.0001
Index < —.093 [0.0062] [0.0097] [0.0081] [0 .0080 ]** [0.0085] [0 .01 20 ]** [0.0041] [0.0045] [0.0070]
n 887 474 413 865 439 426 847 434 412
Diff [10;13] 0.0247 0.0585 -0.0135 -0.0121 0.0055 -0.0325 -0.0755 -0.0707 -0.0795
[0.0383] [0.0539] [0.0397] [0.0310] [0.0458] [0.0282] [0 .03 63 ]** [0.0571] [0 .03 43 ]**
n 1004 525 478 908 458 450 778 401 377
Diff [14;16] -0.0429 0.0051 -0.0937 0.0149 0.0626 -0.0453 0.0581 0.0115 0.0973
[0.0520] [0.0718] [0.0660] [0.0530] [0.0687] [0.0707] [0.0525] [0.0694] [0.0706]
n 1081 532 549 803 446 357 578 301 275
Immigrants Diff [6;9] -0.0037 -0.0016 -0.0061 0.0024 0.0082 -0.0063
[0.0088] [0.0139] [0.0060] [0.0077] [0.0124] [0.0063]
n 607 320 287 536 287 249
Diff [10;13] 0.0005 -0.0079 0.0086 0.027 0.0211 0.0249
[0.0272] [0.0348] [0.0379] [0.0296] [0.0377] [0.0445]
n 508 262 246 460 228 231
Diff [14;16] -0.0088 -0.0736 0.0533 0.0286 -0.0013 0.0719
[0.0720] [0.0917] [0.0949] [0.0778] [0.1035] [0.1041]
n 272 137 135 256 138 117
table continued on next page
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1997 1998 1999
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Non poor Diff [6;9] 0.0076 -0.0026 0.0171 0.0043 0.0097 -0.001 0.0071 0.0098 0.0044
[0.0100] [0.0073] [0.0178] [0.0121] [0.0231] [0.0040] [0.0046] [0.0061] [0.0059]
n 2050 994 1054 1786 915 871 1612 820 790
Diff [10; 13] -0.0091 0.0136 -0.0316 0.0132 0.0456 -0.0193 0.0299 -0.0115 0.0669
[0.0190] [0.0245] [0.0250] [0.0198] [0.0269]* [0.0262] [0.0280] [0.0337] [0.0434]
n 2627 1290 1337 2233 1094 1139 1821 894 921
Diff [14; 16] 0 .0644 0.0309 0.1006 0 .0816 0.1411 0.0245 0.0505 0 .0897 0.0017
[0.0386]* [0.0524] [0.0488]** [0.0383]** [0.0470]*** [0.0520] [0.0392] [0.0511]* [0.0494]
n 2855 1570 1285 2102 1030 1072 1675 874 798
Standard errors clustered at the village level. *,**,*** significant at 10, 5, 1%.
Pre-program enrolment rates for poor households in treatm ent and con­
trol communities do not differ, with the exception of forgotten poor in the 
most marginalized communities, who have higher enrolment rates in treat­
ment than control villages. The same occurs among non-poor children in 
the oldest age group. Although the differences in enrolment rates for densi­
ficados and forgotten households in the least marginalized villages are never 
significant, their point estimates are quite large.
I repeated the computation of mean differences conditioning on a set 
of observable characteristics: both size of the point estimates and standard 
errors are lower, although the differences remain not statistically different 
from zero. The pre-program differences for forgotten household from the 
most marginalized communities are no longer statistically significant for the 
youngest age group, when controlling for observable sources of heterogeneity. 
Conditioning on observable characteristics does not change the value of the 
point estimates and the significance levels for non-poor households, instead. 
One additional fact worth noticing is the absence of significant differences 
in immigrants’ enrolment rates.
4 .4 .2  D o u b le -d ifferen ced  effect o f  P rogresa  on  sch o o l en ro l­
m en t by  sam p le  su b -grou p
Given the pre-program enrolment differences and the fact that some groups 
of households are present only in subsets of the initial village sample19, I 
present difference in difference probit estimates of the marginal effect of 
Progresa on child enrolment.
P(sit =  1) =  P(s 't > 0)
s it =  a  + P u t +  7 P it + 9^8 2/98 P it + d g g yg g P a  +  O X a  + u a  (4.12)
where Pa indicates whether the child belongs to the treatm ent (Pa = 1) 
or control group (Pit = 0); y is 0 for the pre-program year, and 1 other­
wise; X  are a set of conditioning variables that may capture any source
19Hence reducing the strength of the randomisation assumption.
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of difference in observable characteristics and improve the precision of the 
estimates.
The 5 coefficients are the parameter of interest, measuring the effect of 
Progresa on school enrolment of treated children in 1998 and 1999. (4.12) 
is estimated separately by age group and gender for each of the five groups.
The additional conditioning variables are: primary school quality, mea­
sured by the ratio of resident children per teacher; number of secondary 
schools (standard and televised) in the locality (note that most villages do 
not have a secondary school); poverty level20; household size; household 
head gender, education and presence in the household. These variables are 
added to all specifications. Given the larger sample size for 1997 and pooled 
poor, I added also and spouse education and presence in the household, 
interacted by gender, and presence of disabled individuals in the household.
Not all individuals can be matched in the three waves. Part of it is pure 
sample attrition caused by individuals entering and exiting the valid age in­
terval. A further, endogenous cause is domestic or international migration. 
Indeed, the previous chapter shows that labour migration, especially inter­
national, is different between treatment and control groups for 1997 poor, 
although the volume of migration is quite small. I estimated (4.12) using 
alternatively the pooled sample of all individuals aged 6 to 16, and the sub­
set of children present in all three waves. The differences in the values of 
the parameters of interest between these two groups are negligible.21
Table 4.7 presents estimates of double-difference program effects for all 
groups of households in the Progresa sample. The first panel provides esti­
mates of the average effect of the program on all poor in Progresa community 
(including non-compliers, forgotten households and immigrants). It is a very 
broad measure of the program effect, and it is the one more directly compa­
rable to Schultz’s, with whose results it shares the overall message that the 
impact of the program is larger for older children (secondary schoolchildren
20As measured by the principal component estimated by the Progresa staff with 1997 
data.
21 Results not presented but available upon request.
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according to Schultz’s groupings). The larger effect for ’’old” females than 
males is apparent in 1999 only.
The second and third panels provide separate estimates of the intention 
to treat effect for 1997 poor and treated densificados22. Such effects appear 
to vary substantially in terms of their broad policy implication: whereas 
1997 poor seem to benefit considerably from Progresa, with enrolment going 
up by 3 to 7 percentage point for the whole sample, reaching a peak of 12 
percentage points for girls aged 14 to 16, there is no significant effect for 
densificado children, with the exception of a one percentage point increase 
in enrolment of the youngest group in 1999. I repeated the estimations 
pooling 1998 and 1999 data, i.e. creating a dummy that takes the value 
of one for the two post-1997 observations, and adding additional sets of 
conditioning variables to try and increase the precision of the estimates, but 
they were never significantly different from zero. The large difference in 
program effect by group is further investigated below.
The absence of a significant effect for forgotten household is consistent 
with the hypothesis that, by November 1998, this group had realized they 
were not going to receive the schooling subsidy, and behaved accordingly. 
Somewhat less intuitive is the estimated average program effect for non-poor 
in Progresa villages. Enrolment for primary school males significantly in­
creases by one percentage point for boys aged 6 to 9, and by 6 percentage 
points for females aged 10 to 13, while it drops dramatically, by 14 per­
centage point, for older girls. A possible explanation consistent with these 
figures may be that the larger funding to primary school offsets the disin­
centive caused by the higher school attendance, making primary schooling 
more attractive to all children. This may be possible because of the small 
increase in primary school enrolment, which was already close to 100% in 
the pre-program year. The surge in school attendance of 14 to 16 years old 
girls may have had the opposite effect, not only because of the decrease in
22 Intention to treat and TT are virtually identical for densificados because of the low 
proportion of non-compliers
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school quality per pupil, but also due to an increase in the relative demand 
for girl-specific jobs that the higher enrolment of indigent girls has caused.
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Table 4.7: Double-difference program effect on enrollment rates by age group, year and gender
[6;9] [10;13] [14;16]
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
All poor in DD98 0.0037 0.006 0.001 0.0205 0.0243 0.0157 0.0477 0.0621 0.0341
Progresa [0.0027] [0 .00 29 ]** [0.0029] [0 .00 88 ]** [0 .0098 ]** [0.0124] [0 .01 98 ]** [0 .02 72 ]** [0.0280]
Villages DD99 0.0047 0.0068 0.0022 0.0292 0.0245 0.0336 0.0369 0.0158 0.063
[0 .00 21 ]** [0 .0 0 2 2 ]*** [0.0026] [0 .0 0 8 1 ]*** [0 .0097 ]** [0 .0 1 1 3 ]*** [0 .0203]* [0.0276] [0 .02 88 ]**
n 42843 21709 20868 41529 21234 20239 28678 15339 13322
Poor 1997 DD98 0.0064 0.0089 0.0028 0.0317 0.0302 0.0337 0.0712 0.0789 0.0681
[0 .00 28 ]** [0 .0 0 2 8 ]*** [0.0034] [0 .0 0 9 1 ]*** [0 .0 1 0 1 ]*** [0 .0 1 2 8 ]*** [0 .0 2 4 1 ]*** [0 .03 14 ]** [0 .03 34 ]**
DD99 0.0045 0.0071 0.0007 0.0423 0.0392 0.0451 0.0716 0.0341 0.1222
[0.0025]* [0 .0 0 2 4 ]*** [0.0038] [0 .0 0 8 9 ]*** [0 .0 1 0 0 ]*** [0 .0 1 3 0 ]*** [0 .0 2 3 3 ]*** [0.0332] [0 .0 3 2 5 ]***
n 30814 15685 14564 27891 14318 13546 16208 8766 7429
Treated DD98 -0.0023 0.0024 -0.0026 0.0051 0.0246 -0.0188 0.0394 0.0579 0.0154
Densificados [0.0131] [0.0149] [0.0121] [0.0236] [0.0236] [0.0361] [0.0546] [0.0778] [0.0762]
DD99 0.0092 0.0099 0.0049 0.0089 0.0235 -0.0028 0.0626 0.0609 0.0857
[0 .0053]* [0.0082] [0.0122] [0.0228] [0.0225] [0.0396] [0.0601] [0.0799] [0.0831]
n 3319 1529 1651 3793 1969 1820 3041 1657 1384
table continued on next page
table continued from last page
[6;9] [10; 13] [14;16]
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Forgotten DD98 -0.0093 -0.0176 -0.0048 0.0074 0.0295 0.009 0.0029 0.0286 -0.01
[-.093; 1.29] [0.0067] [0.0144] [0.0050] [0.0416] [0.0399] [0.0743] [0.0881] [0.1093] [0.1120]
DD99 0.0193 0.0239 0.0131 -0.0446 -0.0087 -0.0594 0.1033 0.0973 0.1164
[0.0106]* [0.0159] [0.0104] [0.0430] [0.0411] [0.0829] [0.0850] [0.0995] [0.1191]
n 2017 989 1027 2387 1272 1112 1989 1059 930
Forgotten DD98 -0.0417 -0.0121 -0.022 -0.0059 -0.0191 -0.0095 0.0792 0.0933 0.0656
Index<-.093 [0.0367] [0.0129] [0.0144] [0.0387] [0.0495] [0.0465] [0.0584] [0.0907] [0.0740]
DD99 -0.0047 -0.0205 0.0005 -0.0517 -0.0564 -0.0725 0.034 0.0132 0.0614
[0.0127] [0.0131] [0.0012] [0.0591] [0.0803] [0.0620] [0.0642] [0.0978] [0.0928]
n 2401 1255 1185 2586 1338 1247 2305 1211 1092
Non poor DD98 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0009 0.0097 0.0186 0.0018 -0.0014 0.0938 -0.097
[0.0056] [0.0053] [0.0039] [0.0202] [0.0251] [0.0300] [0.0431] [0.0593] [0.0596]
DD99 0.0071 0.0104 0.0012 0.0199 -0.0374 0.0601 -0 .079 -0.0221 -0 .1427
[0.0028]** [0.0031]*** [0.0034] [0.0192] [0.0355] [0.0217]*** [0.0476]* [0.0647] [0.0641]**
n 5286 2621 2663 6378 3168 3208 6440 3394 3044
Robust standard errors in brackets. *)**)*** significant at 10, 5, 1%.
Table 4.8: TTEs of Progresa on school enrolment of 1997 poor
[6; 9] [10;13] [14;16]
all male female all male female all male female
Bloom
98 0.009 0.014 0.005 0.034 0.030 0.038 0.068 0.076 0.064
[0.007] [0.009] [0.006] [0.014] [0.017] [0.020] [0.022] [0.031] [0.030]
99 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.043 0.040 0.047 0.069 0.039 0.116
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.013] [0.016] [0.015] [0.021] [0.031] [0.028]
Using effect on non-poor - assumption (4.10)
98 0.009 0.014 0.004 0.034 0.030 0.038 0.065 0.075 0.062
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.015] [0.014] [0 .022] [0.022] [0.029] [0.029]
99 0.007 0.013 0.002 0.043 0.040 0.047 0.069 0.037 0.113
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.013] [0.015] [0.020] [0.020] [0.028] [0.032]
Using effect on immigrants - assumption (4.11)
98 0.009 0.014 0.005 0.034 0.030 0.038 0.069 0.078 0.063
[0.007] [0.009] [0.004] [0.007] [0.012] [0.016] [0.028] [0.025] [0.045]
99 0.007 0.013 0.002 0.043 0.040 0.047 0.070 0.040 0.114
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.006] [0.018] [0.025] [0.023] [0.038]
Effects and standard errors computed by block bootstrap, block =  village. Estimates in
bold are significant at 5%.
Table 4.8 shows estimates of average TT effects for 1997 poor and den­
sificados under alternative assumptions. The point estimates for the three 
sets of the T T E s  are virtually identical and very similar to the intention 
to treat estimates, because of the small proportion of non-complieis. The 
results are consistent with previous findings from this literature: the effect 
of Progresa differs by age group and gender. It is higher for older cohorts, 
certainly because primary school pre-program enrolment is extremely high, 
hence there is very limited scope for improvements; probably, also because 
of the positive relationship between the size of the scholarships and the 
school grade pupils enrol to. Attendance of higher schooling grade is asso-
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ciated with larger cash transfers (although the higher monetary incentives 
for older children are paired with a higher market value of their labour, if 
productivity increases with age).
The same applies to female versus male effects: Progresa has no signifi­
cant effect on the enrolment of the youngest females (while it has a positive, 
though small effect for boys). The effect for girls aged 14 to 16 is instead 
a few percentage point larger than for males of the same age, in 1999. The 
comparative magnitude of these effects is possibly explained by the female 
lower pre-program enrolment rate, and by the fact that the value of sec­
ondary school grants for girls exceeds the one for boys.
The effect of Progresa on school enrolment appears to be remarkably 
stable over time for children aged 6 to 13. For children aged 14 to 16, instead 
the magnitude of the effect decreases over time for males and increases for 
females. The timing of the program effect is a topic that deserves further 
investigation.
4 .4 .3  T h e  effect o f  p overty  on  en ro lm en t for 1997 p o o r  and  
tre a te d  d e n s if ic a d o s
The comparison of T T E s  for 1997 poor and treated densificados shows pos­
itive and significant estimates for the former, and no significant ones for the 
latter. In quite a few cases the point estimates between the two groups do 
not differ considerably, but densificados’ estimates have much larger stan­
dard errors. While this lower precision is probably attributable to a smaller 
sample size, it is nevertheless useful to test whether the different poverty 
levels of the two groups result into different program effects. For instance, 
the least poor among eligible households may have enough resources to fund 
the migration of some of its offspring, and be less responsive to the school 
subsidies.
In order to test this hypothesis, I estimate (4.12) again for these two 
groups of children, adding the 1997 household-specific indicator of poverty 
level interacted by dummies for Progresa villages and years of program im­
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plementation. Table 4.9 reports the marginal effects of the poverty index for 
treated children in the post-1997 years. The poverty index varies between 
180 and 1380, and is such that higher values are associated lower degree of 
indigence.
147
148
Table 4.9: Effect of household poverty level on the likelihood of being enrolled, marginal effects
[6;9] [10; 13] [14;16]
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
1997 -0.001 -0.005 0.003 -0.002 0.013 -0.017 0.003 0.024 -0.011
poor [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0 .007]* [0 .00 8 ]** [0.015] [0.019] [0.020]
Treated 0.001 0.014 -0.004 0.056 0.046 0.064 -0.027 -0.037 -0.003
densificados [0.004] [0 .0 0 7 ]** [0.006] [0 .0 2 0 ]*** [0 .027]* [0 .033]* [0.034] [0.052] [0.049]
Poverty index multiplied by 100. Standard errors clustered at the village level.
The estimated coefficients show that this is not the case. In fact, less 
indigent densificado (those with a higher index level) are either as likely or 
more likely to have their children enrolled in school.
4.5 Conclusion
This note explains how to estimate program effects in the Progresa data in 
spite of the administrative errors that result in the exclusion of a large sub­
group of the eligible sample from the program (labelled forgotten household). 
In fact, it suggests an approach that turns the mistake into an econometric 
advantage, permitting the estimation of a series of parameters with clear 
policy relevance.
The key to the identification of counterfactuals in the presence of ” forgot­
ten” households is considering the various classes of households that belong 
to the eligible poor separately. It has been shown how indigent households 
in treatment communities are in fact composed by families classified as poor 
during the first stage of selection, in 1997; by households initially designed 
as non-poor, but later re-classified as poor, labelled densificados; by house­
holds who begin to be recorded in the data set only in October-November 
1998 (called immigrants). Once divided in this way, it is immediately no­
ticeable that nearly all forgotten households belong to the latter two classes 
- only 7 families out of the approximately 7800 ”1997” poor do not receive 
the treatment, although they comply with the program requirements.
I suggest to use the marginalization index at the village level to identify 
the potentially excluded villages in the control group. I compare the dis­
tribution of pre-program variables for forgotten households in control and 
treatment villages with the same marginalization level. There is a reduc­
tion in the number of statistically significant differences with respect to the 
pooled sample of eligible households. No immigrant is an actual beneficiary.
I discuss ways to estimate the program effect for the small fraction of 
non-compliers, having failed to find a set of variables that permit to identify 
a valid counterfactual among the control group.
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I provide an empirical application, estimating the effect of Progresa on 
school enrolment. Simple mean comparison of pre-program enrolment rates 
for forgotten households presented significant differences for households in 
control and treated villages, in three out of 27 cases. Conditioning on ob­
servables makes the differences not significant.
I present double-differenced estimates of the program T T E s  for the two 
groups of eligible poor. The conclusions reached are broadly consistent 
with those of the existing literature: Progresa improves school enrolment 
of children of all ages, but its largest impact is for older children, most 
likely secondary school pupils, and it is higher for girls than boys in its 
second year of implementation. The effect is not statistically significant 
for textitdensificados, although the point estimates are similar to the ones 
for 1997 poor. I explore the possibility that the effect of Progresa is lower 
for textitdensificados than for 1997 poor because the former group is less 
indigent than the latter, but poverty appears either unrelated or negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of school enrolment.
Both groups of poor households who do not receive the program for 
exogenous reasons have show no significant difference between treatment 
and control children.
4.6 A ppendix
The results of the comparison of the distribution of variables for densifi- 
cado beneficiary and forgotten households are reported below. Standard 
errors are computed accounting for clustering of observations at the village 
level. The following tables contain most of the variables from the 1997 sur­
vey (with few derived variables, such as domestic and international migra­
tion, household income, land size, household member age composition and 
child schooling and enrollment levels) and the consumption module from the 
March 1998 pre-program survey.
Only 1997 education-related variables are used, as it is feared that the 
March 1998 results may partially reflect some anticipation effect. School
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attendance may vary before the program implementation to insure that as 
many children are entitled to the subsidy. This includes strategic grade 
progression or failure.
I use the following tests: Pearson’s chi squared test of association, for 
categorial variables; Kolmogorov-Smirnov, for continuous variables; t-test, 
for dichotomous variables. P-values of the differences between treatment 
and control groups are reported in tables below.
The columns refer to the following subgroups: column (1) is for 1997 
poor. All other columns are for densificados. Column (2) compares benefi­
ciary and forgotten; column (3) beneficiaries and control groups; column (4) 
control and forgotten groups; columns (5) and (6) compare beneficiaries and 
forgotten with households in the control group who live in villages within 
the same marginalization index intervals; columns (7) and (8) compare for­
gotten and control households who live in the least poor and the poorest 
communities, respectively (using the marginalization index value -0.093 as 
threshold).
Child school enrolment variables are computed considering sons and 
daughters, nieces/nephews, grandchildren and great-grandchildren of house­
hold heads.
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Table 4.10: Mean comparison of individual and household-level variables,
1997 data
Variable P value
1-3 5-6 2-5 2-6 2-5cs 2-6cs 2-6J-.1
i-.l
2-6 
(—1;1.3)
Children age distr [0-17] 0.895 0.775 0.912 0.907 0.947 0.834 0.613 0.162
For children aged [6; 16]:
School attendance 0.468 0.029 0.465 0.150 0.130 0.046 0.544 0.000
Highest school grade 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.208 0.086 0.206 0.036 0.254
Highest grade (attendance) 0.061 0.010 0.004 0.127 0.186 0.136 0.044 0.260
Highest grade (no attendance) 0.235 0.000 0.004 0.148 0.567 0.193
Worked last week 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.242 0.077 0.233
For household heads:
Worked last week 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.024
Work frequency 0.000 0.047 0.006 0.095 0.000 0.254 0.347 0.004
Social security 0.323 0.103 0.003 0.002 0.489 0.003 0.001 0.012
Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.022 0.619 0.017
Age at first job 0.191 0.112 0.147 0.112 0.356 0.143 0.133 0.100
Ever migrated 0.624 0.704 0.153 0.253 0.000 0.065 0.154 0.099
Highest school grade 0.441 0.005 0.230 0.074 0.018 0.109 0.261 0.012
Household-level data:
p40al DIF grant 0.683 0.3896 0.083 0.586 0.276 0.081 0.000 0.031
p40bl Children solidarity grant 0.269 0.957 0.854 0.799 0.790 0.743 0.853 0.270
p40cl INI grant 0.491 0.706 0.268 0.495 0.097 0.349 0.868 0.209
p40dl PROBECAT grant 0.846 0.833 0.455 0.309 0.920 0.325 0.306 0.323
p40el PET 0.056 0.647 0.231 0.241 0.013 0.077 0.387 0.159
p40fl DIF breakfast 0.362 0.387 0.226 0.072 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.283
p41al free tortilla 0.871 0.318 0.048 0.881 0.060 0.921 0.477 0.314
p41bl LICONSA grant 0.884 0.977 0.816 0.861 0.953 0.680 0.453 0.000
p42a any blind 0.316 0.687 0.985 0.608 0.598 0.544 0.277 0.786
p42b any mute 0.366 0.631 0.227 0.399 0.580 0.195 0.271 0.283
p42c any deaf 0.997 0.238 0.460 0.618 0.506 0.722 0.474 0.569
p42d anyone with mental problem 0.366 0.931 0.302 0.311 0.116 0.299 0.567 0.876
p42e anyone with missing limbs 0.736 0.398 0.135 0.560 0.169 0.560 0.408 0.712
p42f anyone handicapped 0.723 0.374 0.561 0.729 0.275 0.856 0.213 0.149
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Table 4.11: Mean comparison of household-level variables, 1997 data
Variable P value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
p97 bf cb cf bcs fcs fl fr
p53 house type 0.000 0.647 0.244 0.315 0.498 0.260 0.219 0.141
p54 house tenancy 0.001 0.001 0.358 0.003 0.707 0.005 0.135 0.001
p55 Floor material 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.026 0.000
p56 Roof material 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p57 Walls material 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
p58 house room number 0.432 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.792 0.044 0.138 0.001
p59 water piping in land plot 0.061 0.062 0.352 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p60 water piping in house 0.893 0.567 0.912 0.386 0.281 0.346 0.103 0.071
p61 bathroom in the house 0.444 0.106 0.153 0.864 0.000 0.942 0.362 0.000
p62 bathroom with running water 0.887 0.390 0.173 0.534 0.911 0.400 0.289 0.038
p63 electric light 0.590 0.000 0.000 0.543 0.000 0.102 0.014 0.147
p64 electricity meter 0.838 0.800 0.509 0.634 0.357 0.413 0.345 0.901
p65a blender 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.497 0.000 0.970 0.001 0.350
p65b refrigerator 0.671 0.000 0.000 0.616 0.011 0.730 0.103 0.676
p65c gas heater 0.707 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.392
p65d gas water boiler 0.649 0.003 0.002 0.764 0.539 0.644 0.506 0.524
p65e radio 0.806 0.000 0.000 0.753 0.000 0.516 0.009 0.040
p65f CD player 0.883 0.167 0.227 0.843 0.493 0.860 0.389 0.549
p65g television 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.699 0.000 0.821 0.000 0.003
p65h VCR 0.285 0.019 0.082 0.647 0.384 0.699 0.256 0.833
p65i washing machine 0.581 0.003 0.007 0.516 0.001 0.223 0.094 0.498
p65j electric fan 0.175 0.321 0.167 0.761 0.026 0.199 0.233 0.461
p65k car 0.385 0.097 0.920 0.070 0.376 0.011 0.245 0.081
p651 van 0.941 0.032 0.981 0.009 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.001
p66 land ownership 0.327 0.566 0.328 0.739 0.013 0.262 0.282 0.000
p67 number of plots 0.021 0.825 0.683 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.984 1.000
land size 0.000 0.346 0.016 0.264 0.025 0.310 0.007 0.491
p71 animal ownership 0.244 0.598 0.979 0.599 0.607 0.188 0.000 0.000
p72a horses 0.379 0.069 0.196 0.450 0.844 0.301 0.249 0.571
p72b donkeys 0.789 0.004 0.243 0.079 0.370 0.025 0.702 0.000
p72c oxen 0.572 0.703 0.308 0.199 0.269 0.230 0.795 0.137
p73a lambs and sheep 0.111 0.997 0.493 0.418 0.352 0.432 0.612 0.954
p73b cows and veal 0.327 0.192 0.863 0.140 0.323 0.132 0.078 0.678
p73c hens 0.906 0.778 0.115 0.213 0.583 0.197 0.012 0.388
p73d pigs 0.744 0.562 0.066 0.208 0.030 0.255 0.021 0.098
p73e rabbits 0.669 0.480 0.351 0.026 0.299 0.041 0.150 0.182
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Household-level variables, continued
Variable P value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
p97 bf cb cf bcs fcs fl fr
Last week, how many days did you eat:
p034a01 tomato 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.176 0.014 0.111 0.053 0.548
p034a02 onion 0.964 0.139 0.005 0.126 0.023 0.117 0.018 0.264
p034a03 potato 0.692 0.004 0.001 0.462 0.994 0.310 0.254 0.026
p034a04 carrot 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.876 1.000 0.999 0.909 1.000
p034a05 green vegetables 0.886 0.792 0.104 0.844 0.995 0.508 0.142 0.056
p034a06 orange 0.010 0.488 0.669 0.584 0.000 0.671 0.465 0.000
p034a07 banana 0.012 0.780 0.072 0.001 0.017 0.001 0.057 0.000
p034a08 apple 0.995 0.004 0.005 1.000 0.922 1.000 0.967 1.000
p034a09 lemon 0.745 0.908 0.731 0.218 1.000 0.139 0.102 0.028
p034al0 other vegetables 0.385 0.008 0.062 0.851 0.015 0.851 0.774 0.140
p034b01 corn tortilla 1.000 1.000 0.998 1.000 0.969 1.000 0.855 0.999
p034b02 nixtamalque bread 0.982 0.994 0.620 0.999 0.995 0.952 0.625 0.999
p034b03 corn 0.578 1.000 0.996 0.833 0.188 0.775 0.641 0.049
p034b04 white bread 1.000 0.039 0.209 0.509 0.953 0.744 1.000 0.004
p034b05 sweet bread 0.989 0.058 0.955 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.088 0.184
p034b06 sliced bread 0.908 1.000 0.991 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.993
p034b07 wheat flour 0.721 0.813 0.988 0.994 0.921 0.993 0.964 0.162
p034b08 soup 0.614 0.364 0.754 0.671 0.890 0.790 1.000 0.989
p034b09 rice 0.976 0.114 0.022 0.912 0.146 0.861 0.050 0.637
p034bl0 crackers 0.040 0.002 0.867 0.020 0.034 0.049 0.969 0.317
p034bll beans 0.000 0.583 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.002
p034bl2 cereal 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p034c01 chicken 0.015 0.647 0.013 0.346 0.000 0.333 0.654 1.000
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Consum ption and expenditure, continued
Variable P value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
p97 bf cb cf bcs fcs fl fr
p034c02 beef/pork 0.830 0.697 0.314 0.999 0.103 1.000 1.000 0.983
p034c03 lamb/goat 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p034c04 fish 0.004 1.000 0.986 0.922 0.294 0.890 1.000 1.000
p034c05 tuna 0.974 1.000 1.000 0.848 0.841 0.842 1.000 1.000
p034c06 egg 0.699 0.015 1.000 0.000 0.838 0.000 0.000 0.756
p034c07 milk 0.183 0.000 0.004 0.264 0.565 0.489 0.861 0.037
p034c08 butter pork 0.238 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.280 0.094
p034d01 pastelitos 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.997 1.000 0.919
p034d02 soda 0.281 1.000 0.842 0.493 0.523 0.492 0.379 1.000
p034d03 alcoholic drinks 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.986 1.000 0.834 0.834 1.000
p034d04 coffee or tea 0.842 0.179 0.045 0.769 0.000 0.911 0.915 0.957
p034d05 sugar 0.977 0.946 0.563 0.999 0.689 0.981 1.000 0.754
p034d06 vegetable oil 0.250 0.912 0.667 1.000 0.362 1.000 0.554 0.557
How did you get the
p035a01 chili 0.460 0.512 0.046 0.274 0.002 0.267 0.704 0.002
p035a02 onion 0.482 0.002 0.020 0.122 0.001 0.160 0.949 0.005
p035a03 potato 0.049 0.089 0.025 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.424 0.006
p035a04 carrot 0.462 0.618 0.477 0.588 0.347 0.569 0.542 0.604
p035a05 green vegetables 0.434 0.328 0.468 0.344 0.531 0.330 0.268 0.638
p035a06 orange 0.564 0.092 0.508 0.184 0.000 0.269 0.259 0.000
p035a07 banana 0.021 0.000 0.295 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.766 0.096
p035a08 apple 0.774 0.905 0.790 0.495 0.827 0.484 0.187 0.461
p035a09 lemon 0.000 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.681 0.080
p035al0 other vegetables 0.156 0.744 0.009 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.095 0.195
p035b01 corn tortilla 0.429 0.004 0.660 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.774 0.256
p035b02 nixtamalque bread 0.242 0.277 0.198 0.249 0.017 0.292 0.160 0.951
p035b03 corn 0.694 0.176 0.871 0.216 0.052 0.198 0.786 0.384
p035b04 white bread 0.499 0.924 0.222 0.125 0.235 0.146 0.217 0.040
p035b05 sweet bread 0.322 0.784 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.072 0.140
p035b06 sliced bread 0.992 0.290 0.035 0.350 0.247 0.298 0.430 —
p035b07 wheat flour 0.677 0.177 0.315 0.401 0.453 0.385 0.326 0.694
p035b08 soup 0.812 0.044 0.768 0.150 0.731 0.128 0.195 0.452
p035b09 rice 0.973 0.478 0.451 0.179 0.586 0.190 0.288 0.554
p035bl0 crackers 0.071 0.297 0.513 0.366 0.509 0.260 0.238 0.161
p035bll beans 0.045 0.575 0.031 0.073 0.003 0.293 0.122 0.380
p035bl2 cereal 0.380 0.867 0.840 0.999 0.911 1.000 0.480 0.789
155
Consum ption and expenditure, continued
Variable P value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
p97 bf cb cf bcs fcs fl fr
p035c01 chicken 0.131 0.085 0.174 0.121 0.992 0.098 0.042 0.254
p035c02 beef/pork 0.968 0.855 0.292 0.356 0.358 0.345 0.162 0.283
p035c03 lamb/goat 0.268 0.098 0.008 0.497 0.065 0.512 0.547 0.523
p035c04 fish 0.570 0.003 0.146 0.222 0.499 0.167 0.724 0.387
p035c05 tuna 0.343 0.368 0.474 0.757 0.806 0.710 0.361 0.187
p035c06 egg 0.869 0.001 0.022 0.259 0.188 0.231 0.574 0.163
p035c07 milk 0.240 0.082 0.607 0.114 0.864 0.115 0.257 0.139
p035c08 butter pork 0.082 0.654 0.883 0.402 0.465 0.444 0.239 0.710
p035d01 pastelitos 0.832 0.365 0.703 0.338 0.352 0.340 0.364 —
p035d02 soda 0.238 0.411 0.534 0.657 0.194 0.700 0.977 0.464
p035d03 alcoholic drinks 0.432 0.290 0.188 0.652 0.399 0.634 0.001 0.040
p035d04 coffee or tea 0.426 0.000 0.000 0.289 0.017 0.328 0.899 0.423
p035d05 sugar 0.152 0.051 0.056 0.199 0.039 0.182 0.588 0.090
p035d06 vegetable oil 0.348 0.154 0.349 0.125 0.061 0.113 0.348 0.083
p036a01 chili 0.953 0.301 0.015 0.016 0.222 0.191 0.007 0.358
p036a02 onion 0.380 0.207 0.035 0.361 0.710 0.373 0.007 0.494
p036a03 potato 0.647 0.282 0.041 0.272 0.082 0.236 0.222 0.367
p036a04 carrot 0.197 0.794 0.655 0.681 0.583 0.688 0.550 0.783
p036a05 green vegetables 0.128 0.087 0.387 0.235 0.383 0.244 0.132 0.727
p036a06 orange 0.130 0.542 0.282 0.959 0.536 0.982 0.112 0.516
p036a07 banana 0.194 0.673 0.420 0.858 0.931 0.871 0.375 0.925
p036a08 apple 0.834 0.896 0.248 0.276 0.612 0.191 0.065 0.761
p036a09 lemon 0.867 0.315 0.068 0.552 0.378 0.569 0.305 0.218
p036al0 other vegetables 0.046 0.070 0.993 0.041 0.865 0.029 0.123 0.252
p036b01 corn tortilla 0.335 0.108 0.032 0.440 0.299 0.419 0.051 0.693
p036b02 nixtamalque bread 0.573 0.320 0.055 0.799 0.509 0.704 0.019 0.223
p036b03 corn 0.581 0.279 0.097 0.545 0.474 0.576 0.038 0.859
p036b04 white bread 0.024 0.759 0.859 0.948 0.485 0.921 0.662 0.766
p036b05 sweet bread 0.094 0.432 0.774 0.464 0.671 0.435 0.043 0.841
p036b06 sliced bread 0.396 0.932 0.136 0.116 0.338 0.120 0.360 0.057
p036b07 wheat flour 0.607 0.706 0.315 0.127 0.186 0.118 0.115 0.444
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Consum ption and expenditure, continued
Variable P value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
p97 bf cb cf bcs fcs fl fr
p036b08 soup 0.537 0.394 0.250 0.792 0.617 0.768 0.069 0.125
p036b09 rice 0.253 0.342 0.290 0.449 0.356 0.441 0.116 0.369
p036bl0 crackers 0.253 0.212 0.606 0.754 0.097 0.747 0.320 0.626
p036bll beans 0.160 0.058 0.017 0.347 0.212 0.332 0.082 0.614
p036bl2 cereal 0.656 0.562 0.890 0.538 0.288 0.563 0.620 0.348
p036c01 chicken 0.055 0.067 0.297 0.076 0.458 0.082 0.249 0.077
p036c02 beef/pork 0.321 0.315 0.117 0.305 0.258 0.315 0.090 0.370
p036c03 lamb/goat 0.628 0.421 — 0.282 — 0.287 0.335 —
p036c04 fish 0.311 0.304 0.336 0.095 0.776 0.108 0.036 0.675
p036c05 tuna 0.108 0.369 0.347 0.173 0.567 0.193 0.416 0.406
p036c06 egg 0.368 0.193 0.149 0.515 0.084 0.507 0.090 0.196
p036c07 milk 0.131 0.023 0.102 0.894 0.751 0.873 0.704 0.134
p036c08 butter pork 0.497 0.610 0.011 0.008 0.063 0.010 0.029 0.214
p036d01 pastelitos 0.359 0.004 0.462 0.087 0.831 0.103 0.312 0.468
p036d02 soda 0.097 0.310 0.301 0.812 0.114 0.840 0.725 0.954
p036d03 alcoholic drinks 0.743 0.918 0.166 0.129 0.859 0.108 0.015 0.590
p036d04 coffee or tea 0.579 0.192 0.454 0.552 0.238 0.539 0.141 0.199
p036d05 sugar 0.318 0.306 0.169 0.744 0.464 0.747 0.268 0.241
p036d06 vegetable oil 0.263 0.227 0.447 0.348 0.623 0.330 0.060 0.300
Last week, why didn’t you eat
p037a05 green vegetables 0.000 0.736 0.060 0.001 0.136 0.005 0.000 0.003
p037a07 banana 0.266 0.044 0.920 0.003 0.867 0.007 0.006 0.014
p037b09 rice 0.224 0.060 0.737 0.057 0.680 0.085 0.018 0.717
p037c01 chicken 0.008 0.124 0.141 0.000 0.341 0.001 0.014 0.003
p037c06 egg 0.078 0.333 0.760 0.217 0.329 0.335 0.446 0.007
p037c07 milk 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.096 0.017 0.023 0.081
p037d02 soda 0.082 0.019 0.060 0.001 0.128 0.005 0.004 0.922
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Consumption and expenditure, continued
Variable P value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
p97 bf cb cf bcs fcs fl fr
How much did you spend?
p038a how much did you spend? 0.735 0.000 0.137 0.005 0.011 0.017 0.265 0.030
p038b how much did you spend? 0.022 0.963 0.414 0.810 0.900 0.745 0.996 0.067
p038c how much did you spend? 0.053 0.117 0.008 0.783 0.045 0.676 0.959 0.344
p038d how much did you spend? 0.560 0.058 0.086 0.643 0.044 0.706 0.395 0.531
p039a how much do you owe of this? 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p039b how much do you owe of this? 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p039c how much do you owe of this? 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p039d how much do you owe of this? 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
p040 how many meals do you eat at home? 0.063 0.278 0.259 0.353 0.005 0.331 0.408 0.000
ep041 do all family members eat at home? 0.589 0.445 0.454 0.920 0.514 0.798 0.436 0.042
ep042 how many people eat outside? 0.904 0.002 0.608 0.005 0.654 0.011 0.019 0.573
Do those who eat outside
p04301 take any food 0.201 0.030 0.557 0.270 0.692 0.242 0.357 0.246
p04302 eat at relatives’ house 0.367 0.695 0.313 0.488 0.411 0.488 0.657 0.712
p04303 receive food as part of their salary 0.425 0.894 0.815 0.921 0.377 0.932 0.697 —
p04304 eat at school 0.022 0.138 0.478 0.231 0.251 0.254 0.534 —
p04305 receive food by anyone 0.234 0.454 0.349 0.167 0.377 0.173 0.376
p04306 buy it 0.193 0.199 0.491 0.504 0.623 0.512 0.281 0.272
p044 How much do they spend on food? 0.669 0.998 0.425 0.512 0.975 0.512 0.461 —
p045 How much can you spend per week? 0.034 0.048 0.039 0.887 0.292 0.927 0.121 0.628
p046 How much do you spend per week? 0.474 0.127 0.000 0.250 0.281 0.260 0.002 0.049
Consumption and expenditure, continued
Variable P value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
p97 bf cb cf bcs fcs fl fr
If you had more money, would you spend it in
p04701 food 0.110 0.003 0.067 0.082 0.001 0.123 0.004 0.231
p04702 fixing house 0.251 0.028 0.482 0.227 0.445 0.142 0.232 0.305
p04703 clothes or shoes 0.002 0.268 0.212 0.412 0.151 0.384 0.925 0.042
p04704 pay debts 0.427 0.521 0.541 0.106 0.187 0.084 0.986 0.019
p04705 alcoholic drinks 0.165 0.269 0.616 0.175 0.333 0.808 0.423 0.909
p04706 outings and entertainment 0.264 0.674 0.318 0.183 0.181 0.228 0.498 0.470
p04707 medicine 0.036 0.662 0.100 0.140 0.211 0.112 0.351 0.081
p04708 school supplies 0.352 0.659 0.380 0.747 0.094 0.758 0.969 0.136
p04709 toys 0.148 0.136 0.144 0.139 0.451 0.137 0.307 0.081
p04710 would save it rather than spend it 0.660 0.523 0.999 0.398 0.493 0.352 0.707 0.305
Expenditure last week
p04801 transport to school 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.991 1.000 1.000 1.000
p04802 transport to other places 0.093 0.770 0.006 0.081 0.302 0.060 0.227 0.012
p04803 cigarettes or tobacco 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.936
p04804 alcoholic beverages 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.927 0.999 0.790 1.000
p04805 non alcoholic beverages 0.124 0.330 0.013 0.649 0.000 0.708 0.996 0.232
Expenditure last month
p04901 personal and home hygiene 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.017 0.230 0.425
p04902 medicine 0.657 0.473 0.626 0.990 0.906 0.904 0.909 0.138
p04903 medical appointments 0.825 0.152 0.312 0.958 0.994 0.996 0.996 0.222
Expenditure in the last six months
p05001 pots and pans 0.064 0.671 0.904 1.000 0.202 1.000 0.159 0.138
p05002 toys for boys and girls 0.994 0.881 1.000 0.998 0.870 1.000 1.000 0.553
Consum ption and expenditure, continued
Variable P value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
p97 bf cb cf bcs fcs fl fr
p05003 clothes/fabric for girls 0.051 0.013 0.098 0.965 0.219 0.986 0.951 0.811
p05004 clothes/fabric for boys 0.011 0.005 0.009 1.000 0.428 1.000 1.000 0.863
p05005 clothes/fabric for women 0.355 1.000 0.577 0.298 0.409 0.308 0.211 0.334
p05006 clothes/fabric for men 0.892 1.000 0.477 0.319 0.428 0.217 0.027 0.633
p05007 shoes for girls 0.739 0.001 0.047 0.527 0.364 0.600 0.895 0.510
p05008 shoes for boys 0.063 0.000 0.001 0.999 0.012 1.000 1.000 1.000
p05009 shoes for women 0.008 0.184 0.953 0.423 0.066 0.627 0.510 0.926
p05010 shoes for men 0.004 0.871 0.898 0.615 0.871 0.811 0.274 0.823
p05011 things for school 0.363 0.251 0.943 0.714 0.528 0.888 0.630 0.990
p05012 cooperation in school 0.024 0.335 0.814 0.718 0.992 0.700 0.824 0.762
If you had more money, would you spend more on
p05101 food 0.247 0.085 0.058 0.762 0.003 0.700 0.470 0.259
p05102 fixing house 0.781 0.026 0.413 0.261 0.169 0.151 0.124 0.630
p05103 clothes or shoes 0.038 0.882 0.071 0.073 0.426 0.076 0.002 0.136
p05104 paying debts 0.176 0.507 0.257 0.487 0.623 0.410 0.069 0.503
p05105 buying animals 0.652 0.647 0.749 0.648 0.266 0.548 0.105 0.035
p05106 buying seeds/plants 0.001 0.399 0.959 0.106 0.894 0.135 0.025 0.466
p05107 tools 0.358 0.791 0.749 0.937 0.435 0.698 0.725 0.885
p05108 electrical appliances 0.884 0.866 0.853 0.922 0.387 0.616 0.811 0.358
p05109 alcoholic drinks 0.238 0.757 0.305 0.660 0.115 0.660 0.827 0.208
p05110 entertainment 0.382 0.518 0.536 0.493 0.699 0.500 0.420 0.854
p05111 medicine 0.041 0.133 0.125 0.659 0.009 0.465 0.035 0.010
p05112 things for school 0.364 0.274 0.888 0.142 0.443 0.102 0.643 0.030
p05113 toys 0.910 0.763 0.065 0.240 0.002 0.775 0.562 0.160
p05114 would rather save it 0.037 0.009 0.230 0.189 0.168 0.116 0.329 0.095
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Table 4.12: Mean enrolment by age groups, all children
1997 1998 1999
[6; 9] [10; 13] [14;16] [6;9] [10; 13] [14;16] [6; 9] [10; 13] [14;16]
Poor 1997
Control 0.991 0.864 0.441 0.987 0.881 0.450 0.982 0.884 0.483
0.096 0.343 0.497 0.115 0.323 0.498 0.132 0.320 0.500
Treatment 0.989 0.874 0.454 0.993 0.922 0.533 0.988 0.935 0.575
0.106 0.331 0.498 0.081 0.269 0.499 0.108 0.247 0.494
Densificados
Control 0.986 0.889 0.485 0.998 0.902 0.522 0.971 0.916 0.524
0.116 0.315 0.500 0.044 0.297 0.500 0.168 0.278 0.500
Treatment 0.983 0.891 0.437 0.991 0.913 0.515 0.972 0.928 0.524
0.128 0.312 0.496 0.097 0.282 0.500 0.165 0.259 0.500
Forgotten right
Control 0.989 0.881 0.476 0.998 0.897 0.539 0.973 0.916 0.530
0.106 0.324 0.500 0.046 0.304 0.499 0.162 0.278 0.500
Treatment 1.000 0.927 0.581 0.992 0.971 0.653 1.000 0.947 0.656
0.000 0.261 0.494 0.089 0.167 0.477 0.000 0.224 0.476
Forgotten left
Control 0.989 0.882 0.470 0.997 0.900 0.420 0.992 0.934 0.446
0.104 0.323 0.500 0.052 0.301 0.494 0.089 0.248 0.498
Treatment 0.994 0.880 0.433 0.980 0.879 0.470 0.995 0.879 0.475
0.076 0.325 0.496 0.140 0.326 0.500 0.067 0.326 0.500
Immigrants
Control 0.992 0.917 0.509 0.991 0.881 0.500
0.088 0.276 0.502 0.094 0.325 0.502
Treatment 0.989 0.918 0.500 0.994 0.908 0.529
0.107 0.276 0.502 0.080 0.290 0.501
Non poor
Control 0.994 0.886 0.407 0.984 0.900 0.472 0.990 0.889 0.505
0.078 0.318 0.492 0.125 0.300 0.500 0.101 0.314 0.500
Treatment 0.993 0.904 0.494 0.991 0.904 0.566 0.997 0.911 0.534
0.084 0.295 0.500 0.097 0.294 0.496 0.057 0.284 0.499
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Table 4.13: Mean enrolment by age groups, males
1997 1998 1999
[6; 9] [10;13] [14;16] [6:9] [10;13] [ 14; 16] [6:9] [10;13] [14,T6]
Poor 1997
Control 0.992 0.879 0.479 0.987 0.897 0.475 0.982 0.897 0.513
0.091 0.326 0.500 0.115 0.305 0.500 0.133 0.304 0.500
Treatment 0.987 0.892 0.489 0.995 0.936 0.561 0.989 0.945 0.578
0.115 0.310 0.500 0.073 0.244 0.496 0.104 0.228 0.494
Densificados
Control 0.997 0.934 0.486 0.996 0.908 0.556 0.967 0.931 0.584
0.058 0.249 0.501 0.061 0.290 0.498 0.179 0.254 0.494
Treatment 0.987 0.930 0.442 0.988 0.933 0.547 0.957 0.950 0.573
0.112 0.256 0.497 0.111 0.250 0.498 0.203 0.218 0.496
Forgotten right 
Control 1.000 0.930 0.479 0.996 0.902 0.569 0.972 0.925 0.589
0.000 0.256 0.500 0.064 0.298 0.496 0.165 0.264 0.493
Treatment 1.000 0.976 0.645 0.982 0.988 0.750 1.000 0.961 0.753
0.000 0.153 0.480 0.132 0.111 0.435 0.000 0.194 0.434
Forgotten left 
Control 0.984 0.897 0.463 0.995 0.874 0.391 1.000 0.923 0.428
0.125 0.305 0.500 0.074 0.333 0.489 0.000 0.268 0.497
Treatment 0.996 0.914 0.491 0.989 0.874 0.508 0.996 0.886 0.494
0.061 0.280 0.501 0.104 0.332 0.501 0.066 0.319 0.501
Immigrants
Control 0.985 0.925 0.556 0.985 0.904 0.508
0.121 0.265 0.502 0.121 0.296 0.504
Treatment 0.984 0.917 0.482 0.993 0.925 0.507
0.127 0.277 0.503 0.081 0.264 0.503
Non poor 
Control 0.992 0.879 0.426 0.972 0.906 0.479 0.989 0.901 0.521
0.087 0.327 0.495 0.165 0.293 0.500 0.107 0.300 0.500
Treatment 0.989 0.917 0.502 0.986 0.944 0.593 0.998 0.910 0.561
0.106 0.277 0.500 0.120 0.231 0.492 0.045 0.286 0.497
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Table 4.14: Mean enrolment by age groups, females
1997 1998 1999
[6;9] [10;13] [14;16] [6; 9] [10; 13] [14;16] [6;9] [10;13] [14; 16]
Poor 1997
Control 0.990 0.850 0.399 0.987 0.866 0.422 0.983 0.872 0.448
0.097 0.358 0.490 0.114 0.341 0.494 0.130 0.334 0.498
Treatment 0.991 0.855 0.411 0.992 0.906 0.498 0.987 0.923 0.574
0.096 0.352 0.492 0.088 0.292 0.500 0.113 0.266 0.495
Densificados
Control 0.976 0.846 0.484 1.000 0.896 0.490 0.975 0.898 0.455
0.153 0.362 0.501 0.000 0.306 0.501 0.156 0.303 0.499
Treatment 0.980 0.850 0.432 0.994 0.891 0.472 0.987 0.902 0.476
0.141 0.358 0.496 0.080 0.313 0.500 0.115 0.298 0.501
Forgotten right 
Control 0.977 0.834 0.471 1.000 0.892 0.509 0.974 0.905 0.462
0.149 0.373 0.500 0.000 0.312 0.501 0.160 0.294 0.500
Treatment 1.000 0.866 0.489 1.000 0.950 0.560 1.000 0.929 0.551
0.000 0.342 0.502 0.000 0.220 0.498 0.000 0.259 0.500
Forgotten left 
Control 0.994 0.863 0.476 1.000 0.927 0.453 0.985 0.945 0.471
0.076 0.345 0.500 0.000 0.260 0.499 0.123 0.228 0.501
Treatment 0.992 0.845 0.362 0.969 0.885 0.419 0.995 0.872 0.451
0.091 0.363 0.482 0.175 0.320 0.495 0.070 0.335 0.499
Immigrants
Control 1.000 0.910 0.467 1.000 0.862 0.491
0.000 0.288 0.503 0.000 0.346 0.505
Treatment 0.994 0.919 0.520 0.994 0.887 0.562
0.078 0.275 0.503 0.080 0.318 0.500
Non poor 
Control 0.995 0.893 0.385 0.997 0.895 0.464 0.991 0.877 0.493
0.068 0.309 0.487 0.055 0.307 0.499 0.095 0.329 0.501
Treatment 0.997 0.891 0.485 0.996 0.866 0.540 0.996 0.911 0.503
0.056 0.312 0.500 0.063 0.341 0.499 0.067 0.284 0.501
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